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Preparation of this document
This overview of social, economic and institutional aspects of an ecosystem approach 
to fisheries (EAF) was initially prepared to facilitate the work of the FAO Expert 
Consultation on the Social, Economic and Institutional Considerations of Applying the 
Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries held in Rome, Italy, from 6 to 9 June 2006. The report 
was used as the primary background material and source of concepts and references for the 
supplemental EAF guidelines discussed at the meeting. Comments and additional inputs to 
the draft were received during the meeting from the Expert Consultation participants.
The Annex “Process-oriented methodologies and information management tools for 
use in EAF implementation” was prepared by Patrick McConney (University of the West 
Indies) with Merle Sowman (University of Cape Town), Cassandra De Young (FAO) 
and Anthony Charles (St. Mary’s University), based on the original Expert Consultation 
background document and other references. John M. Ward (National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration – NOAA) provided the graphic “Interdependent influences 
of EAF management” during the Expert Consultation.
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Abstract
This document aims to provide a better understanding of the role of the economic, 
institutional and sociocultural components within the ecosystem approach to fisheries 
(EAF) process and to examine some potential methods and approaches that may facilitate 
the adoption of EAF management. It explores both the human context for the ecosystem 
approach to fisheries and the human dimensions involved in implementing the EAF. For the 
former, the report provides background material essential to understand prior to embarking 
on EAF initiatives, including an understanding of key concepts and issues, of the valuation 
of aquatic ecosystems socially, culturally and economically, and of the many policy, legal, 
institutional, social and economic considerations relevant to the EAF. With respect to 
facilitating EAF implementation, the report deals with a series of specific aspects: (1) 
determining the boundaries, scale and scope of the EAF; (2) assessing the various benefits 
and costs involved, seen from social, economic, ecological and management perspectives; (3) 
utilizing appropriate decision-making tools in EAF; (4) creating and/or adopting internal 
incentives and institutional arrangements to promote, facilitate and fund the adoption of 
EAF management; and (5) finding suitable external (non-fisheries) approaches for financing 
EAF implementation. 
De Young, C.; Charles, A.; Hjort, A.
Human dimensions of the ecosystem approach to fisheries: an overview of context, 
concepts, tools and methods.
FAO Fisheries Technical Paper. No. 489. Rome, FAO. 2008. 152p.
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Preface
The original version of this document was prepared as a background document for use by 
participants in the FAO Expert Consultation on the Social, Economic and Institutional 
Considerations of Applying the Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries (EAF) held in Rome 
from 6 to 9 June 2006. That first document was also used as the primary background material 
and source of concepts and references for the supplemental EAF guidelines (FAO Technical 
Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries No. 4 Supplement 3 – The human dimensions of the 
ecosystem approach to fisheries1) discussed at the meeting. The objective of this document, 
as with the Expert Consultation itself, is to provide a better understanding of the role of 
the economic, institutional, and sociocultural components within the EAF process, and to 
examine some potential methods and approaches that may facilitate the adoption of EAF 
management.
These goals, in turn, reflect the state of the world in terms of EAF implementation, as 
described in the Prospectus for the Expert Consultation:
The concept of an ecosystem approach to fisheries (EAF) is reaching a point of general acceptance by 
those involved in fisheries and their management. There is general agreement that fisheries management 
must incorporate the complicated and often not-well-understood links between human activities and the 
environment. However, although the EAF approach is now commonly discussed in international colloquia, 
and excellent guidelines have been produced, most discussion has revolved around biological and 
environmental components (or biotic and abiotic compartments) of EAF. As a primary goal of an ecosystem 
approach is “to balance diverse societal objectives”, social, economic and institutional information form an 
essential component of the information necessary for policy making. Such information is essential in order 
to evaluate the various benefits and costs related to any management decisions. Such benefits and costs 
include positive and negative externalities of ecosystem-based management as well as the benefits and costs 
directly incurred by individuals. 
In considering the interaction of social, economic and institutional factors with the EAF, 
four major “entry points” might be envisioned:
 1. social, economic and institutional factors are often driving forces behind the need for 
EAF management;
 2. the potential costs and benefits to individuals and society of applying the EAF will 
have social, economic and management components, as well as ecological ones;
 3. social, economic and institutional instruments are all useful in the application of 
EAF, and in particular are relevant in creating incentives for EAF adoption; and
 4. social, economic and institutional factors can all play roles in supporting or 
constraining the implementation of EAF management. 
In other words, social, economic and institutional elements can be simultaneously 
drivers, constraints and/or supports for EAF implementation and, in addition, there can 
be social, economic and institutional outcomes of that implementation. All of these “entry 
points” need to be taken into account in EAF discussions. 
 This document therefore attempts to compile a selection of available fishery-specific, as 
well as non-fishery specific, literature (and methods) relating to how economic, social and 
institutional aspects: (1) drive EAF; (2) are valued and distributed among direct and non-
direct users; (3) can be used as instruments in the application of EAF; and (4) are related 
to existing institutions. The document also explores possible means of financing the EAF, 
given that the costs and benefits related to EAF management have both private- and public-
good aspects at local, regional, and global levels. 
The document is divided into two main parts. The first part provides introductory 
and background material essential to understand prior to embarking on EAF initiatives. 
1  In preparation.
xThis material includes: (1) concepts, issues and considerations relevant to the EAF; 
(2) discussion of how aquatic ecosystems are valued, socially, culturally and economically, 
as well as the various non-market and market valuation techniques for assessing that value; 
(3) policy, legal, institutional; and (4) social and economic aspects relevant to the EAF, and. 
The second part covers the key issues facilitating the implementing the EAF: (1) defining 
the boundaries, scale, and scope of the EAF at hand; (2) the various benefits and costs 
involved in EAF, from social, economic, ecological and management perspectives, and 
the decision-making tools that can assist EAF implementation; (3) internal incentives and 
institutional arrangements that can be created and/or utilized for promoting, facilitating 
and funding the adoption of EAF management; and (4) external (non-fisheries) approaches 
for financing EAF implementation. The material presented in the two main parts of the 
report is complemented by an annex that reviews methods commonly used to meet two 
specific operational needs in EAF implementation – smoothly-running policy and planning 
processes and effective information acquisition and utilization. 
It should be noted that this report is designed to cover a wide range of topics accessible 
to those in all fishery areas and disciplines, rather than to reflect the detailed state-of-the-
art research on any one topic. Despite its breadth, however, there are certainly relevant 
topics not covered here. For a comprehensive treatment of the subject, the reader is 
encouraged to read this report in conjunction with the above-mentioned Guidelines as well 
as the FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries No. 4 – Fisheries management 
(1997 – hereafter, the FM Guidelines) and No. 4 Supplement 2 – The ecosystem approach 
to fisheries (2003 – hereafter, the EAF Guidelines) and the FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 
No. 443 – The ecosystem approach to fisheries: issues, terminology, principles, institutional, 
foundations, implementation and outlook (FAO, 2003a).
1PART I
The humAn ConTexT foR An 
eCosysTem APPRoACh To 
fIsheRIes

31.  Introduction and background
InTRoduCTIon 
In 2000, the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity1 (CBD) defined the 
ecosystem approach2 (EA) as “a strategy for the integrated management of land, water 
and living resources that promotes conservation and sustainable use in an equitable 
way” and chose the EA as the primary framework for the CBD implementation; 
stressing a multidisciplinary collaboration to achieve the CBD objectives.3 
In the fishery sector, the ecosystem approach has been similarly accepted as one of 
the key “vehicles” for developing and improving fisheries management. There have 
been, however, a multitude of variations on the definition of an EA; some have focused 
more on the natural science ecosystem components, while others stressed a more 
holistic and integrated (interdisciplinary) interpretation. In response to an international 
call for assistance to clarify what is meant by an EA in the fisheries context, the FAO 
published guidelines on the ecosystem approach to fisheries4 in 2003. 
Recognizing the wide range of interpretations of the approach, the FAO proposed the 
following definition, which is aligned with the more general EA but seeks a pragmatic 
balance by focusing the EAF on aspects within the ability of fisheries management 
bodies to implement, even while recognizing the fisheries sector’s responsibility in 
collaborating in a broader multisectoral application of the EA:
an ecosystem approach to fisheries (EAF) strives to balance diverse societal objectives, by taking 
account of the knowledge and uncertainties of biotic, abiotic and human components of ecosystems 
and their interactions and applying an integrated approach to fisheries within ecologically meaningful 
boundaries 
It is important to note that the concepts and principles of an EAF are not new – 
they are already either explicitly contained in a number of international and national 
instruments and agreements (e.g. as in the case of the CBD above) or implicitly 
manifested through local, regional, and international actions5 – whether or not these 
explicitly used the term “EAF”.6 
In particular, other sector-specific applications of the EA include those to urban 
management, to drylands, to forestry, and to human health. Each of these is naturally 
interpreted from the perspective of the particular sector – albeit generally incorporating 
the trio of ecological, social and economic considerations. For example, the ecosystem 
approach to human health incorporates “human health considerations into the dynamic 
interrelations of ecosystem analyses” and “places humans in the centre of a series of 
1 http://www.cbd.int and CBC (2000). Report of the fifth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23.
2 For an historical description of the EA, see FAO (2003b).
3 Which are “the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair 
and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, including by 
appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into 
account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate funding.”
4 FAO (2003); hereafter referred to as the EAF Guidelines.
5 For brief presentations on national and international efforts at implementing the EAF, see the report 
from the Seventh meeting of the United Nations Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans 
and the Law of the Sea (12-16 June 2006) available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/consultative_process/
consultative_process.htm.
6 Similar or related concepts include the ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM), environmental 
management, ecosystem management, sustainable management and biodiversity management.
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nested spheres, which can negatively and 
positively influence health and well being” 
as shown below.7
From the above discussion of EA 
and EAF concepts, the next step lies in 
understanding what the approach means 
in practice. This report is grounded in the 
belief that the application of the EAF must 
be holistic, integrated, participatory, and 
adaptive, and builds on the EAF Guidelines 
by providing here a focus on the human 
dimensions (i.e. political, legal, cultural, 
social, economic and institutional aspects) 
of such an application. 
Specifically, this report acknowledges 
the following “entry points” of human 
considerations – social, economic and 
institutional – into the implementation of 
an EAF:
1. Social, economic and institutional 
objectives and factors may be 
driving forces behind the need for 
EAF management;
2. The costs and benefits of applying the EAF, whether to individuals or to 
society, have social, economic and institutional impacts and implications;
3. Social, economic and institutional instruments are all crucial for successful 
implementation of the EAF; and
4. Social, economic and institutional factors present in fishery systems can play 
either supporting or constraining roles in EAF implementation. 
In other words, social, economic and institutional elements can be simultaneously 
drivers, constraints, and/or supports for EAF implementation, and in addition, there 
can be social, economic and institutional outcomes of that implementation. All of these 
“entry points” need to be taken into account in EAF discussions. 
Basically, the EAF takes place in the context of societal and/or community objectives, 
which inherently reflect human aspirations and values. As implementation of the EAF 
is a human pursuit, the social and economic forces at play need to be understood, 
the incentives and disincentives driving human behaviour need to be investigated, 
and actions need to be undertaken in terms of fishery governance and corresponding 
institutional arrangements – all so that management can induce outcomes in the fishery 
compatible with societal objectives.
In addition, although focusing on the fisheries sector, EAF will have inter and 
intra-sectoral process components that must be taken into account, even if beyond the 
scope of the fisheries managers’ direct responsibility. However, the more integrated 
or cross-sectoral the approach taken is, the more likely the attainment of sustainable 
development goals.
Certainly, the need to incorporate human components of the fishery system into an 
ecosystem approach is clear as humans are part of, depend on, and affect the ecosystem 
in which they live, work, and play. The challenge lies in implementation. This report 
seeks to provide support in meeting that challenge, by consolidating a range of available 
knowledge and experience relevant to EAF implementation, from social, economic and 
7 The Ecosystem Approach to Human Health and Neurotoxics Working Group – http://www.unites.
uqam.ca/neuro/.
FIGURE 1
framework for an ecosystem approach  
to human health
biosphere
global ecosystem
regional ecosystem
local ecosystem
community
home and workplace
biological factors
geo
phy
sics
ch
em
ica
l p
ol
lu
tio
n socio-political
situation
cultu
re
economics
health and 
well-being
Introduction and background 5
institutional viewpoints, and examining the manner by which these aspects can be 
practically incorporated, as well as highlighting the remaining gaps in both knowledge 
and implementation. 
undeRsTAndIng The ComPlexITIes And ConTexTs
In any given fishery in which implementation of EAF management is being planned, 
it is important to understand the current state of the fishery and its natural and human 
environment (the starting point) – the context in which EAF is being developed. This 
must be the first step in interpreting the EAF for the given situation. 
For example, knowing the context will help clarify if the particular EAF will be: 
incremental or wholesale, intersector or intra-sectoral, local or international, involving 
intensive scientific research or relying on the best available information, etc. Establishing 
this EAF context will involve not only understanding the fishery/ecosystem from both 
the natural science and human perspectives, but also society’s goals and values with 
respect to ecosystem goods and services; the socio-economic context (at the micro and 
macro levels) in which the fishery operates; the policy and institutional frameworks in 
place; as well as the political realities and power dynamics affecting the governance of 
resources. A good understanding of these issues and other realities surrounding the use 
of aquatic resources is essential to guide EAF policies, objectives and plans – in their 
absence, policies and plans may very likely fail to assist in the move towards sustainable 
fisheries.
The human aspects that play a role in determining an EAF include the power and 
governance structures in place, the economic “push” and “pull” mechanisms driving the 
fishing activities, the socio-cultural values and norms associated with fishing, and the 
external contexts (e.g. global markets, natural phenomena, emergencies, and political 
changes) that impact on our ability to manage our fisheries. Chapters 2 through 4 
describe many of the human dimensions and the techniques available assisting their 
evaluation, surrounding the EAF context.
The context also includes the motivation for the EAF. The list of potential factors 
driving fisheries managers, a community, or a society to adopt the EAF is as extensive 
and varied as the list of potential reactions to these drivers. These drivers may include 
human as well as biological factors, at any scale (from local to international), and may be 
reactionary or forward looking. For example, countries may be reacting to international 
treaties or conventions, to crises and conflicts within and around the fisheries, or to 
lobbying from special interest groups. Alternatively, countries may be adopting the 
EAF as part of a future framework for achieving sustainable development.
Key ConCePTs And Issues 
This part of the report discusses (i) the idea of an EAF management, highlighting 
the role of human aspects, (ii) key underlying issues in implementing the EAF (i.e., 
boundaries, scale and scope), and (iii) the relationship of the EAF to complementary 
approaches that also include broader looks at the components and interactions in the 
fishery (the livelihoods approach and integrated management). 
eAf management
The word “management” has been purposely left out of the term “EAF” as the 
approach is not limited to management but applies to policy, legal frameworks, 
development, planning, etc. However, some of the early motivation for the EAF lay in 
the recognition that single-species stock assessment and management (what is referred 
to in the EAF Guidelines as “Target Resource Oriented Management” or TROM) 
could be insufficient and that there was a need to look more broadly at the surrounding 
ecosystem – prey and predator species, oceanographic effects, environmental impacts 
of other human activities, etc. 
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This broadening of attention from individual species to multiple fish species and 
ecosystems includes the management of a range of human interactions with the fishery 
ecosystem, whether technical, economic, social or institutional. Furthermore, the EAF 
must deal to some extent with interactions with other uses of the aquatic environment, 
and with linkages throughout the fishery system (e.g. to the post-harvest sector and the 
socioeconomic environment of the fishery). 
Overall, then, the EAF must incorporate whatever ecosystem and human 
considerations are of direct relevance to fisheries management, i.e. which will typically 
need to be taken into account for effective fisheries management. This is not really any 
different from the situation in conventional fishery management, which also needs to 
take human considerations into account to be successful (even if this has not always 
been achieved – see, e.g. Charles, 1998a; Cochrane, 2000). However, as pointed out in 
the EAF Guidelines, the challenge is that much greater in EAF, given the consequent 
broadening of attention that is needed, to include aspects of ecosystems and of 
corresponding human elements. 
There has been some progress in meeting this challenge, both in terms of moving 
towards an improved understanding of social, economic and institutional aspects 
relating to fishery management (and EAF in particular), and in terms of developing 
tools and instruments to improve management by taking this understanding into 
account. On the other hand, even with conventional management and certainly with 
EAF, there remains a gap between words and deeds when it comes to incorporating 
such aspects into fishery management. One indication of this gap is the recurring 
pleas from social scientists, over the past several decades, for increased progress in 
this direction. 
The efforts of countries to address aspects of EAF have arisen in three main 
categories: 
1. Issue-based technically-oriented actions, such as: 
 • reducing the impacts on bycatch species;
 • increasing the selectivity and decreasing the harmful impacts of fishing gear;
 • protecting and restoring critical habitats and species interactions;
2. Implementation of institutional changes as part of national EAF measures, 
such as:
	 •	changing fisheries policies to include EAF and precautionary principles;
	 •	 increasing stakeholder involvement in fisheries management;
	 •	creating multidisciplinary and/or intersectoral advisory groups/committees;
	 •	 taking part in multicountry projects aiming at harmonizing management at 
the large marine ecosystem level;
	 •	using community-based management tools; and
3. Broadening the nation’s information systems to include:
	 •	multispecies or ecosystem models (looking at changes across the food web);
	 •	bio-economic models (looking at changes across the fish and the fishing 
industry);
	 •	 incorporated qualitative and quantitative models, such as people’s 
perceptions;
	 •	multidisciplinary information in risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses;
	 •	 local and/or traditional knowledge; 
	 •	 integrated indicator systems; 
	 •	participatory information systems.
While there seem to be few examples to date of a comprehensive adoption of the EAF 
in all aspects of the fishery system (i.e. from the policy realm to implementing adaptive 
management operationally, and also adjusting institutional and other supporting 
frameworks), there have been many incremental moves, and the momentum is building 
towards broader use of the EAF in many fisheries. 
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social, economic and institutional considerations in eAf
A wide range of social, economic and institutional considerations may be relevant to 
the implementation of an EAF: 
1. First, EAF must take place in the context of societal and/or community 
objectives, which inherently reflect human aspirations and values. 
2. Second, as EAF takes into account interactions between fisheries and 
ecosystems, this includes a wide range of complexities relating to human 
behaviour, human decision making, human use of resources, and so on. 
3. Third, implementing the EAF is a human pursuit, with implications in terms of 
the institutional arrangements that are needed, the social and economic forces 
at play, and the carrots (incentives) and sticks (e.g. penalties) that can induce 
actions compatible with societal objectives. 
Indeed, the latter aspect – that of institutional arrangements – highlights the need in 
EAF for structured decision making processes, grounded in the accepted set of societal 
objectives, and governed by a suitable set of operating principles – what has been 
referred to as a “fishery management science” approach (Lane and Stephenson, 1995). 
The fishery objectives being pursued underlie the criteria for judging success, which 
are in turn needed in order to decide on the best management approach. Parallel to the 
objectives are principles governing fishery management, which influence the choices 
made of policy and management measures to best meet the stated objectives – these are 
drawn from a range of sources such as national legislation, international conventions, 
and “approaches” including the precautionary approach and the ecosystem approach.
Such processes must take place in a world of complexity, and the hope is that 
EAF provides an effective vehicle to better recognize and address the wide range of 
complexities in fisheries, complexities that can bear directly on the success of fisheries 
management. Social, economic and institutional aspects contribute as much to the set 
of complexities faced within fishery management as do those relating to fish species and 
the aquatic environment itself. For example, a fishery typically faces the complexities 
of: (a) multiple and conflicting objectives; (b) multiple groups of fishers and fishing 
fleets and conflicts among them; (c) multiple post-harvest stages; (d) complex social 
structures, and socio-cultural influences on the fishery; (e) institutional structures, and 
interactions between fishers and regulators; and (f) interactions with the socioeconomic 
environment and the larger economy (Charles, 2001). 
eAf, the livelihoods approach and integrated management
The move towards a broader approach to fisheries management reflects the fundamental 
goal of sustainable development, in keeping with WSSD objectives. To this end, it is 
useful to look at the ecosystem approach 
to fisheries in comparison with two major 
multisectoral thrusts in global discussions 
relating to natural resource and spatial 
area management: the livelihoods approach 
and the integrated management approach. 
These complementary and overlapping 
approaches, and interactions with the EAF 
(Figure 2), are discussed in this section. 
The livelihoods approach 
Just as the ecosystem approach has 
developed from an understanding of the 
need to manage target fish stocks and fishing 
in the broader context of the ecosystem, 
similarly the livelihoods approach (Ellis, 
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2000; Allison and Ellis, 2001) grew from a recognition of the need to place fisheries 
in a larger context of households, communities and socio-economic environments. 
Adopting a livelihoods thinking into EAF implies that fisheries management must 
look at fishers and fishing fleets in the context of where fishers live, in households, 
communities and fishery-based economies – just as it deals with the fish in the context 
of where the fish live, the ecosystem. Fisheries management thus deals with the fishery 
as one of a portfolio of livelihood sources (if such alternatives exist) and as potentially 
linked, through livelihoods, to other economic sectors. 
A livelihoods approach can inform fisheries management in a number of ways, 
which may, if desired, be incorporated as well into EAF management: 
•	demographic: population and population trends, migration, age and gender 
structure;
•	 sociocultural: community objectives, gender roles, stratification, social cohesion;
•	 economic: income and its distribution, degree of fishery dependence, markets;
•	 institutional: community organization and infrastructure, involvement of 
women;
•	marine Infrastructure: wharves, markets;
•	 community infrastructure: cultural facilities, schools, religious institutions;
•	non-fishing activities: boatbuilding, agriculture, tourism, industry; and
•	policy: linking fishery objectives to broader regional and national policy goals.
Integrated management
Integrated management (whether of oceans, coasts, watersheds, etc.) is an approach, 
or mechanism, to manage multiple (competing) uses of a certain designated area – uses 
such as fisheries, aquaculture, forestry, oil and gas, mining, agriculture, shipping 
and tourism. This involves managing multiple stakeholders8 (e.g. local communities, 
industries) as well as interactions among people and ecosystems, and among multiple 
levels of government. The integrated management approach is typically characterized 
by attention paid to a multiplicity of resources (e.g. soil, water, fish stocks, etc.) and 
of habitats (e.g. open ocean, estuaries, wetlands, beaches, lakes, rivers, etc.), as well 
as a range of environmental factors (e.g. changes in water temperature, turbidity and 
acidity, chemical pollutants and water flows). 
Typically, integrated management – like the EAF and the sustainable livelihoods 
approach – involves processes for participatory decision making and conflict resolution, 
and requires a range of information on characteristics of the designated area, from the 
local climate and the state of the ecosystem, to the relevant natural resources, and the 
human community (cultural, economic, social). 
A key aspect of integrated management is the implementation of an institutional 
framework in which to manage the mix of components and interactions within 
the relevant system, incorporating these aspects within a wider context of human-
environment interactions, institutional linkages, multiuse conflict, multistakeholder 
governance systems and the like. This aspect of integrated management, involving 
institutional frameworks and managing multiple uses, is similar to that of EAF, but 
operating in a multisectoral context (i.e. fisheries together with other marine, coastal 
and/or watershed uses, such as shipping, mining, etc.), rather than solely within the 
fishery sector. Thus, EAF and integrated management are very much complementary, 
needing to operate in synchrony even while their scope differs with respect to what is 
being managed. 
8 The concept of stakeholders comprises all interested parties, whether they are classified as primary, 
secondary or tertiary stakeholders.
Introduction and background 9
ConClusIons
Adoption of EAF management will, on the one hand, ensure that we take into account 
impacts of the broader fishery system (the ecosystem and relevant human elements) 
on fishery management, and at the same time, ensure that the broader consequences 
of management actions are assessed. The boundaries, the scale of management, and 
the scope of that management are all crucial factors to consider in implementing EAF 
management in practice. The EAF deals with the “bigger picture” around fisheries, 
specifically to allow us to encompass relevant factors affecting and interacting with 
management from across the fishery system and beyond. EAF management: (1) looks 
at managing target fish species and fishing activity within the context of the ecosystem; 
(2) looks at the fishery within a larger context of households, communities and the 
socioeconomic environment (with support from the livelihoods approach); and 
(3) considers fishery management in a broader institutional context of managing 
multiple resource uses (feeding into and interacting with integrated management 
approaches). 
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2.  human values of ecosystem 
services
InTRoduCTIon
That ecosystems provide services9 to human beings (e.g. food, recreation, water, 
aesthetics) is indisputable. The question of whether and how to formalize the values 
of these services to society remains a difficult and, at times, controversial subject. This 
chapter will present briefly: 1) an overview of potential services provided by ecosystems; 
2) an overview of the various classifications, from the point of view of economists, of 
the values that humans may attribute to these services; 3) the methodologies in use to 
estimate these values, qualitatively or otherwise; and 4) how this information can help 
in implementing the EAF.
eCosysTem seRvICes
Ecosystem services are a sub-set of the intricate workings of ecosystems in that they 
are those benefits, both tangible and intangible, provided by ecosystems for which 
there is an explicit demand by humans (MEA, 2005a)10. Trying to make sense of and 
organize conceptually the myriad of such services provided would be a complicated 
task for any natural resource manager. Fortunately, in undertaking a global review of 
ecosystems and their services, the Millennium Assessment (MEA, 2005a) has reviewed 
various classifications of ecosystem services and suggested a set of four, sometimes 
overlapping, categories:
•	Provisioning – the products obtained from ecosystems, including food and 
fibre, fuel, genetic resources, bio-chemicals, natural medicines, pharmaceuticals, 
ornamental resources, and fresh water;
•	Regulating – the regulation of ecosystem processes including those relating to 
air quality, water, climate, human diseases, erosion, biological controls, and storm 
protection; 
•	Cultural – the nonmaterial benefits people obtain from ecosystems through, 
for example: spiritual enrichment, cognitive development, reflection, recreation, 
and aesthetic experiences, including cultural diversity, spiritual and religious 
values, knowledge systems, educational values, inspiration, aesthetic values, social 
relations, sense of place, cultural heritage values, and recreation and ecotourism; 
and
•	Supporting – the benefits “that are necessary for the production of all other 
ecosystem services. They differ from provisioning, regulating, and cultural 
services in that their impacts on people are either indirect or occur over a very 
long time.” 
Fishery-related ecosystem services would be a further sub-set relating to the 
ecosystem services of importance to fisheries. The definition of this sub-set would be 
context specific and could range, depending on the scope of the EAF, from being very 
9 The term “services” includes tangible goods (food, water, etc.) as well as intangible services (cultural, 
ecological, etc.).
10 Boyd et al. (2004) note that “it is the services created by ecological characteristics that will be explicitly 
tied to social value” and make the distinction that “ecosystem services are the outcomes of ecosystem 
functions that yield value to people.”
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narrow, only including aspects of the target and related species, to a broader inclusion 
of the entire gamut of ecosystem services, however linked to the fisheries at hand. 
Ideally, one should move as far towards the latter definition as possible, to incorporate 
as integrated an EAF implementation as possible. When making decisions about certain 
fisheries, fisheries managers and other stakeholders would need to know the impacts of 
their decisions (or lack of decisions) on other sectors and/or benefit holders, in terms 
of the stream of services provided. Activities meriting management could include, for 
example, (1) upstream agriculture runoffs impacting the fishery ecosystem’s ability to 
regulate water quality and hence support abundant populations of the targeted species, 
or (2) destructive fishing practices, such as dynamite fishing harming coral systems, 
which negatively impact the tourism sector or other members of the community who 
benefit from the coastal region.
Every time a decision is made, whether it be to start, stop, or change an activity, the 
decision will impact the stream of services provided by the natural system and, either 
directly or indirectly, human welfare. Behind any decision, there may be winners and 
there may be losers in terms of welfare and there will certainly be tradeoffs. Decision-
makers in fisheries need to understand what services the aquatic ecosystems provide, 
to whom (e.g. the fisheries, the communities and economies dependent on them, and 
others who hold value for these services), and how the distribution of these services 
will change once the decision is implemented. 
The vAlue of eCosysTem seRvICes To humAn well-beIng
Just as it is useful to categorize ecosystem services to aid in understanding what they 
are, so too is it useful to categorize the types of values individuals and societies hold for 
these services. An attempt at such a categorization is presented in Figure 3, providing 
TV
categories
Example
Fisheries
ecosystem
services
Common
valuation
method
USE VALUE NON- USE VALUE
Direct use value
Consumptive, 
non consumptive
Indirect use 
value
Option and 
quasi-option
Bequest value
Existence
•Habitats and biological 
regulation
•Employment/livelihoods
•Food chain/global life 
support
•Transportation
•Local/National/Int’l 
relations
•Intrinsic 
preservation
•Biodiversity
•Social Identity
•Religious and 
cultural identities
• Capture/Recreational/
Aquarium fishing (food, 
income)
•Ornamental resources
•Medicinal resources
•Tourism/Recreation
•Culture/heritage/spiritual
•Science and Education
•Preservation for future 
uses
•Stewardship
•Precautionary or 
risk/uncertainty 
reduction
•Future knowledge 
potentials
M, P, HP, TC, CV, 
CJ, Ranking
AC, P, CV, CJ, Ranking AC, CV, CJ, Ranking CV, CJ, Ranking
FIGURE 3
Total value of a fisheries ecosystem
Sources: adapted from MEA, 2005b; Farber et al., 2006
Notes: M = market methods, P = Production approaches, HP = Hedonic Pricing, TC = Travel Cost, CV = Contingent Valuation, CJ = 
Conjoint analysis, AC = Avoidance Cost
Human values of ecosystem services 13
a schematic framework for the various categories of values that humans may hold for 
ecosystem services. 
The framework is divided into use values and non-use values for a particular 
ecosystem’s services. Use values occur when individuals and societies derive benefits 
and, hence, have value for ecosystems services they use or interact with directly, such as 
for food, for recreational activities and relaxation, and for other tangible products that 
come from these ecosystems (direct use). Non-use values, on the other hand, reflect 
situations in which we value the services indirectly for their supporting and regulating 
functions, such as maintaining water quality and community traditions (indirect use). 
Individuals and societies also value ecosystems for what they represent for the 
future. Some may value today the knowledge that their grandchildren will benefit 
from these services and others value having resources available in the case they 
become necessary for their direct use in the future (referred to as “option value”). In 
addition, some value the services independently of anyone’s current or future uses 
of these services (“existence values”). This category represents a philosophical value 
of the inherent right of ecosystems and communities to exist now and in the future. 
This perhaps vague but very important value can reflect the idea that each part of the 
ecosystem exists for a reason, whether we are aware of the reason or not, and therefore 
should be valued as part of the ecosystem. 
The above framework may assist in determining the list of ecosystem services 
potentially affected by management actions. In this regard, two points should be noted. 
First, it is important to differentiate between the values of a given individual, and those 
collective values of a community, or of society as a whole. Second, one can expect 
debates to occur over the balancing of the various values described here – use, non-use, 
existence and option values. Overall, the key act of bringing together the multisectoral, 
multidisciplinary stakeholders involved, to identify the various values linked to an 
ecosystem and to consider which are likely to be affected by management decisions (and 
how) is one step in understanding the interactions of the fishery and its ecosystem.
The next step in the management process stems from limitations imposed by two 
realities: 1) that financial and human resources are not unlimited, and 2) that often we 
cannot improve everything all the time (i.e. there will be tradeoffs attached to each 
decision). Because of such constraints, decision-makers need some way of prioritizing 
the changes to the various ecosystem services. 
There exist techniques to identify the EAF “issues” and risks in specific fisheries and 
to determine preliminary priorities for those issues, such as check lists and problem/
component trees combined with risk assessments11,12. Component trees assist in 
organizing the scoping and understanding of the services provided by ecosystems. For 
example, a top level of the tree may branch out into three categories: ecological well-
being, economic well-being, and ability to achieve; followed by successive branches 
organizing ecosystem services further, such as in Figures 4a and 4b. Stakeholders would 
use these trees to organize their thoughts regarding the ecosystem in question.
Once the (probably) large number of services has been identified, some sort 
of prioritization would need to take place before investing in additional analyses. 
Fletcher et al. (2002) propose analysing the magnitudes and probabilities of change in 
services from implementing a management decision (or not) through risk assessment 
techniques. This risk assessment would help pull out the relatively highly important 
services that would require immediate additional consideration.
11 For example, see the methods used in the ecologically sustainable development (ESD) process for 
fisheries in Australia; http://www.fisheries-esd.com.
12 The EAF Guidelines promote this approach and it has been used by FAO in a number of case studies, 
including the Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem programme. In addition, the FAO is developing 
more globally applicable problem trees based on the Australian ESD trees.
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Fishery ecosystem
Ecosystem Well-being Human Well-being Ability to achieve
Retained species
Non -retained species
General Ecosystem
Indigenous
Community
National
Governance
Exogenous Impacts
FIGURE 4A
Top level component tree for understanding the contributions of a fishery ecosystem to well-being
Source: Adopted from Fletcher et al., 2002
Community Well-being
Industry Community
(i.e. people directly employed and families)
Local/regional Communities
(as relevant to particular fishery) 
Fishery/Industry Dependent/sensitive communities Less dependent/sensitive communities
Economic benefits
Income
Lifestyle
Work-related injuries
Attachment to lifestyle
Industry structure
Employment
Distribution
Community A Community B Community A Community B
Resource Dependency
(e.g. employment economics)
Social capital
Other values (e.g. 
positive/negative feelings)
Other values
FIGURE 4B
lower level component tree for understanding the contributions of a fishery-related ecosystem  
to socio-economic well-being
Source: Fletcher et al., 2003
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The following section describes 
some of the methods (quantitative 
and qualitative) available for further 
analysis in order to assist decision-
makers when contemplating 
management actions.
meThodologIes foR 
AssessIng The vAlue of 
fIsheRIes eCosysTems
As it is impossible to maximize all 
societal objectives concurrently, 
tools are necessary to describe the 
social, economic, and environmental 
tradeoffs involved with each 
management alternative. For example, 
in Figure 5, three management 
alternatives are presented in terms of 
their attainment of environmental, social and economic goals. Each alternative has its 
own mix of impacts. In order to make comparisons among the possible alternatives, it is 
useful to have a standardized basis for comparison between two or more states of goods 
and services provided by an ecosystem. This section presents a few methods commonly 
used in economics to provide standardized information for decision making.
Given that the cost-benefit framework13 is currently the most common method for 
comparing alternatives in decision making, the issue of standardizing the values of 
services becomes imperative, as important values may be ignored if they are not placed 
into the cost-benefit language. The rational for this economic valuation14 approach 
includes the assumptions that 1) in the absence of such valuations, potential changes in 
ecosystem services may be otherwise attributed either a zero or an infinite value in a 
cost-benefit analysis decision-making process; 2) such an approach provides a common 
unit of measurement (either monetary or ranking) for understanding the contribution 
of fisheries ecosystems to human well-being and understanding the potential tradeoffs 
among these contributions linked to management choices; and, 3) human beings make 
decisions in line with the incentives they face, so understanding such incentives would 
enable decision makers to understand current fishery ecosystem use choices and 
potential changes in these choices if such incentive structures evolve.15
Figure 3 above, matched the use and non-use categories of ecosystem services with 
a few of the common methods used to evaluate these services. These methods may 
be grouped into (1) those that estimate a monetary value for a service and (2) those 
that do not attempt to place a nominal value but try to provide relative values. The 
former group estimates how much people are willing to pay for a service or a change 
in a service and include market-based as well as non-market-based methods. Market-
based values are relatively easier to estimate, as quantitative values exist already in one 
form or another, although they may require some filtering in order to isolate the value 
of the service at hand. For example, the value of a healthy bay may be nested within 
the real estate values surrounding the bay. Additionally, the value of a fishery may be 
theoretically reflected in the value of the use rights to the fishery.
13 See Chapter 6 for further details on cost and benefits related to the EAF as well as cost-benefit 
analyses.
14 Economic valuation differs from other disciplines’ values (e.g. ecological value) in that it is focused on 
human preferences and is measured in terms of how much individuals are willing to forego in other goods 
and services to obtain a given good or service (Lipton et al., 1995). 
15 See Chapter 7 for a discussion on the use of incentives for obtaining management objectives.
Economic Objectives Attainment
Social Objectives AttainmentEnvironmental Objectives
Attainment
Current Scenario
Alternative Scenario 1
Alternative Scenario 2
FIGURE 5
example tradeoff representations of alternative  
management scenarios
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Non-market-based methods are necessary when the ecosystem service in question 
is not traded in a market. Examples of such services include the cultural identity 
of coastal communities, the preservation of ecosystems for their intrinsic value, or 
changes in water quality. Although without established prices, these services may be 
highly valued. Non-market based methods tend to focus on creating fictional markets 
for the service in question in that people are asked to contemplate how much of market 
BOx 1
sample methodologies for assessing value of fisheries ecosystems  
to human well-being
Conventional economic valuation
Revealed-preference approaches
Travel cost: Valuation of site-based amenities are implied by the costs people incur to 
enjoy them (e.g. improved sports fishing activities, whale watching);
Market methods: Valuations are directly obtained from what people must be willing to pay 
for the service or good (e.g. ecolabelling price differentials, increased value of a fishery);
Hedonic methods: The value of a service is implied by what people will be willing to pay 
for the service through purchases in related markets, such as housing markets (e.g. vessel 
purchases, housing purchases on coastal areas and waterfronts); and
Production approaches: Service values are assigned from the impacts of those services on 
economic outputs (e.g. increased efficiency from bycatch reduction methods, improved 
CPUE in a fishery).
Stated-preference approaches
Contingent valuation: People are directly asked their willingness to pay or accept 
compensation for some change in ecological service (e.g. coastal reef preservation, 
endangered species protection); and
Conjoint analysis: People are asked to choose or rank different service scenarios or 
ecological conditions that differ in the mix of the conditions (e.g. marine protected areas 
with varying levels of permitted human activities).
Cost-based approaches
Replacement cost: The loss of a natural system service is evaluated in terms of what it 
would cost to replace that service (e.g. alternative coastal livelihoods); and
Avoidance cost: A service is valued on the basis of costs avoided, or the extent to which it 
allows the avoidance of costly averting behaviours, including mitigation (e.g. participatory 
fisheries management reduces conflicts, health benefits of fish products).
Non-monetizing valuation or assessment
Individual index-based methods, including rating or ranking choice models, expert opinion 
(e.g. expert review of sea turtle stocks, their conservation, status, and major threats).
Group-based methods, including voting mechanisms, focus groups, citizen juries, 
stakeholder analysis (e.g. fisheries management advisory councils, GIWA LME 
assessments).
Notes: Examples have been changed to reflect fisheries aspects. For a concise review of these methods 
including limitations, see Pagiola et al. (2004). 
Source: Farber et al. (2006). 
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goods, which have established prices, they would be willing to forego in exchange for 
the service. For example, an individual can conceptualize foregoing a meal in order to 
support the conservation of a marine mammal. If on average, this person spends $30 on 
a meal, they would be willing to pay $30 for the conservation activity.
Non-monetary methods focus on the relative values of services in that they provide 
information regarding one ecosystem service relative to another ecosystem service (e.g. 
it would be more detrimental to well-being to lose service A than service B).
 The box below lists some of the methodologies in use for assessing values of 
fisheries ecosystems to human well-being. Each approach is replete with its own set of 
limitations, criticisms, and cost implications, and the application of each will depend 
on the specific issue at hand. Appendix 2.1 provides examples of fisheries-related case 
studies in which these methodologies have been applied. These examples have been 
chosen to represent the wide-range of methodologies and their application to multiple 
fisheries-related issues; however, they do not fully represent the limitations and 
assumptions associated with each methodology. 
how eCosysTem vAluATIon CAn helP In ImPlemenTIng The eAf 
Such valuation methods would provide nominal or relative value estimates, which would 
then be incorporated into a broader evaluation or into decision-making mechanisms, 
such as cost-benefit analyses, indicator frameworks, national accounting systems, 
asset mapping, and bio-economic models. As mentioned previously, such mechanisms 
would allow the decision-makers to better understand the social, environmental, and 
economic tradeoffs related to any management alternatives. The use of such broader 
evaluation mechanisms in EAF management will be discussed in Chapter 6. A complete 
review of conceptual and practical issues regarding cost-benefit analyses with special 
regard to the environment may be found in Pearce et al. (2006). 
There are various caveats to emphasize. First, the valuation of many ecosystem 
services, especially non-market benefits, is complicated and often costly and will not 
resolve all decision-making questions. Many, indeed, are ethically opposed to the idea 
of placing a value on the ecosystem or on cultural values. Furthermore, other ethical 
issues, such as balancing existence and bequest values against use values, or treating the 
winners and losers of management measures equally, may remain at the discretion of 
decision-makers. Second, many of these methods are based on individual preferences 
and values, which are then aggregated by the number of individuals “affected”. This is 
not necessarily the same value as a societal value of a service.
ConClusIons
The EAF calls for the inclusion of a wide range of ecosystem services in planning, 
management, and development. Many methods exist for assisting in deepening 
our knowledge of the value of ecosystem services to individuals, communities, and 
societies. These values may then be placed into the appropriate decision-making 
tools in order to understand the possible trade-offs and impacts of the management 
options under evaluation. Unfortunately, such information comes at a price; therefore, 
proper thought and planning are necessary before investing in the data collection and 
analysis process. Included within this planning is the explicit identification by fisheries 
managers of their objectives and needs with respect to data collection in the search for 
the most appropriate (and least cost) methods for obtaining these data.
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APPendIx 2.1
examples of the use of valuation tools in fisheries
Case study – Contingent valuation: economic value of non-commercial fish
Situation – Rivers in the Four Corners Region (United States of America) provide 
2 465 river miles of critical habitat for nine species of fish that are listed as threatened or 
endangered. Continued protection of these areas required habitat improvements, such as 
fish passageways, as well as bypass releases of water from dams to imitate natural water 
flows needed by fish. A contingent valuation survey was used to estimate the economic 
value for preserving the critical habitat. 
Application – Survey respondents were provided detailed maps that highlighted the areas 
designated as critical habitat units for the fish. They were told that some State and Federal 
officials thought the combined costs of the habitat improvements and the restrictions 
on hydropower were too costly and had put forward a proposal to eliminate the critical 
habitat unit designation. They were asked if they would contribute to the Four Corners 
Region Threatened and Endangered Fish Trust Fund. 
Respondents were also told that efforts to raise funds would involve contributions 
from all United States taxpayers. If a majority of households voted in favor of the fund, 
the fish species would be protected from extinction. This would be accomplished through 
water releases from Federal dams timed to benefit fish, and through the purchase of water 
rights to maintain instream flows. Also, within the next 15 years, three fish species would 
increase in population to the point that they would no longer be listed as threatened 
species. 
On the other hand, if a majority of households in the United States voted not to 
approve the fund, the critical habitats shown on the map would be eliminated. This would 
mean that water diversion activity and maximum power production would reduce the 
amount of habitat for these nine fish species. Respondents were told that if this occurred, 
biologists expected that four of the nine fish species would likely become extinct in 15 
years. 
The exact wording on the questionnaire was: Suppose a proposal to establish a Four 
Corners Region Threatened and Endangered Fish Trust Fund was on the ballot in the next 
nationwide election. How would you vote on this proposal? Remember, by law, the funds 
could only be used to improve habitat for fish. If the Four Corners Region Threatened 
and Endangered Fish Trust Fund was the only issue on the next ballot and it would cost 
your household $______ every year, would you vote in favor of it? (Please circle one.) 
YES / NO 
The dollar amount, blank in the above illustration, was filled in with one of 14 amounts 
ranging from $1–$3 to $350, which were randomly assigned to survey respondents. 
Results – The questionnaire was sent to a random sample of 800 households in the Four 
Corners states of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah (with the proportions based 
on the states’ relative populations). An additional 800 households were sampled from 
the rest of the United States. The average willingness to pay was estimated to be $195 
per household. When extrapolated to the general population, the value of preserving the 
habitat areas was determined to be far in excess of the costs. 
Source: King and Mazotta, Undated.
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Case study – Conjoint analysis: choice management of the  
Peconic estuary system, new york
The situation – The environmental and natural resources of the Peconic Estuary System 
(United States of America)—the bay waters, beaches, wetlands, ecosystems, habitats, and 
parks and watershed lands—provide many services to the public. The Peconic Estuary 
Program was established under the National Estuary Program, to create a conservation 
and management plan for the environment and natural resources of the Estuary. 
The challenge – In order to develop a management plan that best serves the public, 
information was needed about the value that the public holds for the ecosystem services 
of the Estuary. 
The analysis – Several studies were conducted to estimate the uses and economic 
values associated with the Estuary, including a contingent choice survey to estimate the 
relative preferences and economic values that residents and second homeowners have for 
preserving and restoring key natural and environmental resources: open space, farmland, 
unpolluted shellfish grounds, eelgrass beds, and intertidal salt marsh. 
The results – Early discussions revealed that the public has a strong attachment to 
environmental and amenity resources of the Peconic Estuary, even if they do not use 
these resources directly. Most respondents to the survey (97 percent) supported at least 
one hypothetical action to protect resources, and indicated they would financially support 
such actions. The relative priorities of respondents for protecting natural resources, 
in order, were for farmland, eelgrass, wetlands, shellfish, and undeveloped land. The 
estimated per acre dollar values were about $13 000 for undeveloped land, $30 000 for 
unpolluted shellfish grounds, $54 000 for saltmarsh, $66 000 for eelgrass and $70 000 for 
farmland. The survey results indicated that the resource priorities, or relative values of 
resources, are more reliable than are the dollar estimates of values, and thus the researchers 
recommended that relative values, rather than dollar values, be used in the process of 
selecting management actions. 
Source: King and Mazotta, Undated.
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Case study – Production function: mangrove-fishery valuation  
in southern Thailand
“The undervaluation of natural products and ecological services generated by mangrove 
ecosystems is a major driving force behind the conversion of this system into alternative 
uses.” (Rönnbäck, 1999)
The situation – In recent decades, over 1975–1993 the area of mangroves has virtually 
halved, from 312 700 hectares (ha) to 168 683 ha. Although the rate of mangrove loss has 
slowed, in the early 1990s the annual loss was estimated to be around 3 000 ha/year for all 
of Thailand, and 1 200 ha/year in Surat Thani province. The Gulf of Thailand mangroves 
are thought to provide breeding grounds and nurseries in support of several species of 
demersal fish and shellfish, mainly crab and shrimp.
The analysis – To analyse the impact of mangrove deforestation on these fisheries in Surat 
Thani, harvesting in both demersal and shellfish fisheries was assumed to follow a Cobb–
Douglas function of the level of fishing effort and mangrove area. A separate harvesting 
function was assumed to apply to demersal fish as opposed to shellfish. A panel analysis 
was conducted to estimate the effort function for all shellfish and all demersal fish in the 
Gulf of Thailand. The analysis combined harvesting, effort and mangrove data across all 
five zones of the Gulf of Thailand and over the 1983–93 time period. The cost functions 
derived for each fishery were used to estimate the likely welfare impacts of a change in 
mangrove area in Surat Thani, assuming alternatively open access and managed fishery 
conditions.
The results – For all mangrove-dependent fisheries, the value of a change in mangrove 
area ranged from US$33-110/ha, depending on whether the fisheries are open access or 
Managed and the demand elasticity. Given an annual loss of 1200 ha of mangroves in Surat 
Thani, which was approximately the annual rate of mangrove conversion recorded in the 
early 1990s in the province, the economic loss in terms of support of the Gulf of Thailand 
fisheries in Zone three was estimated to be around US$100 000 per year, if these fisheries 
were optimally managed. Under open access conditions, this economic loss ranges from 
US$40 000 to US$132 000, depending on demand elasticities.
These partial results should then be placed within a multiple-use, multiple-objective 
context in which the benefits and costs of alternative land-use choices may be evaluated 
and compared.
Note: For a discussion of the value for seafood production (aquaculture and capture-based) of mangroves, 
see Rönnbäck (1999).
Source: Barbier, 2000
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Case study – destruction and loss costs of coral reefs in the Philippines
•	 Healthy coral reefs can produce, on a sustainable basis, 20 tonnes or more of fish 
and other edible products per square kilometer per year; once destroyed by use of 
dynamite or cyanide for fishing, production is reduced to less than 4 tonnes/km2/yr. 
The sustainable catch from a good reef over ten years is about 200 tonnes while a 
destroyed but recovering reef catch over the same period is only 72  tonnes – the loss 
being 128  tonnes of fish with an estimated value of US$192 000 (US$19 200 yearly) 
at current (year 2000) market prices for reef fish.
•	 The net present value of benefits per km2 from blast fishing to individuals over 25 
years (assuming a ten percent discount rate each year) is only US$14 600. This small 
gain is compared to losses of: US$400 000 from loss of tourism potential, more than 
US$190 000 from loss of coastal protection and about US$108 000 from foregone 
sustainable fishery income, all dependent on a healthy coral reef.
•	 Bacuit Bay, Palawan was the subject of a study that determined that over a ten-
year period reef fisheries and tourism would generate US$41 million more than 
logging the forests in the watershed affecting the bay. Logging in this case caused 
sedimentation that would have destroyed the coral reefs for both fisheries and 
tourism in the bay. 
Source: compilation of studies by White et al., 2000
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Case study – Travel cost estimation: oyster reef restoration project  
in Chesapeake bay
The situation – For nearly half a century, oyster harvests (and stocks) have been declining 
in both Maryland and Virginia (United States of America). Three factors have led to the 
decline of the oyster: over harvest, disease, and sedimentation. Because of the decline in 
oyster stocks, today’s harvests are one percent of levels forty years ago. Closely associated 
with the decline of the oyster population is the destruction of three dimensional oyster 
reefs due to commercial harvest of oysters for their meat, the harvest of oyster shell as 
road substrate, and the clearing of navigational obstructions. In response, the states of 
Maryland and Virginia in cooperation with the United States Federal Government have 
been investigating several options to restore the oyster populations; one of which is the 
creation of artificial reef substrate combined with an aggressive seeding program. The high 
costs related to reef creation are relatively easy to estimate (almost US$15 000/acre for a 
total of approximately US$30 million) but the benefits (e.g. oyster resource, finfish habitat 
improvements, overall ecosystem productivity) are more difficult to evaluate. Therefore, 
estimates of the benefits of reef restoration are necessary to determine a positive benefit-
cost ratio of such projects.
The analysis – A subset of the beneficiaries of an improved oyster reef project included 
angler reef fishers through potentially improved catch or water quality. The study first 
linked the policy variable (creation of oyster reefs) to anglers’ preferences for fishing, then 
use a travel cost model to estimate the willingness to pay per trip for an oyster restoration 
project under two scenarios: the first in which historical catch rates do not change and 
the second in which stock level increase. In both cases, it is assumed that the number of 
trips/angle would remain constant.
The results – Total annual willingness to pay by recreational fishers in the Chesapeake 
Bay was estimated for the two scenarios at approximately US$638 000 and $5 000 000, 
respectively. Under the first scenario, the anglers’ willingness to pay would cover 50 
percent of the total restoration costs within thirty years. Under the second scenario 
(albeit highly speculative) the full restoration costs would be covered within less than five 
years. 
Source: Hicks et al., 2004
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Case study – group-based evaluation of ecosystem services:  
Plum Island, massachusetts (united states of America)
The situation – Natural and human-based changes have affected the capacity of an 
estuarine drainage basin to provide ecosystem services, such as gas, disturbance, and water 
regulation, water supply, food production, recreation, aesthetics, and spiritual and holistic 
services. Several management alternatives could be used to address various objectives each 
with related tradeoffs, such as increasing water supply while maintaining adequate river 
flow, preserving open space, and maintaining a productive estuarine clam fishery. Two 
such alternatives are analysed through a services-based approach: business as usual and 
replumbing sewer and stormwater systems.
The analysis – The effects on ten ecosystem services are scored from -3 to 3 for both the 
business as usual and the replumbing alternatives. Weights, from 0 to 3, are used to rank 
each service in terms of its importance. A “value” of each service change is then estimated 
as the weighted sum of the changes in services.
The results – While the total score for each scenario was negative (-94 for business as 
usual and -67 for replumbing), the results suggested that replumbing, which would allow 
continued suburbanization but with adequate river flow, avoids more losses in services 
than the business as usual scenario. Specific valuation of each service would need to be 
undertaken; however, such a matrix allows for a relatively inexpensive ranking of scenarios, 
importance weighting of ecosystem services, and the inclusion of both quantifiable and 
non-quantifiable values.
Source: Farber et al., 2006
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3.  Policy, legal and institutional 
frameworks
PolICy fRAmewoRKs AffeCTIng eAf
The ecosystem approach to fisheries is not an end in itself, but rather a mechanism 
intended to help better achieve societal objectives through producing more responsible 
fisheries, and in particular through broadening conventional fisheries management into 
an integrated, participatory framework that takes better account of the interaction of 
fisheries with aquatic ecosystems, as well as with interacting human uses. 
As such, EAF interacts with other approaches that have been implemented, or 
are emerging, in the world’s fisheries – such as the precautionary approach and co-
management approaches – as well as interacting with international conventions (such 
as the Convention on Biological Diversity), regional initiatives (such as Regional 
Fisheries Management Bodies) and particular national legal and regulatory frameworks. 
This section reviews some of these interactions, from the perspective of policy 
considerations, while the following section of this chapter focuses on institutional 
aspects of the relevant linkages. 
The specific policy frameworks and approaches discussed here are:
•	Millennium Development Goals
•	Precautionary approach
•	Management and co-management approaches 
•	 International policy frameworks
•	“Pro-poor” policies 
millennium development goals
The Millennium Development Goals impact significantly on policy priorities globally, 
in particular renewing the focus on seeking an appropriate balance of human 
development and environmental conservation – a balance that developed from the 
Brundtland Commission and on through the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, now 
being reflected in the Goals themselves:
•	Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
•	Achieve universal primary education 
•	Promote gender equality and empower women 
•	Reduce child mortality 
•	 Improve maternal health
•	Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases 
•	Ensure environmental sustainability 
•	Develop a global partnership for development 
Implementation of EAF fits closely within the balance noted above, in that it seeks 
(1) to ensure the sustainability of fishery use, i.e. of the benefits to people accruing 
through fishery activities, in particular by ensuring that fishing practices do not 
compromise ecosystem health and by limiting negative impacts on fishery ecosystems 
arising from outside the fishery sector, while (2) being implemented in keeping with 
societal objectives, however defined (and often reflecting many of the above Millennium 
Development Goals, such as poverty reduction and food security). 
While EAF is certainly broadly compatible with these goals, it is nevertheless 
important to assess the benefits and costs of EAF implementation with respect to 
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these goals. In other words, any given policy or operational management mechanism 
to implement EAF may have positive impacts on one or more of the goals, but may 
also have costs involved. A wide range of possibilities may arise. It is possible, for 
example, that an initiative to protect a depleted population of a certain species, through 
EAF measures, would produce positive results in terms of goal #7 (Environmental 
sustainability), but may restrict harvesting activities so that (at least in the short term) 
the catch of other species is reduced, which could have a negative impact on goals #1 
and #4 (Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, Reduce child mortality). Alternatively, 
a “win-win” EAF measure, such as reducing unwanted bycatch in offshore fishing 
activities, may be positive on all counts – improving environmental sustainability 
while also improving the food supply in the short term (there being immediately more 
fish available to small-scale coastal fishers) and in the long term (with less pressure on 
bycatch species, leading to stock rehabilitation). 
Precautionary approach
The precautionary approach (Garcia, 1994; FAO, 1995a) provides a policy and 
management framework for dealing with the various forms of uncertainty faced in 
fisheries management (Francis and Shotton, 1997; Charles, 1998b and 2001). Aspects 
of this range from appropriate risk assessments to robust and adaptive fishery 
management methods, to appropriate institutions capable of implementing such a 
management approach. As FAO (1995a, p.6) notes:
Management according to the precautionary approach exercises prudent foresight to avoid 
unacceptable or undesirable situations, taking into account that changes in fisheries systems are only 
slowly reversible, difficult to control, not well understood, and subject to change in the environment 
and human values.
Precautionary management involves explicit consideration of undesirable and potentially unacceptable 
outcomes and provides contingency and other plans to avoid or mitigate such outcomes. Undesirable 
or unacceptable outcomes include overexploitation of resources, overdevelopment of harvesting 
capacity, loss of biodiversity, major physical disturbances of sensitive biotopes, or social or economic 
dislocations. Undesirable conditions can also arise when a fishery is negatively influenced by other 
fisheries or other activities and when management fails to take action in the face of shifts in the 
external conditions affecting, for example, the productivity of the fish stocks.
Some aspects of implementing the precautionary approach are analytical in nature. 
For example, a major focus of attention in fisheries has been on efforts to operationalize 
the precautionary approach in terms of determining and setting suitable limits on catch, 
fishing mortality or fishing effort. This involves a combination of risk analysis and 
risk management, with methods such as management procedures providing analytical 
frameworks to support the implementation of a precautionary approach. 
Equally important is the implementation of the precautionary approach at a policy 
level. This deals not with analytical matters but rather with the various assumptions 
and approaches underlying fishery decision making – and how to determine suitable 
“rules” governing decision making (as opposed to decision rules per se). This involves 
questions of the burden of proof and the standard of proof, the latter relating to “the 
responsibility for providing the relevant evidence and the criteria to be used to judge 
that evidence” (FAO 1995, p.6). Specifically, “the standard of proof to be used in 
decisions regarding authorisation of fishing activities should be commensurate with 
the potential risk to the resource, while also taking into account the expected benefits 
of the activities”. 
Properly putting the precautionary approach into practice requires new information 
and research. For example, the FAO (1999a) has described a number of implications on 
the work of Regional Fishery Bodies, e.g. that “uncertainty should be systematically 
investigated”, “outputs should be identified corresponding to objectives”, “target and 
limit reference points should be established”, “robustness of management regime to (a) 
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overfishing and (b) environmental change should be assessed” and “contingency plans 
should be developed”.
The link between the precautionary approach and the ecosystem approach is a 
logical one: the first calls for suitable use of precaution in decision making, while the 
second calls for suitable breadth in what is considered within the decision-making. 
Together, the two approaches imply a significant challenge – to assess and manage a 
set of uncertainties and risks, but at a broader scale and with a broader scope, covering 
a range of possibilities larger than what would have been considered in conventional 
fishery management. 
A key benefit of this combination lies in the inherent desirability of integrating 
approaches for addressing two major realities of fisheries – uncertainty (the precautionary 
approach) and complexity (the ecosystem approach). On the other hand, there can be 
costs as well. One such cost arises as a result of combining the greater information 
needs implied in implementing EAF management (relative to conventional fishery 
management) and the reality that such a level of information is often unavailable. In 
this case, the manner by which one applies the precautionary approach becomes a key 
issue. For example, in the extreme, being highly precautionary within a situation of 
great ignorance (e.g. a lack of information on all aspects of the ecosystem) could be 
accompanied by the risk of high costs arising from foregone economic activity and 
livelihoods, and lowered food security. 
From the perspective of social, economic and institutional considerations involved 
in EAF implementation, the precautionary approach implies a need to take into 
account a broad set of risks, including (a) those that might arise in fishery use, in terms 
of environmental impacts, (b) those posed by aspects outside the fishery, such as other 
economic sectors, but which might impact negatively on the fishery, and (c) those 
that arise in EAF implementation itself, such as the risk of possible negative social or 
economic impacts from changes initiated to meet EAF goals. 
management and co-management approaches
The nature of fishery management systems evolves over time, drawing on lessons from 
history and on trends in management and governance in the broader society. Four aspects 
of management and governance, and their interaction with EAF implementation, are 
noted here: the particular jurisdiction that is responsible for management, the degree 
of centralization or decentralization of management, the degree of integration within 
the management approach, and the breadth of participation of stakeholders in fishery 
management. 
1. There are many variations around the world in how fisheries management 
fits within a governmental system. In many locations, fisheries management 
is a national responsibility, and is found within a ministry of fisheries, or as a 
component of a ministry of agriculture. In other locations, fisheries management 
may be a responsibility at a provincial/state level, or (as for coastal fisheries in the 
Philippines) at a local, municipal level. Whether or not fishery management – or 
at least some management functions – has been partly or largely devolved to 
industry or community entities (see below), government will be involved in a 
coordinating or policy-level role, and in particular, within EAF management, 
there is an important role in interdepartmental and/or intergovernmental 
linkages with respect to the impact of fisheries on the aquatic environment and 
the impacts of other aquatic (and land-based) activities – from aquaculture and 
shipping to tourism and agriculture – on fish stocks and on fisheries. There are 
implied benefits from such policy and operational coordination, although it is 
important to assess the costs involved in this as well. 
2. The ecosystem approach to fisheries management must be able to be 
implemented both in fisheries that are managed by a central agency and 
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ones in which management is decentralized, as well as combinations in-
between. However, whether the fishery management system is centralized or 
decentralized, it still must deal with ecosystems of varying sizes and scales – it 
is not the case that central management need only deal with larger-scale 
ecosystems, or conversely, that a decentralized management arrangement must 
only deal with smaller-scale ecosystems (e.g. on a more local basis). The fact 
is that any management system will need to approach EAF implementation 
based on the scale needed to address each problem arising. This certainly 
has implications for the linkage between decisions about boundaries (for 
ecosystems versus for jurisdictions) and about scale (how large should be the 
area considered in an EAF process, to be compatible with both the ecosystem 
realities and the management regime in place?). This in turn implies a need – 
whatever the degree of management centralization – for mechanisms to scale-
up or scale-down management decision making. There will also be questions 
of the efficiency of the management arrangement – which may interact in 
rather complex ways with the level of centralization and the level of EAF 
implementation. In any case, EAF is applicable to all fisheries systems, and 
its implementation must be compatible with a recognition of the variety of 
different fishery systems that exists.
3.  The structure of the fisheries management agency, and the fisheries science 
infrastructure, must be taken into account in considering EAF implementation. 
The FAO approach to EAF implementation has been to build on existing 
management structures and processes. The nature of these existing structures 
and processes will affect the benefits and costs, and the time frame, of EAF 
implementation. For example, if management and/or scientific aspects are 
carried out on a species-by-species basis, a mechanism is needed either 
to transform this into an ecosystem approach, or to “scale down” EAF 
implementation to provide some elements of an EAF even within a single-
species approach to management and science. A shift from a single-species to a 
multiple-species approach is to be encouraged, but there may be constraints to 
this that cannot necessarily be overcome in the short term. 
4.  Also relevant to EAF implementation is the degree of stakeholder involvement 
in the fishery management system. The FAO Guidelines on EAF call for the 
use of participatory approaches within EAF management, but the degree to 
which this exists varies from fishery to fishery – according to the extent to 
which co-management and participatory research have been introduced. The 
idea of co-management is the creation and implementation of management 
arrangements through which a set of agreed-upon stakeholders – fishers, fisher 
organizations, communities, corporations, nongovernmental organizations 
or other entities – share decision making and management functions with 
government, and work jointly to develop and enforce fishery regulations and 
management measures (Charles, 2001). There are many nuances to the co-
management concept, some displayed in the following mutually-compatible 
descriptions of co-management: 
…an arrangement where responsibility for resource management is shared between the 
government and user groups. (Sen and Nielsen, 1996, p. 406)
…the collaborative and participatory process of regulatory decision-making among 
representatives of user-groups, government agencies and research institutions. (Jentoft et 
al., 1998, p. 423-4)
…various degrees of delegation of management responsibility and authority between 
the local level (resource user/community) and the state level (national, provincial/state, 
municipal). (Pomeroy, 1995, p. 150)
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…a partnership arrangement using the capacities and interests of the local fishers and 
community, complemented by the ability of the government to provide enabling legislation, 
enforcement and conflict resolution, and other assistance. (Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997, 
p. 465)
Those involved in co-management have both rights and responsibilities, with 
the rights in this case being management rights – the right to be involved in design 
and implementation of management measures. The motivation for co-management 
initiatives includes their potential (1) to reduce conflict between stakeholders and 
government, as well as between stakeholders themselves, by clearly defining rights and 
responsibilities, by providing an institutional forum for discussion among decision 
makers, and by encouraging support for the management process, and (2) to build a 
conservation ethic, by bringing fishers and others into the decision making process, so 
they share responsibility for sustainability in the fishery.
The co-management approach can be applied at any scale, from that of a single 
component (fleet sector, gear type, geographical area) of a single fishery, through to 
multistakeholder multiresource multiuse situations, as arise within the context of 
integrated management. Implementation of EAF – typically involving interactions 
of a fishery with its environment, interactions among a range of fisheries, and/or 
interactions with sectors impacting on (and affected by) the fisheries – thus can utilize 
a co-management approach, albeit with potentially greater challenges than might be 
faced in a simpler within-fishery context. 
These challenges may arise through the need to develop suitable policy for 
cooperative management within an enlarged forum (e.g. between fisheries rather than 
only within a single fishery), as well as suitable institutions within which this can occur. 
Of course, it should be noted that even in a management system operating completely at 
the governmental level (i.e. without co-management) similar issues of coordination arise 
with respect to implementation of EAF, since – as noted earlier – multiple ministries of 
government will need to interact together (even if EAF is led by a fisheries agency). 
International policy frameworks
Some policy initiatives discussed above – notably the Millennium Development 
Goals and the precautionary approach – arise from or are closely related to 
international conventions or policy discussions. Certainly, a number of international 
conventions, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, influence the fishery 
policy environment. However, as noted in FAO (2005a):
At the international level, EAF is reflected mainly in voluntary instruments such as the Rio 
Declaration, Agenda 21, the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, the Reykjavik 
Declaration and the 2002 Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development. 
Also relevant to EAF implementation are UNCLOS and the UN Fish Stock 
Agreement, as well as the World Trade Organization and a range of trade agreements. 
At the regional level, the various regional fishery bodies (RFBs)/regional fishery 
management organizations (RFMOs) play a key role in EAF implementation on 
scales above the national. In recent years, RFBs have begun incorporating references 
to the EAF in their Conventions or Agreements16, creating subcommittees and 
working groups on the EAF, implementing regional EAF projects, and co-operatively 
developing and adopting EAF objectives; however, progress has been slow towards 
incorporating EAF considerations into RFB decision-making (FAO, 2007a).
16 Note that the 1980 Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) 
Convention comprised many of the EAF principles.
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 Since EAF management requires changes to conventional fishery management 
approaches, whether those changes are incremental or not, it is clear that at regional 
and global levels, in addition to those at the national and sub-national levels, there 
will be a need to assess a range of benefits and costs in order to determine how, when 
and to what extent EAF management is implemented. There may also be a need for 
adjustments to legal instruments at each of these scales, to enable adequate realization 
of EAF management. At all scales, these changes will imply certain costs being incurred, 
as well as a need for adequate time for implementation. 
“Pro-poor” policies
The FAO (2005b) has produced, as part of its Technical Guidelines for Responsible 
Fisheries, a document on Increasing the contribution of small-scale fisheries to poverty 
alleviation and food security. This describes considerations relating to small-scale 
fisheries and their role in poverty alleviation and food security, including a range of 
supportive “pro-poor” policy directions. The document notes that: 
Small-scale fishing communities are faced with an array of serious problems, including overexploitation 
and depletion of resources, lack of alternative sources of employment, rapid population growth, 
migration of populations, displacement in coastal areas due to industrial development and tourism, 
pollution and environmental degradation and conflicts with large commercial fishing operations. 
However, small-scale fisheries are critical for food security and poverty alleviation in many 
countries. 
Of relevance to the ecosystem approach to fisheries is the emphasis in the Guidelines 
on a broad view of the fishery; noting, for example “the importance of considering 
cross sectoral uses of fisheries and related resources, the special role of women in fish 
marketing, processing and value addition, the significant scope for trade…”.
The 2005 Guidelines present many policy directions for “pro-poor policies”, noting 
that “all of these issues may need to be legislated for to ensure that certain rights are 
enshrined in law for small-scale fishers and fishworkers so that they cannot be eroded 
through social, economic and political marginalization” (p. 27). Of particular relevance to 
how EAF is developed is the statement: “The increasing importance of decentralization 
in many regions of the world is worthy of special mention in the legislative context. It 
is important in bringing decision-making closer to the poor and therefore increasing the 
likelihood of success of pro-poor policies and programmes” (p. 29). 
InsTITuTIonAl And legAl fRAmewoRKs AffeCTIng eAf
In moving from conventional fisheries management towards an ecosystem approach 
to fisheries management, some changes to current institutional and legal frameworks 
are likely necessary. In this document, the term “institutional framework” refers to 
both the set of rules governing fisheries resources use and the specific organizational 
arrangements involved in the formulation and implementation of fisheries resources 
laws, policies, strategies and programmes. These changes include ways of taking 
account of, and dealing with, the increased scope of this management approach. Such 
an increased scope conveys the need for:
•	 increased coordination, cooperation and communication within and among 
relevant institutions and resource user groups in the planning process and in 
implementation; 
•	more information regarding the ecosystem and the factors affecting it; 
•	 incorporation of uncertainties into the decision-making process due to the increase 
of factors (predator-prey relationships, nearby activities such as agriculture, and 
their impact on the ecosystem etc.) causing uncertainties; and
•	ways of involving the broadened definition of stakeholders in the decision-making 
and management. 
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good governance
Guiding the prospective adaptation of the institutional and legal frameworks, to an 
ecosystem approach to fisheries management, should be the idea of “good governance”. 
Governance is a term describing how political, economic, administrative and other 
forms of power or authority is exercised to manage a country’s resources and affairs. 
Thus governance comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which 
citizens and groups voice their interests, mediate differences, exercise their legal rights 
and meet their obligations (AusAID, 2000). This broad term is used to explain, amongst 
other things, to what extent governments are accountable to, and allow participation 
by, the public (Coffey, undated). 
While the concept of “governance” is descriptive, the idea of “good governance” 
is standard-setting, i.e. normative in nature. The exact meaning of “good governance” 
varies according to the policy area in question but the general principles of good 
governance are seen to involve (UNESCAP, 2007; OECD, 2007): accountability; 
transparency; responsiveness; effectiveness and efficiency; rule of law. The OECD 
(2007) expands on these five aspects as follows:
•	Accountability: the governing body should be able and willing to show the extent 
to which its actions and decisions are consistent with clearly-defined and agreed-
upon objectives.
•	Transparency: the governing body’s actions, decisions and decision-making 
processes should be open to an appropriate level of scrutiny by other parts 
of government, civil society and, in some instances, outside institutions and 
governments.
•	Responsiveness: the governing body should have the capacity and flexibility to 
respond rapidly to societal changes, and take into account the expectations of 
civil society in identifying the public interest, and should be willing to critically 
re-examine the role of the governing body.
•	Efficiency and effectiveness: the governing body should strive to produce quality 
public outputs, including services delivered to citizens, at the best cost, and ensure 
that outputs meet the original intentions of policymakers.
•	Rule of law: the governing body should enforce equally transparent laws, 
regulations and codes.
Further principal elements of “good governance” are: consensus-orientation, 
participation, equality and inclusiveness, decentralisation (UNESCAP, 2007; Coffey 
Undated), and forward vision, the latter implying the governing body’s ability to 
anticipate future problems and issues based on current data and trends and develop 
policies that take into account future costs and anticipated changes (e.g. demographic, 
economic, environmental, etc.) (OECD, 2007).
Good governance is an element needed in implementation of EAF management. 
In fisheries, where management and exploitation occur largely out of public view 
and scrutiny (even given that the fishery is often managed by the public sector), 
accountability is of great importance. As a means of ensuring accountability, access to 
information and transparency in policy are critical. This access is also a precondition 
for meaningful public participation in decision-making. Policy effectiveness can be 
improved by decentralised management, as measures can be tailored to local needs and 
increased opportunities be given local stakeholder participation in decision-making 
(Coffey, Undated). In terms of the legal framework for good governance within 
fisheries management, the FAO Code of Conduct on Responsible Fisheries, although 
non-binding, refers to the need for increased transparency within the decision-making 
processes and to ensure that timely solutions to urgent matters are achieved. In 
addition, states are called upon to facilitate consultation and effective participation in 
decision-making (Article 6 of the Code) (Coffey, Undated).
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nested institutions
If governance describes how a resource sector, fisheries in this case, is governed, and 
the principles of good governance suggest the ways in which a resource ought to be 
governed, then an understanding of how institutions interrelate is vital in moving 
forward. Such an understanding will assist in highlighting negative interrelationships 
as well as the interrelations that contribute positively to governance.
It is suggested that institutions operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction (Scott, 
1995, in Hersoug, 2004) and that they work at different levels of society. Because they 
are linked to each other, and thus form networks, they should be analysed as open 
systems, which receive impulses from the outside, i.e. from other institutions, in the 
form of impacts, resources and ideas (Scott 1992, in Hersoug, 2004). As they do not 
“exist in a cultural, social and institutional vacuum”, institutions are never fully self-
controlled (Hersoug, 2004: p. 212). This conclusion is of importance when considering 
institutional adaptation to EAF management, as any successful change requires 
understanding of how the institutional system really works and which factors need to 
be considered.
An institutional system can be divided into two levels – a practical level and a 
higher, political level. Institutional change may originate at both levels. If, for example, 
technological change has undermined established institutions at the practical level, 
corrective actions may be needed at the political level. More general institutional 
reform may originate at the political level, which could convey changes to institutions 
at the practical level which were, in their original form, considered legitimate by their 
main users. Sometimes a required reform at the practical level needs to await a shift 
at the political level in order to take place. Institutional change may also occur at the 
practical level, without it being noticed or sanctioned at the political level. Importantly, 
however, there will be rules structuring the relationship between the levels, deciding 
for example which issues at the practical level will be considered at the political level, 
the procedures for this, who is allowed to participate in decision-making, etc. (Holm, 
1995). 
A high degree of interconnectedness between institutions can produce dynamic 
change patterns – changes in one part of the system may have effects on other parts of 
the system and a new balance may be established. Likewise, a small change in one part 
of the system may lead to cumulative effects on the system as a whole. For example, 
by allowing an increased scope of stakeholders to participate in the decision-making 
procedures, greater changes to the system of management institutions may be felt to be 
required in order for it to be viewed as legitimate. On this matter, it is also relevant to 
highlight the point made by Easter and McCann (2007) that “Informal institutions such 
as norms and culture affect which laws and policies can be implemented. …changes in 
formal institutions that contradict norms are unlikely to be successful.” (p. 10-11).
within organizations 
As a way of identifying problem areas in the institutional framework in relation to the 
attainment of good governance, the field of organization theory can give some insight 
into what it is about organizational behaviour that gives rise to unsustainable natural-
resource policies and practices (Ascher, 2000). In terms of lessons that may be useful 
for EAF management, organization theory suggests the need (Ascher, 2000) to:
1. establish simpler, non-competing mandates for agencies;
2. provide information to many governmental and non-governmental actors;
3. Restructure intra-governmental arrangements to reduce the opportunities for 
interagency jurisdictional conflicts;
4. restructure organizational incentives to create longer time horizons for agency 
leaders and personnel;
5. liberalize to reduce rent-seeking alliances that promote corruption.
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Chapter 7 will specifically address adjustments to current institutional frameworks 
in the move towards EAF management. Two key questions to be addressed are:
1. What kind of new institutional mechanisms are warranted, or how would 
existing institutions need to change, in order to facilitate an implementation of 
the EAF? 
2. What examples are there of the practical use of EAF-friendly institutional 
mechanisms or frameworks?
ConClusIons
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, EAF management is not an end in 
itself but simply a mechanism in moving towards sustainably managed fisheries. The 
discussion above on the policy, institutional, and legal frameworks of the ecosystem 
approach to fisheries management, has set out the context within which this broader 
management approach is to take place. In the discussion, general ways forward have 
been suggested, and problem areas highlighted. Whether a desirable result is achieved 
or not, will however depend on the success of implementation. However, success will 
be more likely given an ability to work within broadly accepted policy frameworks, 
and to develop or reinforce institutional and legal arrangements that allow for good 
governance, for effective nested institutions (outside and between institutions), and for 
appropriate organizational structures (inside institutions and/or agencies). In addition, 
there will always be a need to deal with problems arising through gaps between policy 
and management (e.g. lack of capacity), legal failure and a lack of compliance (e.g. due 
to lack of capacity), and the possibility of institutions being affected by power and 
politics. All these aspects form the reality within which EAF implementation must 
take place. 
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4.  social and economic 
considerations 
InTRoduCTIon
The ecosystem approach to fisheries (EAF) management has been advocated widely, 
on the basis of its potential to meet a range of broad objectives relating to ecosystem 
health, biodiversity conservation, and sustainable natural resource use, among others. 
These general benefits can in turn be broken down into more specific benefits, including 
those relating particularly to human considerations, such as greater employment and 
income generation as a result of rehabilitated ecosystems, reduction in the risk of 
fishery collapses, aesthetic benefits, etc. At the same time, there are potential costs 
involved in implementing EAF, ranging from direct costs of implementation (e.g. 
increased management costs) to possible indirect or induced costs, resulting from how 
the EAF is implemented (e.g. reduced employment and/or revenues in the short term, 
as well as ethics and equity-related considerations). 
Accordingly, this chapter discusses some of the social and economic considerations 
that can influence the form and extent of EAF implementation. The particular aspects 
discussed here include: (a) employment, livelihood and regional effects; (b) impacts on 
poverty levels, e.g. resulting from changes in income or employment; (c) impacts on 
food security, e.g. resulting from short-term decreases in catch levels, if they occur in 
shifting to an ecosystem approach to fisheries management; (d) cultural factors that 
may affect EAF implementation; (e) use of traditional knowledge and management 
practices; and (f) impacts on the distribution of benefits and costs related to EAF 
implementation. 
Of course, the overfishing and ecosystem degradation that typically underlie the 
need for EAF result in immediate economic losses for the fisheries, and a disruption 
of livelihoods, community well-being and traditional ways of life. Likewise, applying 
the ecosystem approach, while aiming to contribute to sustainable development in the 
longer term, will also undoubtedly result in costs, at least in the short term – particularly 
since one implication may be a reduction of fishing effort and output. However, there 
are also possible long term social benefits such as an improved quality and diversity 
of fish stocks (e.g. increased size of individuals and greater abundance of higher value 
species). Improved quality may, for example, lead to increased income for fishers. Actual 
impacts on effort and catch will depend on many factors, including the nature of the 
ecosystem and the state of exploitation at the time of implementation of EAF.
This chapter attempts to raise some social and economic issues that may need to 
be addressed in the application of EAF, such as the social impacts of any decreases in 
fishing effort that may prove necessary. In examining these issues, one should keep 
in mind that the implicit assumptions in moving to EAF management are: 1) that in 
the long term, EAF will promote the attainment of the ultimate objectives, such as 
reducing poverty and hunger; and 2) that failing to implement EAF will eventually 
have serious negative impacts on those whose livelihoods depend on aquatic resources. 
Furthermore, it is useful to note that the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries (FAO, 1995b), in highlighting the relationship between fisheries and food 
security, and the need for transparency in decision-making processes and for effective 
participation of interested parties, provides helpful guidance on the social aspects of 
applying the EAF.
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The PARTICulAR sITuATIon of ARTIsAnAl And smAll-sCAle fIsheRIes
In the developed as well as in the developing world, artisanal and small-scale fisheries 
serve important roles in terms of providing employment, income and food security, as 
well as maintaining cultural/traditional practices (Berkes et al., 2001). Their key role 
has been acknowledged in the above-noted FAO Code of Conduct: 
6.18 Recognizing the important contributions of artisanal and small-scale fisheries to employment, 
income and food security, States should appropriately protect the rights of fishers and fishworkers, 
particularly those engaged in subsistence, small-scale and artisanal fisheries, to a secure and just 
livelihood, as well as preferential access, where appropriate, to traditional fishing grounds and 
resources in the waters under their national jurisdiction. 
Five key points that have been raised pertaining to implementation of EAF in the 
context of small-scale fisheries in developing countries are as follows:
•	For developing countries, there is a particularly great need for fisheries management 
to focus on and take into account the human dimension in the fisheries sector. As 
fisheries in coastal areas in developing countries contribute to poverty alleviation 
and food security, it is difficult to reduce the fishing fleet, especially as the 
State might have scarce resources for creating alternative employment. Coastal 
fisheries may also constitute a better opportunity for people in other areas, with 
occupations that cannot provide a basic livelihood, thus leading to migration 
into fishery areas, as experienced, for example, in countries such as China, India, 
Madagascar, Peru and Senegal (Mathew, 2003).
•	Small-scale fisheries, even those that financially generate only marginal profit 
levels, may have significant comparative advantages over industrial fisheries in the 
form of greater economic efficiency; fewer negative impacts on the environment; 
a wider distribution of economic and social benefits (being geographically 
more spread out and decentralized); and their contribution to cultural heritage, 
including ecological knowledge (FAO, 2005b).
•	Although small-scale fisheries most often are focused on supplying fish and 
fishery products to local and domestic markets, and for subsistence consumption, 
export-oriented production has increased in many of these fisheries during the last 
one to two decades as a result of greater market integration and globalization. For 
example, fisheries products, especially from the small-scale subsector, are one of 
the few areas where African, Caribbean and Pacific countries have seen their share 
of world trade increase (Mathew, 2003; FAO, 2005b). 
•	 It has been noted that from an ethical point of view, applying the ecosystem approach 
globally will require that industrialised countries take some responsibility – for 
example, by not selling their excess fishing capacity to developing countries at 
low prices, or giving it away as an article of aid. On the contrary, establishing 
an “international fisheries management assistance fund” has been proposed to 
support developing countries in the management of overexploited fisheries in 
a consultative manner, using the ecosystem approach as a framework (Mathew, 
2003). For example, financing from development banks and development-oriented 
financial institutions could be a way of easing many small-scale fisheries’ transition 
towards a more sustainable use of living resources (FAO, 2005b). At the same 
time, where feasible, it will be helpful for governments in developing countries to 
invest more in fisheries management from existing revenue resources, particularly 
in cases where net earnings from fisheries exports are high. Accompanying this is 
a need for dissemination of information regarding the value of the resources, and 
a need for education in order to explain how an ecosystem approach can improve 
the state of the resources (Mathew, 2003).
•	A key challenge for small-scale fisheries in applying the EAF is dealing with 
impacts caused by factors beyond their control, or outside their territories, 
such as pollution and habitat destruction from land-based activities, destructive 
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practices of non-fishery activities within aquatic environments (e.g. impacts of oil 
exploration and extraction and offshore mining activities), and destructive fishing 
practices by large-scale fisheries. An example of the latter is when industrial 
fishing vessels encroach on inshore areas previously only used by traditional 
fishers, in order to make up for a shortage of resources in their original territory. 
Possible implications of this include a reduction of resources, destruction of 
fishing gear, damage of habitats, etc. Such implications could result in an added 
economic burden to the small-scale fishers, ranging from needing to replace gear, 
through to a loss of livelihood (FAO, 2005c).
emPloymenT, lIvelIhood And RegIonAl AsPeCTs
Shifting fisheries to EAF management, with its broadened attention to ecosystem effects 
and interactions with other economic sectors, may well have impacts on employment, 
livelihoods and regional economies. While in some countries, the fisheries sector 
contributes relatively low proportions of national employment and economic activity, 
the regional implications within a given nation of a transition towards responsible 
fisheries may be more severe, as employment tends to be concentrated where few 
livelihood alternatives exist (OECD, 1997). This is a major issue when an EAF leads 
to reduced levels of employment, and indeed labour stickiness, few employment 
alternatives and low education levels are some of the obstacles for a smooth transition 
in these regions (OECD, 1997).
Impacts on employment stem from the need to reduce fishing effort, which might 
be carried out through direct controls on effort (input controls) or indirectly through 
output controls, or with technical measures, including closed areas, etc. Below are 
some examples of employment impacts of input and output controls:
1. Direct effort controls may result in immediate reductions in employment, if the 
limits on effort are applied in terms of labour inputs, or applied to all inputs. 
On the other hand, if effort is reduced by decreasing capital inputs rather than 
labour inputs (e.g. by shifting to less capital-intensive vessels), employment 
may not be much affected.
2. An output control in the form of a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) that is set below 
current harvest levels will initially lead to a decline in harvesting employment, 
to the extent that such a quota induces less fishing activity (as opposed to merely 
inducing highgrading of the catch). However, as the stock recovers, effort will 
likely increase along with employment, perhaps to above the previous level. If 
a TAC limit applies at the same time as a “race-to-fish” occurs, there could be a 
shortening of the fishing season, leading to a situation with higher employment 
in numbers but of shorter duration. With individual quotas, there will also be 
initially reduced employment as the TAC decreases. This will be exacerbated, 
if quotas are transferable in the marketplace; a concentration of control in the 
fishery can lead to extensive employment losses (although such losses may 
be reduced somewhat in the long run by a possible lengthening of the fishing 
season). Another form of output control is that of individual, or vessel, catch 
limits restricting landings per day, week or month. While the effect of catch 
limits of this sort on fleet size and harvest employment are not definitive, such 
an approach may have the stabilizing benefit of providing a mechanism for 
equitable access to fishery resources, one that may favour small producers over 
large, thereby protecting owner-operated fishing vessels (OECD, 1997). 
Employment impacts, particularly in fishery-dependent regions, are driven by 
characteristics of the labour force:
•	 In some regions, there are few employment alternatives for fishers, and where 
alternatives do exist, these may require employees with higher levels of education 
than that held by the fishers. While only a few countries have published sector-
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specific data on the level of education among fishery workers, this data does suggest 
that the assumption of low-level education amongst fishers is correct (OECD, 
1997). Of course, in addition to their level of formal educational attainment, the 
fishers may have informal learning and experience that equips them with skills of 
use in other sectors.
•	The average age of fishery owner-operators is often greater than that found in 
the working population at large (although the average age of hired workers is not 
significantly different from elsewhere) and re-employment in another occupation 
becomes more difficult the older a person is (OECD, 1997).
•	The level of labour-stickiness is high in such areas due to strong roots in 
community or (family) tradition, reducing the willingness to move in order to 
find similar or alternative employment elsewhere, and thus also making it more 
difficult to reduce fishing effort (OECD, 1997). 
•	While adjustment to reduced fishing effort levels may be feasible if there is a 
functioning social security system or some kind of adjustment programme, poorer 
countries and regions may not have the same possibility of providing such aid to 
their fishers. [In OECD member countries, for example, adjustment problems 
have been approached through such means as extended-term unemployment 
benefits for younger workers; programmes for retraining; early retirement 
packages for older fishermen whose vessels have been withdrawn; and investment 
in infrastructure, tourism and other regional and rural development (OECD, 
1997).] 
Changes to fisheries in the course of implementing the EAF may have more 
widespread effects than just in the fishers’ livelihoods (FAO, 2005b). This is because 
changes in demand and production have impacts not only on producers themselves, but 
also indirect impacts through the commodity supply chain. This includes the supply of 
inputs to the fishing operation through “upstream” activities such as (a) investments 
in vessels, engines and gear, (b) operational costs (fuel, ice, food, bait; labour costs), 
and (c) maintenance costs, as well as through “downstream” activities following the 
harvesting. 
There can also be major interactions of gender and employment that influence the 
nature of EAF-related impacts. In terms of “downstream” activities, such as post-
harvest processing of fish and fishery products, as well as marketing, women often 
play a predominant role (TABFM, 2006; FAO, 2007b). Impacts of implementing 
EAF management on the “downstream” activities, e.g. by a reduction in employment 
opportunities caused by a change in the fishery management regime, may thus affect 
food security indirectly, as women tend to spend more of their income on feeding their 
families than men (see case studies in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay: Josupeit, 2004). 
Women also tend to be less educated, and less able to migrate for work due to social/
cultural/traditional/religious reasons, thus further reducing their mobility in terms of 
labour.
Boxes 2 and 3 provide an example of the livelihood consequences of conservation 
measures and a brief outline of the sustainable livelihoods approach to fisheries, as an 
example of an approach that can be used when attempting to understand the nature of 
people’s livelihood opportunities. 
In summary, attention to alternative livelihoods is of crucial importance in moving 
to an EAF, and more generally to changing towards more sustainable fishery practices, 
by reducing the number of people dependent on fishing as their sole income and 
thus reducing barriers to change. However, there is no easy answer to the challenge 
of introducing alternative livelihoods in situations of fishery dependency – barriers 
such as labour stickiness and low levels of education among the fishing population 
have to be acknowledged, as does the reality that no single “solution” will work in all 
circumstances. Undoubtedly, a customized approach must be adopted.
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PoveRTy And soCIAl seCuRITy/seRvICes
Poverty can be viewed both as impacted by inadequate fisheries management (a result 
of depleted fish stocks, etc.) and as a constraint in improving fisheries management. 
The constraint stems from the fact that it is not typically considered to be reasonable 
to exclude poor people from fishing without creating alternative sources of food and 
livelihoods. Neither can the reality of poverty in fishery-dependent communities 
be necessarily resolved through fisheries management, since it is not always directly 
related to the resource or catch levels. For example, poverty can also be observed 
in remote fishing villages where fishers catch and trade reasonable volumes of fish, 
but where access to health and other public services is lacking and the community is 
politically un-represented (FAO, 2005b).
It has been noted that while fishing may not necessarily generate high economic 
returns, for a majority of households, fishing activities have simply provided them 
with a way to sustain their livelihoods, preventing them from becoming poorer. From 
an economic perspective, there may be no resource rent generated by such activities, 
but from a social point of view this way of providing livelihoods is vital. In areas 
where alternative employment is scarce, and where social security is less than common, 
fisheries constitute a kind of welfare system by way of reducing dependency and 
vulnerability (greater exposure and sensitivity to risk). The vulnerability of households 
– for example, a family head’s loss of job may lead to sudden reduced income – implies 
that fisheries, as additional or alternative sources of income and food, are extremely 
important (FAO, 2005b).
This implies a major dilemma arises in implementing EAF management. On the one 
hand, it is the open-access state of the fishery which is the main mechanism providing 
the above safety net, as it allows people the opportunity and flexibility to engage in 
BOx 2
example of livelihood consequences of conservation measures in India
An example of a dire consequence of not taking into account the social aspects when 
deciding to protect endangered species is the case when some fishermen in Orissa, a 
state in India, committed suicide over a fishing ban. This ban was imposed by the state 
government to protect the Olive Ridley turtles in the Gahirmata Marine Sanctuary, by 
prohibiting fishing for six months of the year within a five km radius of the Bay of Bengal, 
in the coastal districts of Kendrapa and Jagatsingphur. 
The fishing communities accuse the government of being indifferent to their need for 
alternative livelihoods, yet the government officials claim they are aware of the implications 
and that efforts are being made to provide for such alternatives, however, they also have a 
duty to protect these turtles. As a result of reduced fishing possibilities, and through that 
reduced income, ten fishermen have been reported to have committed suicide. Now whole 
families are left behind without a bread earner. There is also a risk that the problem will 
increase as another ban will be imposed in July as this is the time for the breeding season. 
In desperation people have made attempts of fishing within the prohibited area, however, 
a number have been arrested and their boats seized. 
This case shows the importance of making some kind of social impact assessment 
before introducing a conservative measure. An ecosystem approach would suggest that the 
human needs also need to be considered and thus, if a measure reduces certain livelihood 
possibilities, alternative livelihoods ought to be created. However, the possibility for such 
efforts are seldom great, and even less so in developing countries.
Source: NewKerala, 2006
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fisheries following their needs. On the other hand, a commonly-advocated element 
of applying the ecosystem approach is to restrict access to the resource, e.g. through 
limited rights systems (FAO, 2005b). The latter move can produce significant impacts 
on the poor, if people are excluded when limited access is introduced. Alternatively, 
fishermen may migrate to other areas where they can access, and fish from, the same 
stock, thereby maintaining livelihoods but failing to limit resource exploitation). And 
furthermore, since small-scale fisheries take place along thousands of kilometres of 
coasts where enforcement and surveillance costs are high (Berkes et al., 2001; Castilla 
and Defeo, 2001, in Defeo and Castilla, 2005), how feasible is it to move to limited 
BOx 3
sustainable livelihoods approach to fisheries
As mentioned in Chapter 1, a sustainable livelihoods perspective may be useful in the 
application of the EAF as it highlights people’s livelihood situations, the factors affecting 
these, how these can be improved or maintained, and linkages to ecosystem health. The 
use of such an approach may clarify impacts from a change in fisheries management 
on poor people’s livelihoods, and their ability to deal with such a change. For example, 
if applying the ecosystem approach means more conservative levels of fishing, what 
alternative income sources exist, and how plausible are these options? 
In this approach, “a livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required 
for a means of living” (FAO/DFID, 2000, p. 2). In brief, the sustainable livelihood 
framework consists of five elements:
•	 People’s livelihoods depend upon assets. These can be natural (e.g. fisheries resources), 
financial (e.g. cash or credit), physical (e.g. fishing gear), human (knowledge of where 
to find fish and how to catch it), and social capital assets (e.g. traditional management 
mechanisms, co-operative arrangements). 
•	 The transforming structures and processes influencing the access people have to the 
different assets. Examples of these are the institutions, policies and regulations which 
influence the livelihood approaches people adopt and how they make use of their 
livelihood opportunities.
•	 The livelihood strategies are the options and the combination of options people 
have and adopt in order to make a living. For example, a community may rely on 
combining fishing for parts of the year with agriculture for the rest of the year in 
order to have an income throughout the whole year.
•	 Livelihood outcomes are the result of the strategies people adopted.
•	 The vulnerability context is made up of the factors (e.g. floods and droughts in 
inland fisheries) in the external environment which may affect the success of people’s 
livelihood strategies. 
People seek desired livelihood outcomes, such as an increased income, by exploiting 
available assets through various livelihood strategies. However, poor people are generally 
vulnerable to external impacts (e.g. natural disasters), trends (e.g. resource depletion, 
population change), and seasonal change (e.g. food availability and prices) hence their 
desired livelihood outcomes may not always be attainable, and these may also fluctuate. 
A sustainable livelihood would enable poor people to become more resistant or at least 
resilient to changes, trends and external shocks, so that they can maintain or enhance 
their assets and capabilities. The SLA is valuable in assessing the likely impact of potential 
or actual interventions, and may therefore be useful in moves towards an ecosystem 
approach.
Sources: Glavovic, 2006; FAO/DFID, 2000
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access? The dilemma, then, is how to devise an effective, equitable way to implement 
EAF management in such fisheries. 
Below follows an example of a tool for identifying areas in which there may be a 
high correlation between poverty and resource depletion. Related tools for information 
acquisition and management are provided in the Annex to this report. 
food seCuRITy
Since 1973, the consumption of fish as food has doubled globally, and the developing 
world has been responsible for over 90 percent of this growth, largely from small-scale 
fisheries. Small-scale fisheries contribute fifty percent of all food-fish, and almost all 
fish from small-scale fisheries is used for food. Fish form a crucial part of the diet of 
millions of the world’s poor (FAO, 2005b). Indeed, in 2001, more than 400 million 
people received more than 50 percent of their protein from fisheries (FAO, 2005c). 
There are two ways in which fishing can contribute to food security – directly 
through the supply of fish itself (i.e. self-consumption), and indirectly through revenues 
generated from production and related processing and marketing activities, depending 
on whether individuals are self-employed or paid wages, which can then be used to 
BOx 4
Poverty mapping
Poverty mapping is a tool used by various organizations such as IUCN, the World 
Resources Institute, the World Bank and FAO. It can be used to identify areas globally 
where there might be specific problems in applying the EAF due to high levels of 
poverty, but at the same time indicating important social and conservation reasons for 
implementing the EAF. Such areas will therefore be high priorities for external support, 
unique and practical local solutions, or both. 
One example is the IUCN Poverty-Conservation Mapping. Poverty in combination 
with high population density, in areas of high levels of biodiversity, is of particular concern 
as these areas are of great value in themselves, but are also exposed to high pressure from 
the people who may want to exploit the resources as a source of livelihood. As high level 
of poverty often suggest that employment opportunities are few, and the ones that do 
exist are thus very important, a measure of reduction in fishing effort may therefore be 
difficult to implement without some kind of community aid in the shape of alternative 
employment creation etc. In such cases, models can be developed to help predict causal 
relationship between socio-economic variables (e.g. poverty) and environmental change 
(e.g. biodiversity loss, decreasing fish stocks, damaged reefs). For example, the World 
Resources Institute (WRI) has used a mapping system to make an assessment of the health 
of many ecosystems’ goods and services globally. In combination with poverty data, 
ecosystems in need of “pro-poor ecosystem management” can be found. Another related 
use could be that of linking biological resources data with that of poverty and nutrition, 
thus finding potential biological resources-food security relationships. These maps may in 
that way constitute an aid in identifying where poor people largely depend on biodiversity 
assets, and where they will benefit from ecosystem management. 
This type of mapping is an analytical tool which can provide inputs in examination 
of poverty issues, for example in a sustainable livelihood approach. However, it should 
be remembered that although this tool is useful for exploring spatial relationships (visual 
correlations) between indicators, the maps do not in themselves show causal relationships. 
Thus, there is a risk of misinterpretation.
Sources: IUCN, 2004; FAO, 2003c.
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purchase food (FAO, 2005b). At a national level, direct domestic consumption of fish 
can be encouraged (e.g. self-sufficiency of fishing communities) and/or exports of high 
value fish species can enable imports of low value fish species and other food types. 
Various possible impacts of EAF on food security could occur. For example, if EAF 
leads to decreases in available fish landings (whether only short term or both short- 
and long-term), the result is less access to food/protein (even if only temporarily) 
for a certain fraction of those who rely on fish as a key protein and food source. On 
the other hand, if applying the EAF would lead to greater abundance of higher value 
species, this could possibly lead to increased export revenues. These revenues could 
thus lead to increased opportunities of purchasing low value fish species and other food 
types, hence increasing food security.
CulTuRAl And RelIgIous ConsIdeRATIons 
Another social consideration when applying the ecosystem approach to fisheries is how 
the religious practices or cultures of certain fishing communities may be affected, or 
may bear on EAF implementation. Fishing activities often have a cultural or religious 
value and these may contribute to, or perhaps hinder, the adoption of an ecosystem 
approach. At the very least, such aspects must be understood in order to facilitate a 
change in management approach.
Traditional beliefs regarding fisheries have developed through processes of association 
and interpretation of natural phenomena, and they often play an essential role in 
deciding how people use fisheries resources, or at least in justifying and explaining 
resource use. Therefore it is vital to have some understanding of existing beliefs and 
customs regarding fisheries resources when presenting ideas for management, as these 
will provide key information on what may be acceptable to the local community 
(FAO, 1998).
The religious structure of the community may have important implications for the 
way in which fisheries resources are exploited – both in the fishing activity and the 
consumption of fish products. For example, religious proscriptions which forbid the 
consumption of shellfish, molluscs or particular types of fish may mean that fishing 
effort is concentrated on other species, hence increasing the chances of depletion 
of those stocks. Local beliefs and customs may also impose other limits on fishing 
activities or on participation in fisheries (FAO, 1998).
The practice of a particular fishery may be at the centre of people’s beliefs and 
customs, and the use of a particular gear may be based on traditions and beliefs, resource 
knowledge or skills which often have been passed from generation to generation. In 
such cases, people’s attachment to the fishery on which they depend often goes beyond 
the economic benefits derived from it. An example of this is salmon fishing by native 
Americans and Canadians on the west coast of North America, where the importance 
of the fishery for indigenous cultural values has been recognized in current efforts to 
manage the fishery (FAO, 1998). 
Attempts to alter patterns of fisheries which form an important part of local cultures 
may be resisted if they are interpreted as a threat to the social and cultural independence 
and distinctiveness of a community. Thus, the success or failure of management 
measures will often ultimately depend on the extent to which those affected by them 
understand their function. However, scientists’ understanding of fisheries resource 
issues and artisanal fishers’ understanding will often differ quite radically. Therefore 
it is important to seek out common ground and find ways in which “scientific” 
management measures may translate into a locally appropriate form (FAO, 1998). 
For example, in an attempt to establish a way to harvest mussels sustainably for 
subsistence needs, in an area on the east coast of South Africa, harvesters participated 
in an experiment which was designed to visually demonstrate appropriate harvest 
levels. This was done by allowing different levels of harvesting intensities in different 
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sub-zones, which then clearly showed how intense harvesting could lead to over-
exploitation. In order to ensure an understanding of the activity, role-playing was 
used both before and during the experiment. Results from the experiment were 
also presented at joint committee workshops by using images, models and clearly 
intelligible graphs, as well as translating the findings into Zulu. It was noted that 
although traditional knowledge played a valuable role in the project, it was said to be 
limited to observable phenomena. It was therefore felt that providing harvesters with 
scientific information would help them better understand the resource and participate 
in management decisions (Harris et al., 2003). 
Some further factors may provide guidance on the level of adaptability, and 
underlying attitudes, towards management measures such as the ecosystem approach:
•	Skills and knowledge regarding fishing techniques and fisheries resources will 
often be passed from one generation to the next at the household level. The extent 
to which this takes place, and the patterns of inheritance of occupational skills, 
will inform on how an understanding of management issues will be passed from 
generation to generation.
•	Where fisheries resources are in decline, or access to fisheries is threatened, 
it can be important to provide opportunities for youth to have the education 
needed to shift to non-fishery activities more easily. This of course also depends 
on the availability of schools and/or the opportunities a household has to send 
its children to school, as well as traditional/cultural/religious attitudes towards 
education, particularly of girls/women. 
•	As people’s attitudes towards authority will play a great role in shaping their 
responses to efforts to manage their fishing activity, this would mean that if a 
particular institution is perceived by fishers as being either not trustworthy or 
dominated by particular sets of interests which are not necessarily sympathetic to 
the needs of fishers, co-operation is likely to be hindered (FAO, 1998).
•	 In terms of introducing changes to the customs of a society, it should be remembered 
that the culture of a society is not an accidental collection of customs and habits, 
but rather something that has been evolved by the people to help them in their 
conduct of life. There is a definite purpose and function behind each aspect of the 
culture of a society. Social structures, in general, need to be understood in order 
to gain appreciation of who does what in a community, who makes decisions, and 
who (from within the community or from outside) may influence the community 
to accept change. Such structures may be based on sex, religious and ceremonial 
groups, age, kinship/kinship groups, grouping on the basis of common residence, 
etc. If there is a reluctance to change within the community from the beginning, 
unforeseen difficulties in attempts to achieve EAF management may cause further 
reluctance to change.
In Box 5, an example is given of a theoretical framework which can inform the 
implementation of EAF management, by highlighting cultural and religious factors in 
a local/traditional community context.
IndIgenous PeoPle And TRAdITIonAl Knowledge
In addition to the role that cultural or religious practices may play in the application 
of an ecosystem approach to fisheries, the knowledge held in local communities and 
by indigenous peoples is also important. Mechanisms to use this appropriately need to 
be developed. 
It is well-known that many indigenous people or local communities have a profound 
empirical knowledge of the environment in which they live, one central reason being 
the fact that their survival may depend on their understanding of how different 
patterns of resource use will affect the sustainability of resources in the future. Their 
understanding of the environment is often close to the conceptual basis for integrated 
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BOx 5
The interdependency hypothesis and local communities/indigenous people
The interdependency hypothesis suggests that ecosystem viability and community viability are 
interconnected. Its theoretical framework consists of three dimensions: ecosystem viability, community 
viability, and external forces. It is suggested that ecosystem viability and community survival are two 
interdependent objectives that should be given equal focus if both are to benefit, and stresses the 
need to consider the extensive knowledge of local communities about local ecosystems. Although 
this framework is created for application to conservation projects, the relevance to an EAF can be 
found in its highlighting of the local/traditional community context and which factors may need 
special attention when shifting towards more sustainable fishing practices. The proposed theoretical 
framework consists of a series of factors important for ecosystem conservation and community 
viability and can provide a general guide during the design, monitoring, and evaluation phases of 
projects. These general factors should be considered in the light of the specific human culture and 
natural ecosystem considered.
The three dimensions that form the basis of the theoretical framework are ecosystem viability, 
community viability and external forces. Given the focus on human dimensions in this report, the 
latter two of these are discussed below. 
Community viability. The community viability dimension consists of four main categories – culture, 
well-being, participation, and knowledge – each of which consists of a series of factors that are 
assumed to contribute to the viability of local communities. 
 a) Culture – consists of cultural sustainability and social and environmental values. As many 
projects try to provide local people with alternative sources of income, insufficient attention is 
often given to the cultural importance of the original source of income. Certain practices, such 
as tree harvesting and hunting, are not solely performed for the sake of the economic income, 
but have important social, cultural and religious values too. Because there are cultural and 
spiritual reasons why local people engage in these practices, providing them with alternative 
sources of income is often a simplistic and unsuccessful strategy in alleviating problems such 
as over-harvesting.
 b) Well-being – consists of economic well-being and physiological and psychological well-being. 
Even if communities are not poor, economic well-being may be essential in ensuring the 
viability of those communities. For example, reduced employment opportunities, due to more 
conservative fishing, may lead to migration of young people to urban areas, thus leaving villages 
populated with older residents and no mechanism for community viability. In addition, when 
such fundamental needs as health and security are missing, community cohesion and survival 
are threatened and long-term conservation goals (e.g. sustainable fishing practices) may seem 
less important.
 c) Participation – includes the factors community participation and community capacity. Through 
participating in the process that would impact their lives, local people can have the opportunity 
to choose activities (practices) that do not compromise the integrity of their culture and the 
viability of their community.
 d) Knowledge – consists of the factors environmental knowledge and cultural knowledge. 
Traditional environmental or ecological knowledge is being passed on from one generation to 
another. This knowledge may be useful in finding the most appropriate way of applying the ecosystem 
approach in a certain cultural/traditional setting, possibly basing it on such traditional knowledge.
External forces. As local communities and the associated natural ecosystems constitute a part of a 
larger social, economic, and political context, they are inevitably subject to influences originating 
from outside of their locality. An external environment may on the one hand support and enable local 
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or holistic management. A gender aspect of this local knowledge is that women often 
exploit resources and ecological niches which men may have little or no knowledge 
of. This special knowledge, and women’s skills in exploiting it, may provide important 
input into fisheries management decision-making (FAO, 1998).
It has also been suggested that conservation measures can support the recognition 
and guarantee of the rights of indigenous people (IUCN/WWF, 1999). One can find 
similarities between aspects of the ecosystem approach and the approaches of many 
indigenous and other traditional peoples’ organizations (Berkes, 1999) - for example, 
with respect to protected areas within their territory. The concept of sustainable 
use of resources is most often an inherent part of the traditional/indigenous way of 
thinking as they feel connected to the land/water, as a home to their ancestors but also 
to their children, suggesting that certain restrictions to the use of the resource may be 
acceptable as it would benefit future generations (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2004).
Some of the ingredients considered important in this regard are:
•	 that their rights to the territory, and their rights to control and co-manage the 
resources and determine their own development priorities, are recognized; 
•	participation of traditional institutions in co-management arrangements is 
allowed; 
•	prior informed consent; and
•	 sustainable use of natural resources that have been used traditionally by indigenous 
people is incorporated in the management plan whilst maintaining the integrity of 
the ecosystem (IUCN/WWF, 1999). 
In applying the ecosystem approach and reducing fishing pressure where needed, 
traditional knowledge can often provide suitable management options. For example, 
there may be rights-based fisheries in place, often based on rotational access to fisheries 
resources – although this system is more easily applied to non-mobile gear and species 
and often focuses on mitigating conflicts between user groups over access rather than 
reducing overfishing pressures (Mathew, 2003).
Box 6 describes an example of a local community’s effort to adopt the ecosystem 
approach to fisheries.
communities and natural areas to thrive, and on the other hand it might instead threaten the ecosystem 
and community viability. This component describes what form external social, economic and political 
forces may take. Such forces need to be acknowledged, and preferably addressed, in order to enhance 
ecosystem and community viability. 
 a) Social forces – can work in two extreme ways: (i) policies promoting the conversion of natural 
areas to commodity goods may be favoured by a public that seek fast economic growth at 
the expense of nature conservation, or (ii) people may be willing to sacrifice the sustainability 
of local communities and their culture for nature conservation. Thus the social values of the 
public can provide an indicator for predicting whether certain projects will have the support 
of the society at large.
 b) Economic forces – Financial incentives often contribute to the destruction of natural 
ecosystems. 
 c) Political forces – It has been suggested that national and international laws and policies are the 
most powerful external factors that impact ecosystem- and community viability. This type of 
force can be, for example, national land policies which encourage migration to remote areas 
and the clearing of forests in exchange for land, but also international policies, such as trade 
liberalization and structural adjustment.
Source: Michaelidou et al., 2002 
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dIsTRIbuTIonAl AsPeCTs
A crucial matter to consider in any management action, and particularly in the 
implementation of as profound a shift as the introduction of EAF management, is that 
of the distributional impacts of the changes. Four issues that need to be considered are 
as follows:
1. To whom do the various benefits and costs accrue?
 A major consideration in EAF implementation, as noted in the EAF Guidelines, 
is the question of who receives the benefits and who incurs the costs of that 
implementation. This question arises in terms of the cross-section of current 
participants in the fishery (and beyond) as well as over time (see below).
2. Intertemporal aspects: When do the various benefits and costs occur?
 The potential benefits and costs of EAF management, if they occur at all, 
may do so over a wide range of time scales in the evolution of the fishery. For 
example, some potential benefits may be realized over a longer time frame (e.g. 
larger fish stocks), while some costs (e.g. of more elaborate management) are 
potentially arising in the short term. There may be certain realities (e.g. annual 
food supply considerations, electoral time frames) that also affect or constrain 
implementation of EAF. 
3. Scale: At what scale do benefits and costs occur?
 Similarly, the potential benefits and costs of EAF may occur over a wide 
range of spatial/geographical or administrative scales (e.g. local, national, 
international). There may, for example, be a benefit that is international in scale 
(e.g. increased existence value of conserved biodiversity) and a corresponding 
cost that is local in scale (such as a negative impact on displaced fishers in a 
specific fishing community near an MPA), or any other combination could 
arise. Even within a given fishery ecosystem, the migration of fish and/or 
larvae may lead to situations in which those incurring the costs of conserving 
resources or habitats may not be those receiving the benefits (or at least may 
be sharing the benefits with others who are not incurring costs). 
BOx 6 
example of an ecosystem approach initiative in bocas del Toro, Panama.
Bocas del Toro is a marine archipelago off the coast of Panama with diverse mangrove 
forests, a unique flora and fauna, and coral reefs. A rise in tourism has led to unplanned 
development in the area, putting great pressure on the ecosystems because of over-
fishing of the lagoons and coral reef destruction. The local communities have always 
sustainably used and depended on the goods and services provided by the ecosystems, 
hence by their own initiative, indigenous fishermen have now suggested regulation of the 
access to fishing grounds and area protection to the government, as means towards more 
sustainable use of the resources. These suggestions are supported by, amongst others, the 
IUCN Commission on Ecosystem Management, and a community management plan for 
the whole archipelago has been developed, based on the ecosystem approach, together 
with local authorities and NGOs. This plan includes a national park, seven community 
areas with areas for conservation but also for sustainable use, and also a buffer zone with 
regulated access and use. However, these areas are controlled by the authorities and as 
the communities have not yet received a response from these, they are not sure how to 
proceed without legal confirmation of their plans.
Source: Windevoxhel, 2006 
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4. Form of the benefits: What is the distribution of benefits across the various 
types?
 The various benefits and costs of EAF implementation reflect the range of 
human values of fisheries ecosystems, as discussed in Chapter 2. Therefore it 
is important to recognise that the benefits could arise in any of the following 
forms:
 Use values: 
•	 net economic benefits of fishing, including income and employment
•	 food provision and food security benefits 
•	 non-fishing use values that arise from fisheries ecosystems, e.g. tourism, 
aquaculture
•	 the values of fisheries ecosystems as mechanisms for social interaction and 
as local “commons”, as well as providers of livelihoods
 Non-use and existence values:
•	 cultural benefits of fisheries ecosystems (e.g. for artistic expression or 
ceremonies)
•	 aesthetic and existence benefits (e.g. the value of watching a sunset by the 
sea, or of knowing that whales are swimming in the sea)
•	 option value (i.e., the value of maintaining fisheries ecosystems in terms of 
possible future benefits that might be realized as a result) 
ConClusIons
This chapter has explored a wide range of social and economic considerations that 
can influence the form and extent of EAF implementation. Specifically, the following 
have been discussed: (a) employment, livelihood and regional effects, (b) impacts on 
poverty levels, (c) impacts on food security, (d) cultural factors that may affect EAF 
implementation, (e) use of traditional knowledge and management practices, and 
(f) impacts on the distribution of benefits and costs related to EAF implementation. 
This list of themes can be viewed as a form of checklist to consider in moving to an 
EAF management framework. However, it must be noted that (i) since only brief 
overviews of each topic have been provided here, in practical EAF implementation, 
more in-depth understanding of each topic will be required, and (ii) no claim is made 
here to the completeness of this list of topics, as fisheries have within them a very 
wide range of social, economic and cultural considerations. Nevertheless, the material 
presented in this chapter represents a starting point in incorporating relevant factors in 
the move to EAF management.    
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PART II
fACIlITATIng The 
ImPlemenTATIon of The eAf
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5.  Initial steps in implementing  
the eAf
Moves to EAF management can take many forms – from small steps to introduce 
ecosystem considerations into conventional management, through to major efforts 
to re-design fisheries management institutions, regulations, and processes. Decisions 
concerning the extent of EAF implementation will need to take into account factors 
such as the feasibility of the time frames involved, the budgets and human resources 
available, the administrative and political realities of the situation, among other 
considerations.  
boundARIes, sCAle And sCoPe 
The EAF, and indeed any form of fisheries management, faces an initial challenge of 
defining the relevant “fish stock” to manage, i.e. setting the right boundaries, as well 
as deciding on the appropriate scale and scope within which to manage. Often, as time 
passes, these matters are seen as resolved – fisheries management proceeds and such 
issues are no longer the subject of debate. However, moves to an EAF re-open the 
discussion, since dealing with ecosystems and “fishery systems” leads to questions 
of ecosystem boundaries (as opposed to fish stock boundaries) as well as potentially 
enlarging the spatial scale of management (e.g. to better incorporate certain ecosystems) 
and adjusting the scope of management (e.g. to include human impacts on ecosystems 
that have not been traditionally managed). These matters are explored briefly here. 
boundaries
To study or manage any system – whether it be an ecosystem, a coastal zone or 
an economy – requires specifying its boundaries. There is a continual challenge of 
determining appropriate boundaries around any given ecosystem, or in determining 
suitable boundaries specifying who are to be included as human participants in “the 
fishery”. The challenge is compounded in meshing together ecosystem boundaries with 
social, economic and institutional boundaries. Specifically, management units might be 
defined to reflect biological stock units and oceanographic realities, or on the basis of 
human factors (to reflect, for example, the cohesive nature of a fishing community, or 
jurisdictional lines). 
Can boundaries simultaneously reflect ecological, economic, socio-cultural, 
institutional and political considerations? If not, is one way of defining boundaries 
intrinsically better than another, or how do we balance the “natural” delimitations of 
watersheds, coastal zones, etc., on the one hand, and the boundaries of the system from 
the perspective of human populations and activities, on the other? What factors are of 
greatest importance in setting boundaries? 
An example of these challenges has arisen in EAF implementation efforts in the 
Benguela region of southern Africa. These efforts have recognized the importance 
for management of taking into account the boundaries reflecting the two primary 
ecosystems of Angola, Namibia and South Africa, i.e. (1) the Benguela upwelling 
system in the central and southern part of the region and (2) the warmer ecosystem 
north of the Angola Front which typically occurs in southern Angola. However, such 
boundaries cross national jurisdictions of coastal states, thereby requiring cooperative 
linkages among nations in the region. 
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scale
The scale of a fishery system can vary greatly. On the one hand, a discrete small-
scale fishery may be based in a small bay or lake, with its local fish resources and a 
corresponding fishing community. On the other hand, there are fisheries at the scale of 
a province/state or a nation, or those on an even larger scale of regional multinational 
fishery organizations such as the European Union or the FAO’s regional fishery 
management organizations. The question of scale arises in three ways regarding the 
EAF:
First, it is important to understand whether the many social, economic and 
institutional considerations in implementing the EAF vary depending on the scale of 
the fishery (e.g. local, national, regional, or even broader, scale), and in what manner.
Second, in implementing the EAF it will be important to address the challenges 
in managing fisheries in which (a) human (social, economic and institutional) scales 
are different from that of the resource, or that of the harvesting activity, or (b) there 
can be differences in the scales that are appropriate to deal with each component of a 
fishery – fish stocks, fishers, science, enforcement, policy, etc. 
Third, management of a given fishery may be required at multiple scales, and this 
may involve a process of “scaling up” or “scaling down”. For example, if fisheries 
management (and an EAF) is already implemented at a broad geographical scale 
(e.g. state, province or nation), this may need to be scaled to work at a local level. 
Equivalently, when local-level or community-based management is in place within local 
ecosystems, this may need to be “scaled up” while allowing for spatial heterogeneity 
and differing human and institutional arrangements. These situations may imply a 
need for “cross-scale linkages”. For example, if local or decentralized approaches to 
management are needed to account for 
local conditions, but the fish stocks 
range over larger geographical areas, an 
institutional arrangement may be needed 
to help coordinate across boundaries. This 
could be the case for a fishery on a highly 
migratory stock, such as tuna. In that 
case, biological aspects are on a large 
scale, crossing national boundaries, while 
a national or sub-national scale may fit for 
the fishers and the management system, 
and indeed very local management of 
fleets may also be effective. 
scope
The scope of the fishery system is also 
crucial to determine. What is included or 
excluded? An EAF broadens the scope 
beyond seeing a fishery as simply “fish 
in the sea, people in boats”, beyond 
consideration only of commercially-
important species, beyond management 
efforts directed solely at the harvesting 
process. In other words, it becomes 
important to include interactions between 
the core of the fishery – fish and fishers – 
and other elements of the ecosystem and 
the human system relevant to management 
(Figure 6). To neglect such interactions 
Industrial development
Forestry
Agriculture
Aquaculture
Coastal 
development
habitats
stocks
cohorts
COMMUNITY
an
th
ro
p
o
g
en
ic
 in
fl
u
en
ce
s
b
io
lo
g
ical co
n
sid
eratio
n
s
FIGURE 6
Interdependent influences of eAf management
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(whether these be predator-prey or harvesting-processing or some other interaction) 
may lead to unexpected negative results from management measures. 
The key lies in seeking a suitable balance – to incorporate a suitably broad perspective 
into fisheries management, but doing so without incurring excessive costs or over-
extending the management activities by attempting to manage too much. For any given 
fishery, the idea is to determine what components of the broad fishery system (which 
non-target species, which post-harvest activities, which community institutions, etc.) 
need to be incorporated to make EAF management effective. 
ConClusIons 
This brief chapter has focused on three key matters that must be settled prior to 
undertaking EAF implementation, namely determination of the boundaries, the scale 
and the scope within which the EAF is being considered. As alluded to at the start of 
the chapter, decisions about the extent of EAF implementation will also need to take 
into account additional factors such as the feasibility of the time frames involved, the 
budgets and human resources available, the administrative and political realities of 
the situation, etc. The reality behind all of these considerations is the fact that EAF 
management can take many forms, from an incremental move to account for ecosystem 
interactions within largely conventional management, through to the re-designing 
of fisheries management institutions, regulations, and processes in the spirit of a full 
ecosystem approach. Accordingly, choices exist among multiple paths towards EAF 
management, and therefore, as is often said when dealing with complex systems such 
as fisheries, one size does not fit all.
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6.  Assessing the impacts of eAf 
management
benefITs And CosTs of eAf
As discussed earlier, the ecosystem approach to fisheries (EAF) has the potential to 
produce a variety of benefits, both general (e.g. ecosystem health, sustainable natural 
resource use) and more specific, notably those relating to human considerations (such 
as greater employment and income generation, aesthetic benefits). On the other hand, 
potential costs of implementing EAF include direct costs of implementation (e.g. 
increased management costs) and indirect or induced costs (e.g. the risk of reduced 
employment and/or revenues in the short term). To assess the consequences of moving 
to EAF management, it is necessary to (1) determine what are the relevant benefits and 
costs, and then (2) measure each of these and draw conclusions from comparing the 
benefits and costs. 
Consider the first of these steps. While this can only be carried out fully given the 
details of a specific fishery, it is possible to consider in general the various possible 
benefits and costs that might arise from EAF management. Table 1 lists some of 
these benefits and costs, grouped under the four headings: ecological, management, 
economic and social. 
Two points must be noted here. First, this is simply a generic listing of possibilities, 
with no claim to being exhaustive. Second, the categories used here are intuitively 
sensible, but are not those typically used in formal cost-benefit analysis or social 
impact assessment (methods that are discussed below). For example, in cost-benefit 
analysis, economists view “economic” costs and benefits as all those of a societal or 
“global” nature (thus including most ecological and social aspects) while “financial” 
costs and benefits are monetary aspects as seen from a private perspective. 
For some entries in Table 1, an indication is given of the conditions or particular 
situations that may produce the benefit or cost in question, but ultimately the potential 
magnitude of the benefit or cost, and its probability of occurrence, will depend on 
TABLE 1 
some possible benefits and costs of eAf implementation
ecological benefits and costs 
benefits Costs
Healthier ecosystems (directly or with EAF linkages to 
effective ICOM)
Increased global production of goods and services from 
aquatic ecosystems (a global benefit)
Improved fish stock abundance (due to healthier 
ecosystems)
Reduced impact on threatened/endangered species
Reduced bycatch of turtles, marine mammals, etc.
Less habitat damage (due to more attention to fishing 
impacts)
Lower risk of stock or ecosystem collapse
Reduced contribution of fisheries to climate change (if EAF 
leads to lower fuel usage)
Improved understanding of aquatic systems
Decreased fish stocks (if fishery management is now less 
effective than previously)
Increased habitat damage (if management is now less 
effective or creates induced impacts)
Shift in fishing effort to unprotected areas, leading to a loss 
of genetic biodiversity
Greater highgrading/dumping, and thus more wastage (if 
catch and/or bycatch is restricted)
Reduced fish catches (if more predators – e.g. seabirds, 
seals – due to better protection
Human dimensions of the ecosystem approach to fisheries: an overview of context, concepts, tools and methods56
management benefits and costs
benefits Costs
Better integration in management across fisheries, other 
uses, etc.
Clearer expression of management objectives, leading to 
greater societal benefits
Better balancing of multiple objectives
Better balancing of multiple uses, leading to increased net 
benefits 
More robust management due to broadening from single-
species tools
Improved compliance due to more “buy-in” to management, 
through better participation
Increased cost of management
Increased cost of research
Increased cost of data collection and data management
Increased cost of coordination across fisheries & aquatic 
uses
Increased cost of additional and more participatory 
meetings
Increased cost of monitoring, observers, etc.
Increased risk of non-compliance (if regulations too complex 
or unacceptable)
Increased risk of collapse of management system (if too 
demanding of resources)
Risk of management failure (if excessive faith placed in 
“new” EAF paradigm) 
Poor management results and loss of support (if EAF 
imposed or implemented improperly)
economic benefits and costs 
benefits Costs
Increase in benefits to fishers per fish caught (bigger fish 
from a healthier ecosystem)
Increased catches (especially in long term)
Increased contribution to the economy (especially long 
term)
Reduced fishing costs (if EAF results in reduced bycatch)
Increased net economic returns (if EAF involves reduced 
fishing effort, towards MEY)
Higher-value fishery (if increased availability of food to top 
predators increases stock sizes)
Greater livelihood opportunities for fishers (e.g. in tourism, 
if charismatic species abundances increase through EAF)
Increased non-use (e.g. cultural) and existence values (the 
latter resulting from appreciation of healthier aquatic 
systems and a greater abundance of aquatic life, etc.)
Reduced catches (especially in short term)
Loss of income to negatively affected fishers
Increased income disparity among fishers (if EAF impacts 
are uneven)
Reduction of government revenues from licenses, etc. (if 
there is reduced effort)
Reduction in benefits to fishers (if lower government 
support)
Reduced contribution to economy (short term)
Reduced employment in short term and possibly long term
social benefits and costs 
benefits Costs
Positive impacts on food supply in long term (if greater 
catches become possible)
Synergistic positive effect of coordinated EAF across fisheries 
and/or nations (LME)
Greater resilience (if there is emphasis on multiple sources 
of fishery livelihoods)
Greater resilience (if increased bycatch results in more 
livelihood opportunities)
Reduced conflict (if EAF processes deal effectively with 
interfishery issues) 
Negative impacts on food supply in short term (and risk of 
this also in long term)
Greater inequity (if EAF favours those able to invest in 
appropriate technology)
Greater inequity (if there is mis-placed allocation of 
responsibility for EAF costs)
Increased poverty among those adversely affected by EAF 
(short term, or both)
Reduced benefits to fishers (if EAF linked to ICOM, and 
tradeoffs detrimental to fishers)
Greater conflict (if EAF leads to enforced interaction among 
a larger set of societal and/or economic players)
TABLE 1  (cont.)
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the specifics of the fishery and of EAF implementation. Note that in the case of a 
cost of EAF, for a given fishery, the product of the probability of occurrence and the 
magnitude of the cost represents the “risk” associated with that cost. 
While the above listing of possible benefits and costs of implementing EAF was 
organized according to ecological, management, economic and social categories, another 
route to viewing benefits and costs is by organizing them according to specific stages 
and actions involved in implementing the EAF. Through a step-by-step examination of 
FAO’s EAF Guidelines, a set of five tables has been created, listing EAF considerations 
that have implied benefits and/or costs on the following themes:
1. Moving towards EAF management (from Guidelines section 1.4)
2.  Options to manage fishing (from Guidelines section 3.2)
3.  Legal and institutional aspects of EAF (from Guidelines section 4.2)
4.  Research for an improved EAF (from Guidelines section 5)
5.  Threats to implementing EAF (from Guidelines section 6)
The tables are contained in Appendix 6.1 to this chapter. Note that each of these 
represents a template to be completed in a specific fishery/ecosystem situation – i.e., 
each includes a set of elements arising in EAF implementation, for each of which it is 
necessary to determine (a) whether the element is applicable in the particular fishery 
or ecosystem under discussion, and (b) if so, what are the relevant benefits and costs 
arising for that element (measured qualitatively or quantitatively). 
meAsuRIng benefITs And CosTs
A wide variety of potential benefits and costs of EAF were listed above, but how 
each of these is actually measured in practice is another matter, as is the subsequent 
decision-making challenge of comparing among the various benefits and costs in order 
to come to appropriate conclusions. We consider here the feasibility of measuring the 
benefits and costs described in Table 1 that deal with management, economic and social 
aspects. 
Among Management benefits and costs, several of the costs (e.g. for management, 
research, data handling, additional meetings, monitoring and observers) are readily 
assessed from governmental sources of information, possibly supplemented by suitable 
surveys. Other costs (e.g. the risks of non-compliance or of collapse of the management 
system) are difficult to measure objectively, but may be amenable either to modelling 
or to surveys and interviewing. Most of the benefits listed (e.g. better integration in 
management across fisheries, clearer expression of management objectives, better 
balancing of multiple objectives and of multiple uses, etc.) are difficult to assess 
objectively, although some (e.g. improved compliance through better participation) can 
be assessed based on available data (e.g. infractions reports). 
Economic benefits and costs are generally easier to measure. First, some are amenable 
to standard fishery data gathering – e.g. for benefits or costs at the fisher level (such 
as changes in income per fish caught, in catch levels, and in fishing costs), and for 
those at the sector level (such as changes in employment, net economic returns, and 
contribution to the economy). Some measures can be obtained through governmental 
accounting systems (such as changes in the revenues from licenses, etc.). Still others 
may require more specific data collection, e.g. through surveys to assess changes in 
livelihood opportunities for fishers, or in increased income disparity among fishers. 
The Social benefits and costs noted above are generally much more challenging to 
assess. This is certainly the case, for example, with changes in management efficiency 
and overall resilience of the human system. However, effects on the food supply, on 
poverty levels, on levels of inequity and on conflict all have objective methods for 
measurement. Thus there is likely to be a wide variation in the capability to measure 
social benefits and costs.
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A wide range of methodologies could be used in measuring the social, economic, 
and management benefits and costs of EAF implementation. These come from a wide 
range of disciplinary traditions and approaches, and many are similar to those listed 
in Chapter 2 for valuation of aquatic ecosystem services. Some possibilities are as 
follows:
•	direct fisheries measures
•	direct governmental accounting
•	 socio-economic surveys
•	 cost-benefit analysis
•	 social impact assessment
•	 indicator frameworks
•	 contingent valuation and travel cost methods
•	 attitudinal and stated preference surveys
•	bioeconomic models
•	 structured or semi-structured interviews 
•	 asset mapping
•	national systems of accounts
The choice among these methods will vary from case to case. Note that those 
methodologies of a particularly broad nature such as bioeconomic models, national 
systems of accounts and indicator frameworks (as described in Chapter 2) have 
the potential to provide cross-cutting approaches to assessing and monitoring the 
management, economic and social aspects in Table 1. A more detailed look at some of 
the major methodologies is presented in the following section.
deCIsIon-mAKIng Tools foR AssessIng eAf
There are various analytical frameworks available to assist in the decision-making 
process relating to EAF implementation. This section considers a sampling of decision-
making tools, such as cost-benefit analysis, social impact assessment, indicator 
frameworks, socio-economic monitoring, systems of national accounts, simulation and 
bio-economic models. Each of the tools is discussed in sequence below, and in most 
cases, sources for further information are provided. Furthermore, a set of additional 
decision-making tools is presented in Appendix 6.2; with some adjustment in their 
application, these may be relevant for EAF as well. 
goal ranking
Goal ranking is designed to make goals and expectations explicit, and to assist 
in discussing them with others, often as a means to collectively reach agreement 
on priorities. Without a systematic method of prioritization it may be difficult 
to preferentially and efficiently allocate attention or resources to the goals that 
stakeholders deem most important. A goal ranking exercise can address this situation. 
Goal ranking can be used in the early steps of the policy and planning processes in EAF 
when several competing or perhaps conflicting goals have been identified. Ranking by 
voting or other numerical processes can be supplemented with negotiation to arrive at 
consensus goals. It is also possible to use the ranking for assigning weights to goals in 
order to assist selection.
Problem trees
The problem tree is an analytical tool, usually done as part of a participatory planning 
process, to logically and visually identify the root causes of observed problems by 
linking and hierarchically clustering a series of problems. It can complement several 
other tools, and forms an important part of the planning toolkit, particularly in Rapid 
or Participatory Rural Appraisals, where the visualization lends itself to use in the 
field with any stakeholder group. Problem trees are useful in planning EAF where 
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there are multiple problems, the relations between which are not easily discernible to 
stakeholders. Using the problem tree method shows participants that their problems are 
being taken seriously. Relating problems to each other is a useful means of emphasizing 
the shared ownership of agreed upon issues. 
Cost-benefit analysis
The most common and, in theory, complete decision-making tool used to determine 
the economic efficiency of choice sets faced by decision-makers is cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA). CBA, or economic efficiency analyses, form one instrument for evaluating 
potential projects. The streams of future costs and benefits are estimated, summed, and 
placed into their “current” year value, entitled the net present value (NPV = the stream 
of benefits minus the stream of costs, discounted to reflect the future point in time in 
which the various benefits or costs are to occur). The NPV of the status quo alternative 
may be compared with the NPV of several alternative projects or scenarios; however, 
and commonly, an individual project NPV is calculated without bases for comparison. 
In the former, the alternative with the highest NPV would be the preferred choice; 
while in the latter use, projects with positive NPV would be accepted. Variant measures 
of economic efficiency include the ratio of benefits to costs or the estimated internal 
rate of return;17 since these are non-denominational, this makes ranking across projects 
easier. Sumaila (2001) presents a brief overview of the CBA approach, a suggestion on 
how to deal with discounting benefits accrued by future generations, and an application 
of this adjusted CBA to a hypothetical case of marine ecosystem restoration. 
As a complete CBA would estimate all benefits and costs related to management 
alternatives, it will be necessary to apply several of the valuation tools mentioned 
earlier in this chapter. Given the cost implications of a complete CBA, these tend to be 
partial analyses (especially with regard to benefits), which may at least provide lower 
bound estimates. When a management agency is faced with budget constraints, a pre- 
and non-monetary evaluation of potential costs and benefits and their relative priority 
ranking would assist the agency in appropriately allocating limited funds.
social impact assessment
As described by TICPGSIA (2003), a social impact assessment (SIA) focuses on human 
environment issues and their resolution. It constitutes a tool in decision-making, aiding 
those affected and responsible agencies, in assessing the impacts and desirability of a 
proposed action. An SIA looks for social and cultural factors that need to be considered 
in a decision, and providing a mechanism for incorporating appropriate knowledge and 
values into the decision. In general, SIA assists in the identification of the most socially 
beneficial course of action. Some of the principles and related guidelines of SIA (see 
below) can be used in considering social implications of applying the EAF.
Indicator frameworks
Indicators frameworks constitute a useful guidance tool in the decision-making 
process in that they can “communicate ecosystem service benefits, and support....
the communication of spatial interdependencies to decision-makers and stakeholder 
groups” (Boyd et al., 2004). Being used to enhance transparency, communication and 
effectiveness in natural resource management, indicators provide help in the assessment 
of the performance of fisheries policies and management at all levels. In relation to 
sustainable development goals, indicators can illustrate the trends and state of a specific 
resource, or the sustainability of fishery activity, or they can be analysed at a broader 
societal or ecosystem level (FAO, 1999b). 
17 To estimate the internal rate of return, the NPV is fixed at zero, and the discount rate is determined that 
makes the present value of flows of costs and benefits equal over the life-span of the project.
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social impact assessment
Some principles and related guidelines of SIA are as follows:
1. Achieve extensive understanding of local and regional settings to be affected by the action or policy
•	 Identify and describe interested and affected stakeholders and other parties, and understand 
their interests and values (e.g. social groups affected by outcomes of an action, e.g. transition to 
EAF).
•	 Develop baseline information (profiles) of local and regional communities (e.g. existing conditions 
and past trends associated with the relevant human environment).
2. Focus on key elements of the human environment
•	 Identify the key social and cultural issues related to the action or policy from the community and 
stakeholder profiles (carried out with public involvement, producing a list of the most significant 
impacts in order of priority, and all significant impacts for all interested and affected parties).
•	 Select social and cultural variables which measure and explain the issues identified (pointing to 
measurable change in human populations, communities, and social relationships).
3. Identify research methods, assumptions and significance
•	 Research methods should be holistic in scope (describing all social impacts related to the action or 
policy, so decision-makers and the affected public are given the chance to evaluate them).
•	 Research methods must describe cumulative social effects related to the action or policy (resulting 
from the incremental impacts of an action added to other past, present or foreseeable future 
impacts).
•	 Ensure that methods and assumptions are transparent (and replicable)
•	 Select forms and levels of data collection and analysis appropriate to the significance of the action 
or policy. 
4. Provide quality information for use in decision-making
•	 Collect qualitative and quantitative social, economic and cultural data sufficient to usefully 
describe and analyse all reasonable alternatives to the action.
•	 Ensure that the data collection methods and forms of analysis are scientifically robust
•	 Ensure the integrity of collected data
5. Ensure that any environmental justice issues are fully described and analyzed
•	 Ensure that research methods, data, and analysis consider underrepresented and vulnerable 
stakeholders and populations.
•	 Consider the distribution of all impacts (whether social, economic, air quality, noise, or potential 
health effects) to different social groups (including ethnic/racial and income groups) - identifying 
those whose adverse impacts might be lost in the aggregate of benefits.
•	 Undertake evaluation/monitoring and mitigation
•	 Establish mechanisms for evaluation and monitoring of the action, policy or program
•	 Where mitigation of impacts may be required, provide a mechanism and plan for assuring 
effective mitigation takes place – such as avoiding the impact; reducing the impacts by redesigning 
the project or policy; or compensating for irreversible impacts (e.g. by providing alternative 
employment for fishers who may lose their job because of changes in fishery management).
•	 Identify data gaps and plan for filling these data needs. 
Source: adapted from TICPGSIA (2003)
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In applying the ecosystem approach, there will be the need to move away from a 
sole focus on biological indicators, such as target species, towards ecological, societal, 
economic and institutional indicators that reflect broader sustainability objectives. 
However, this transition may be difficult as the existing problems with developing 
socio-economic indicators are plentiful, such as: lack of data availability due to 
confidentiality issues and lack of primary information; the non-market nature of 
certain effects; and the diversity of local contexts (fisheries), which complicates the 
definition of common indicators for international comparison (IEEP, 2005).
Various indicator frameworks exist and the choice of framework may reflect policy 
priorities or focus within the organizations and countries using or proposing them. 
IEEP (2005) suggests that, depending on the reference framework, indicators are 
defined by field (social, economic, institutional) or by type (pressure-state-response 
[PSR] or driving forces-pressures-state-impact-response [DPSIR]) (IEEP, 2005). A 
brief review of selected indicator frameworks is presented in Box 9. The FAO indicators 
for sustainable development of marine capture fisheries are attached as Appendix 6.3 
at the end of this chapter.
socio-economic monitoring 
Socio-economic monitoring is the continuous or regular collection and analysis of 
social, cultural, economic and governance data of people, groups, communities and 
organizations, usually at specified intervals. An example of this is the international 
Socio-economic Monitoring Initiative for Coastal Management (SocMon) (Bunce et 
al., 2000; Bunce and Pomeroy, 2003). SocMon, which is being implemented at global 
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An example of the use of social impact assessment within fisheries.
The Tortugas Ecological Reserve was created in the Florida Keys (United States of America) as the 
result of a 3-year collaborative process called “Tortugas 2000” to deal with problems such as a degrading 
marine environment, and commercial and recreational fishing pressure that had reduced the average size 
of some fish species. This reserve is a “no-take” area, created to protect the critical coral reef ecosystem 
of the Tortugas, thus preserving species diversity and health of fish stocks, to help ensure the stability 
of commercial and recreational fisheries, and to provide opportunities for education and research. As a 
part of the collaborative process, and to develop a preferred alternative, a working group was established 
composed of commercial and recreational fishers, conservationists, scientists, divers, concerned citizens 
and government agencies. An “ecosystem approach” was used which meant recommending alternatives 
based on natural resources instead of jurisdictional boundaries, and ecological as well as socio-economic 
information was gathered and considered during the meetings of the working group. In order to 
determine the socioeconomic impact of a closure on fishermen within the sanctuary, a social impact 
assessment was carried out through a system of surveys and informal conversation. A consultation of 
fishermen, charter boat captains, scientists etc. helped to identify what areas were being fished, which 
fish were found in those areas, and how much the fish were worth, and additionally the demographics 
of the fishermen were recorded. The information found was used to minimize the impact of no-take 
zones on the fishing community. Through this assessment, the following impacts of a no-take regulation 
were found: (1) moderate impacts on fishermen (mostly lobster and handline fishermen) and some 
recreational charter operators. (2) minimal or small impacts on recreational fishermen, commercial 
shippers, and treasure salvors. Due to the educational and research value of an ecological reserve, the 
potential benefits to non-consumptive users and scientists were deemed to be high. Through long-term 
fisheries replenishment, it was also suggested that positive effects to the surrounding areas were likely.
Sources: NOAA (2000) and NOAA Web site (2006)
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selected indicator frameworks
The FAO Sustainable Development Reference System (SDRS) integrates the four dimensions of 
sustainability: ecosystem, economy, community and governance. Basing indicators on a small number 
of key criteria or variables, appropriate indicators and related reference points (e.g. threshold values) 
can then be defined, depending on their purpose. The aim is to have a reference system that facilitates 
assessment of progress towards sustainability goals and evaluation of efficiency of management 
measures. This framework can be defined as a pressure-state-response (PSR) framework, which 
considers the pressure imposed by human activities on some aspects of the system, the state of that 
aspect and the actual or desired societal response. Defining indicators of pressures or driving forces may 
be useful as such forces are often the subject of management intervention. 
The OECD focuses on the need for integrating social and economic components in the analysis, using 
two types of frameworks that link objectives, indicators and results: Firstly, an accounting framework 
aiming at integrating environmental aspects into public accounting, in physical and monetary units (e.g. 
the accounting of fishery resources in Australia). Secondly, an analytical framework in which the choice 
of indicators is related to the analysis of interactions between causes, effects and actions. The pressure-
state-response (PSR) and the driving forces-pressure-state-impact-responses (DPSIR) frameworks can 
be used in the identification of such interactions. 
However, some researchers suggest these are not well adapted to identify the dynamics of the socio-
economic components as they were originally used to take into account environmental aspects in public 
policy development and not specifically for the socio-economic aspects.
As an additional tool, the OECD suggests the use of some indicators called “resources-results”, in 
evaluating the preservation of environmental, economic and social assets.
The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) is building from the precautionary 
approach framework to a framework which also considers societal benefits. In doing so, ICES is 
including a wider understanding of institutional and economic dynamics in a more comprehensive 
systems approach to fisheries management. As the former indicator framework focused mainly on 
biological sustainability, this systems approach integrates issues of uncertainty, risk, etc. to examine 
performance of fishery systems.
Australia provides one of the first examples of an indicator framework being implemented and 
adapted to the local context, and it is also being used to develop the FAO framework further. The 
Australian National Strategy on Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) contains three key 
objectives: intra-and intergenerational equity; enhancement of community well-being and welfare; and 
protection of biological diversity. The tree-shaped framework is divided in categories (e.g. contribution 
of the fishery to ecological well-being), and each category into components (e.g. retained species). By 
adapting each tree to the specific context of a fishery (management unit), criteria and indicators can be 
defined to follow up progress towards ESD objectives.
Yet another approach, being developed by Resources for the Future, is ecosystem benefit indicators, 
which are based on both biophysical and socioeconomic data, constructed and manipulated with GIS 
tools. Some indicators relate to the underlying production of the ecosystem and others relate to the 
demand for, and value of, the service. This framework can help identify benefit “hotspots”, i.e. areas 
that generate valuable ecosystem services, by overlaying multiple maps of the relevant ecological and 
socioeconomic indicators. Criteria for what level of hotspot classification would trigger opposition to 
habitat alteration permits could possibly be developed through an expert consultation. 
Sources: FAO (1999b), IEEP (2005), and Boyd et al. (2004) 
and regional levels, is a set of guidelines for establishing socio-economic monitoring 
programmes at the coastal management study site level. It provides a methodology for 
regularly collecting basic socio-economic data useful for coastal management at the site 
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level, and provides a basis for a regional system by which site-level data can feed into 
national, regional and international databases for comparison. SocMon is also intended 
to provide insight to managers, many of whom come from biology backgrounds, into 
what “socio-economics” means, how socio-economic information can be useful to 
their management, and what socio-economic data might be useful for management at 
their site.
 The SocMon initiative uses a standard set of variables that can be tailored to site-
specific situations. It can be used in EAF to monitor and evaluate the performance of 
interventions on specific geographic areas paying special attention to communities and 
households within and outside of the fisheries sector. Some typical SocMon variables 
include:
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evaluation of mPA management effectiveness 
The evaluation of marine protected area (MPA) management effectiveness is about assessing the degree 
to which management actions are achieving stated goals and objectives (Pomeroy et al., 2004). This 
tells us how well an MPA is doing by measuring performance through a series of indicators related to 
generic goals and objectives normally written in MPA management or strategic plans. Evaluation of 
MPA management effectiveness can be a component of the EAF system of indicators wherever MPAs 
are used as part of the management approach, often within the wider context of integrated management. 
MPAs are implemented for a myriad of reasons, and hence they differ in size, management structure 
and management and conservation goals among other features. However, from the perspective of 
human dimensions, the socio-economic and governance indicators (see table below) will be relevant to 
most MPAs even where the bio-physical characteristics are markedly different. 
socio-economic Indicators governance Indicators
Local marine resource use patterns
Local values and beliefs re: the marine resources
Level of understanding of human impacts 
Perceptions of seafood availability
Perceptions of local resource harvest
Perceptions of non-market and non-use value
Material style of life
Quality of human health
Household income distribution by source
Household occupational structure
Community infrastructure and business
Number and nature of markets
Stakeholder knowledge of natural history
Distribution of formal knowledge to community
Percent of stakeholder group in leadership 
positions
Changes in conditions of ancestral and historical 
sites, features, and/or monuments
Level of resource conflict 
Existence of a decision-making and management body
Existence and adoption of a management plan
Local understanding of MPA rules and regulations
Existence and adequacy of enabling legislation
Availability and allocation of MPA admin resources
Existence and application of science research and input
Existence and activity level of community orgsanisations
Degree of interaction between managers and stakeholders
Proportion of stakeholders trained in sustainable use
Level of training provided to stakeholders in participation
Level of stakeholder participation and satisfaction in 
management process and activities
Level of stakeholder involvement in surveillance, monitoring, 
and enforcement
Clearly defined enforcement procedures
Enforcement coverage
Degree of information dissemination to encourage stakeholder 
compliance
A well-established process of evaluation has been developed, which can be tailored to the situation 
at hand, and underscores the need to clarify the management questions before defining the relevant 
indicators (see corresponding guidebook for details on the method).
Sources: Pomeroy et al. (2004)
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systems of national accounts
In seeking to attain sustainability, it has long been argued that there is a pressing need to 
change the way in which national progress is currently evaluated, i.e. to move beyond 
national accounts confined primarily to the goods and services that pass through the 
market and the provision cost of government-supplied services. This evaluation system 
tends to ignore the fact that economic progress often has been achieved at the expense 
of the environment, hence a complement to this accounting framework has been 
sought in the shape of a “green GDP”, or green national accounting (Repetto et al., 
1989). Such an approach is compatible with the goal of EAF to incorporate ecosystem 
values into fishery decision-making. 
One example of this is to use satellite accounts – Systems of Environmental and 
Economic Accounts (SEEA)18 – in the system of national accounts (SNA). This 
provides a way of making the important functions and services of the environment more 
tangible by incorporating these into the economy, in the shape of satellite accounts. 
These accounts record stocks and flows of environmental goods and services, including 
information about critical stocks and flows that may affect fisheries. By linking 
environmental information/data to economic accounts, and covering all important 
environmental-economic interactions, SEEA constitutes a way of overcoming the 
division between economic and environmental analysis. In addition, a wide range of 
sustainability indicators could be included in these satellite accounts (FAO, 2004a).
The three main categories of issues that can be addressed through SEEA for Fisheries 
(SEEAF), as described by FAO (2004a) are: 
1. Monitoring of the economic importance of fisheries, e.g. contribution of 
fisheries to national income and employment; economic linkages between 
the fisheries sector and other sectors; value of natural assets, and the cost of 
depletion.
2. Improvement of fisheries management, e.g. assessment of government policies 
(taxes and subsidies) on the sustainable use of fisheries resources; monitoring 
of the ecosystem health, fisheries and the natural resource base.
3. Estimation of the full costs and benefits of fisheries, e.g. assessment of the 
government fisheries management costs and habitat protection costs.
18 For a discussion on the integration of ecosystem services and their flows into national accounts is 
presented in Weber (2007).
TABLE 2
example socmon variables
demographic Perceptions and attitudes
Age Perceptions of resource conditions
Gender Perceived threats
Ethnicity Perceived coastal management problems
Education Perceived coastal management solutions
Religion Perceived community problems
Language Successes in coastal management
Occupation Challenges in coastal management
Household size governance
Household income Awareness of rules and regulations
Resource use Compliance
Household activities Enforcement
Household goods and services Participation in decision-making
Types of household uses Membership in stakeholder organizations
Household market orientation Quality of life
Non-market and non-use values Material style of life 
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Four categories of accounts exist (FAO 2004a):
1. Asset accounts – information about stocks and changes in stocks of natural 
resources.
2. Flow accounts for pollution, energy and materials – information about the 
use of energy and materials as inputs to production and final demand, and the 
generation of pollutants and solid waste.
3. Environmental protection and resource management expenditure accounts 
– information about expenditures of industry, government and households 
for protection of the environment or management of resources. Taxes and 
property income received from the sale of fishing licenses or purchase of the 
right to fish etc. are also included in this account.
4. Environmentally-adjusted macroeconomic aggregates – adjustments to 
existing country-level key financial and economic data for the depletion and 
degradation of environmental assets.
According to FAO (2004a), the SEEAF asset accounts cover:
1. Produced assets – capital used for fishing and manufacturing of fish products 
(e.g. boats, fishing gears), and cultivated fisheries (e.g. aquaculture).
2. Non-produced assets – e.g. wild fish stocks, water ecosystems (providing 
habitats for fishery resources).
while the SEEA flow accounts cover:
1. Expenditures for protection of fish habitats and resource management accounts 
by industries and households.
2. Activities of industries that provide environmental protection services.
3. Environmental and resource taxes and subsidies.
How can these satellite accounts aid policy-makers? SEEA is a useful tool for 
ministries when attempting to coordinate policies in cases of cross-sectoral impacts, as 
it provides information for weighing alternatives and making trade-offs. An example 
of this could be when considering changes in land use in coastal areas. By being able 
to assess the economic value of fishing in this broader sense, policy-makers can easier 
link information about fisheries to the broader economy, and thus possibly integrate 
fisheries policy with national development in a more plausible way (FAO, 2004a). 
Which are the main areas for improvement in the use of fisheries accounts for 
policy analysis? Firstly, these accounts are still only being used by a small number of 
countries, partly due to the small economic role of fisheries in most countries, and 
partly because of the amount of uncertainties relating to stocks, future stocks, and 
the value of stocks. Secondly, little research has focused on artisanal and subsistence 
fisheries. This possibly stems from the often low economic value of small-scale and 
subsistence, however, they may be vital in terms of providing livelihoods in both 
industrialized and developing countries, and are likely to expand because of population 
growth and improved access to better fishing equipment. Thirdly, sustainable fisheries 
management requires taking into account of all environmental services such the values 
of existence, tourism and recreation, to a greater extent. Fourthly, a specific problem 
lies in creating accounts for straddling and highly migratory stocks, and high seas 
fish stocks, outside EEZs, as there is, at the present, very little information about the 
value of these fish stocks (FAO, 2004a). Related to this is also the issue of “double-
accounting” of straddling stocks, meaning that the same stock is accounted for in more 
than one country’s accounts. 
Further areas which provide complex topics for discussion are: first, the valuation 
of non-market benefits (e.g. biodiversity) – it has been suggested that national 
accountants’ reluctance to put monetary values on such benefits stems from the 
great degree of judgment which is required in the estimation of non-market values 
(Atkinson, 2000); second, the attribution of production to the country of residence of 
the operator, and not to the country of registration of the vessel, due to the problem of 
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“flags of convenience”, however the determination of residence of the operator of the 
fishing vessel has no reference to where the fish is caught or landed. 
scenario modelling and simulations
Given the complexity of fishery systems, it is difficult to predict possible future changes 
in the fishery, and particularly the likely outcomes of management interventions, 
without systematic tools to assist. This complexity increases in the EAF as a broader 
range of factors needs to be considered. However, it is still important to be able to 
explore EAF situations or scenarios in a sufficiently simple manner, without being 
simplistic – so that well-informed policy and planning decisions can be made by a 
variety of stakeholders with diverse backgrounds and perspectives. In this context, 
scenarios and simulations are important and powerful tools for supporting decision-
making.
Scenarios and simulations are based on the idea of a “model” – a tool to represent the 
real world in a form that can be analysed reasonably easily, thus allowing us to explore 
the implications of management options prior to implementing them in practice. 
A model can be expressed verbally (in words), diagrammatically (using graphs), 
physically (in scale models) or with mathematical notation and computer programs. 
The latter type of model allows us to experiment with fisheries management options 
through a “safe” computerized approach that avoids the cost, time, and potential 
danger of implementing un-tested management directly in the fishery. With a computer 
model, one can use “simulation” to explore a range of “scenarios” – potential future 
realities, based on assumptions about how the world will evolve, together with a choice 
of management decisions – to see what implications might arise for each scenario. 
Since scenarios typically involve both ecosystem and human elements of the fishery, 
an important form of model is the “integrated” model which – in contrast to purely 
economic or biological models – combines the various components of the fishery in a 
single model. Integrated models (such as bio-economic models, discussed elsewhere) 
provide the means to examine the many interrelationships among fish, fishers, fleets 
and post-harvest elements of the fishery. In this way, simulations mimic the dynamics 
of actual fisheries – changes over time in fish populations, fishing fleets, people in the 
fishery, and management agencies – so as to predict the effects of fishery management 
decisions. 
In general, it is desirable for fishery models to be such that (a) information 
requirements are not excessive, (b) the model can be directly used in or adapted to a 
range of fisheries, and/or (c) participatory processes are used in creating the model. It 
is useful to note as well that scenario modelling or simulation analysis requires “fitting” 
the model, and this in turn requires a range of suitable time series of data, including 
some not always associated with the fishery itself (such as regional labour conditions, 
migration rates and human population trends, where relevant). 
bio-economic models 
Bio-economic models are representations of the biological and economic structure 
and dynamics of fisheries. These models expressly link economic aspects with their 
biological foundations and range from relatively simple models of profit maximization 
subject to fish population dynamics, to more complicated multifleet, multispecies 
models with complicated growth functions and interaction variables. Tractability, 
representative capacity and data availability, with their related costs, of these models 
are major factors in determining their degree of descriptive power. 
Seijo et al. (1998) provide a review of the theory and practice of static and dynamic 
bio-economic models and their use in management planning. Such models are very 
powerful policy analysis tools in that economic efficiency gains and losses may 
be estimated for a variety of possible fishery management portfolios, institutional 
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structure, and biological growth assumptions. These models lend themselves to graphic 
representation, allowing for pictorial descriptions of changes in fishery outcomes from 
any changes within and without the fishery. 
Bioeconomic models are now being applied to EAF-related topics. For example, 
Boyd et al. (2004) present a bio-economic model that shows how the quality of the 
ecosystem affects fishery activities – specifically how fishing effort is affected by changes 
in habitat (either in quality or quantity), as well as changes in management framework 
and in knowledge about stock dynamics. Box 11 presents a graphic representation of 
this model showing the effects of habitat changes on fishing effort under open-access 
and regulated access situations. 
The discount rate
As mentioned above, the costs and benefits of implementing the EAF, or any 
management decision for that matter, will have a time dimension that will need to be 
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graphic representation of effort and profit changes in a bio-economic model
The following figure demonstrates the economic efficiency loss from fishery habitat loss 
(in quality or quantity) in a regulated (assumed profit maximizing) fishery. The lower total 
revenue curve per unit of fishing effort (from TR0 to TR1) is caused by the reduced ability 
of the ecosystem to sustain the original fish species abundance. The rotating upward of 
the total cost curve (from TC0 to TC1) is, for example, due to increased congestion among 
the vessels fishing in smaller zones.
Fishing effort goes down from E0 to E1 (this effort probably being displaced to other 
fisheries) and net profit decreases from shaded area Profit0 to the shaded area Profit1; 
representing a loss to society.
Source: Boyd et al. (2004)
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considered. The time element comes from the fact that a management action today may 
have immediate benefits and costs, benefits and costs that arise far in the future, or any 
mix between the two. If people valued events in the future as they value events in the 
present, this time spread of costs and benefits would not be an issue. However, this is 
not the case and, in fact, poses some fundamental ethical questions. If, for example, the 
decision was taken today to exhaust a fishery resource in order to provide food for 
the immediate generation but would make it more difficult for future generations to 
fish for food, how should one weight the impacts on the various generations? Do we 
care more, less, or equally about current generations or future generations? What if a 
management action were to imply high immediate costs and benefits only in the long-
term, say, in three generations? Should we still undertake this action? 
Complicating the issue is that no two individuals or groups share exactly the same 
values for costs and benefits along a time line. A politician may have no value for impacts 
occurring after his political lifespan. A conservationist may value any improvements 
in ecosystem services, regardless of when they occur. A large fishing corporation may 
value the resource only during the expected lifetime of the corporation. Traditional 
fishers may value the resource for their own use but also feel a responsibility to 
maintain the resource for use by their children, grandchildren, and so on. A fishmonger 
may prefer to sell fish today in order to invest the money in a different activity. Any 
given stakeholder has his own time value, whether defined consciously or not.
To acknowledge that a “dollar tomorrow” does not have the same value as a “dollar 
today”, a discount rate is used in decision-making tools that compare costs and benefits 
across generations, such as those mentioned previously. The higher the discount rate, 
the less value we place today on costs and benefits that will come at some point in 
the future. If the discount rate is zero, future costs and benefits have the same value 
(are weighted equally) as immediate costs and benefits. If greater than zero, then the 
“present value” (as seen today) of a particular cost or benefit that occurs in a future 
year is lower than the equivalent “present value” of the same cost or benefit if it occurs 
today. 
Therefore, any positive discount rate will favour actions with short-term benefits 
or long-term costs. Actions having short-term costs and long-term benefits will have a 
harder time being accepted until the cost-benefit framework. As ecosystem restoration 
or preservation projects entail long-term benefits with short-term costs, these projects 
would look less interesting from an economic perspective than other projects with 
short-term benefits, such as those that would immediately use ecosystem services.
A challenge in implementing the EAF lies in the difference between “social” and 
“private” perspectives on discounting. Whatever may be the societal view of the 
balance of present and future generations, EAF management must deal with the reality 
that from a private viewpoint (Sumaila, 2005):
•	people are generally impatient and display a preference for having their benefits 
today rather than tomorrow (due to uncertainty, high debt levels, poverty, etc.); 
and
•	money might otherwise be invested elsewhere (the opportunity cost of capital) 
with even higher interest on the investment. 
In a fishery context, the first of these could imply a relatively high discount rate 
among fishers, and thus a challenge in gaining support for longer-term objectives of 
ecosystem health. The second will vary depending on the circumstances in which the 
fishery and fishing community/industry finds itself and its effect on fishing activities 
is less straightforward. 
How to determine a suitable discount rate to meet societal needs has been a subject 
of abundant discussion in fisheries and indeed throughout society. For example, Farber 
and Hemmersbaugh (1993) present some of the practical and philosophical issues in 
using and choosing discount rates, and Pearce et al. (2006) address some current issues 
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of the debate as well as providing some guidance for decision-makers on the choice and 
use of discount rates. In fisheries, the policy implications can be enormous. Sumaila 
and Walters (2005) note that sustainability mandates around the world, including EAF, 
require “that future generations have the benefit of inheriting ‘healthy’ natural and 
environmental resources”. However, Cochrane (2006) notes that when no alternatives 
to fishing exist and/or individuals are highly dependent on fisheries to meet basic 
needs, special consideration is needed – in such cases, private discount rates tend to be 
very high and policy remedies are particularly difficult. 
ConClusIons
This chapter has focused on understanding, measuring and assessing the impacts of 
moving to the ecosystem approach to fisheries, including a set of decision support tools 
for EAF. The first part of the chapter provided an examination of the various potential 
benefits and costs of EAF management, from social, economic and management 
perspectives, as well as in terms of implications within the current EAF guidelines 
themselves, together with a brief discussion of the practical challenges involved in 
measuring these various benefits and costs. The second part of the chapter focused on 
methods for assessing the consequences of EAF management, and therefore making 
decisions about EAF implementation. These methods and approaches included cost-
benefit analysis, social impact assessment, indicator frameworks, systems of national 
accounts, bio-economic models, and applying the discount rate. 
It should be highlighted in closing that the discussion in this chapter provides only 
some starting points for addressing the major challenges involved in predicting and 
assessing the impacts of EAF implementation. Only brief outlines were given of each 
approach presented here, there are other methods to be considered beyond these, and 
the discussion here has been generic in nature, with the specifics of a given fishery 
needing incorporation for any practical analysis of EAF implementation. Nevertheless, 
it is hoped that the material in this chapter can be built upon to support those engaged 
in developing and implementing EAF management.  
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APPendIx 6.1
benefits and costs arising in the eAf guidelines 
This appendix extracts some specific pieces of the current EAF guidelines with 
particular implications, whether in terms of benefits and/or costs (Tables 1–3), areas of 
research that could improve EAF implementation (Table 4) or human considerations 
TAble 1 
moving towards eAf management (section 1.4 in the fAo eAf guidelines)
1.4.1 The fisheries management process
…Recognizing the broader economic and social interests of stakeholders under EAF, the setting of economic and social 
objectives will need a broader consideration of ecological values and constraints than is currently the case. This will require 
a broader stakeholder base, increased participation and improved linkages of fisheries management with coastal/ocean 
planning and integrated coastal zone management activities…
1.4.2 biological and environmental concepts and constraints
Current management practices tend to give insufficient recognition to the fact that many components are intrinsically 
linked… in a complex flow of material, energy and information.
…to be able to implement EAF at an operational level, delineation of the “boundaries” is required and can be achieved by 
a sensible consensus based on proposed EAF objectives.
1.4.3 Technological considerations
Gear modifications, such as those used to selectively harvest the target species and minimize unwanted bycatch… will take 
on increasing importance as ecological objectives are broadened... 
The impact of some fishing gear and methods on the bottom habitat (biotic and abiotic) can often have a negative effect 
on the ecosystem…the introduction of restrictions may be necessary and, where possible, new technologies that mitigate 
any negative impact will need to be developed.
Fishing operations may also cause other negative impacts to the environment... Minimizing such impacts will require 
development and successful introduction of alternative cost-effective technologies and fishing practices.
Many ecosystems, especially those in coastal waters, are impacted not only by fisheries, but also by other users, including 
upstream land-based activities.
1.4.4 social and economic dimensions
…as the overarching goal of EAF is to implement sustainable development, the shift to EAF will entail the recognition of 
the wider economic, social and cultural benefits that can be derived from fisheries resources and the ecosystems in which 
they occur.
The identification of the various direct and indirect uses and users of resources and ecosystems is a necessary first step to 
attain a good understanding of the full range of potential benefits. 
Many ecosystem goods and services are not traded, and therefore need to be valued through means other than market 
prices. 
The consideration of a broader range of ecosystem goods and services necessarily implies the need of addressing a wider 
range of trade-offs between uses, non-uses, and user groups. 
EAF provides a framework within which traditional fisheries management practices can be recognized and strengthened to 
address some of these problems. 
EAF is better suited… to handle impacts arising from destructive fishing practices, habitat degradation and pollution, and 
to use traditional ecological knowledge... 
EAF must… take into account the dependence of artisanal and small-scale fishing communities on fishing for their life, 
livelihoods and food security.
1.4.5 Institutional concepts and functions
One of the implications of implementing EAF is an expansion of stakeholder groups and sectoral linkages. This may have 
substantial impact on institutional structure and process, in terms either of creating new structures or strengthening existing 
institutional collaboration. 
An effective ecosystem approach will depend on better institutional coordination (e.g. between ministries). 
A greater emphasis on planning at a range of geographical levels that involves all relevant stakeholders will be required... 
Management units may need to be redefined geographically or, at the very least, coordinated within a larger-scale planning 
process. 
In most countries, EAF will require considerable capacity building. This will include… training managers and regulators to 
deal with a broader range of options and trade-offs, conflicts, rights and regulations; and enhancing stakeholder capacity 
to participate. 
1.4.6 Time scales
The FM Guidelines recognize three time scales of immediate relevance to the fisheries management process… These will 
also apply to EAF…
1.4.7 Precautionary approach
Under EAF… the principle is much broader than just environmental degradation, and applies to any undesirable outcome 
(ecological, social or economic)...
1.4.8 special requirements of developing countries
The challenge to implement improved fisheries management… may be particularly formidable in small-scale fisheries, where 
the difficulty and costs of the transition to effective management may outweigh the available capacity and short-term 
economic benefits derived from it. 
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that could pose threats to successful implementation of EAF (Table 5). The following 
five themes are covered:
1.  Moving towards EAF management (from EAF Guidelines section 1.4)
2.  Options to manage fishing (from EAF Guidelines section 3.2)
3.  Legal and institutional aspects of EAF (from EAF Guidelines section 4.2)
4.  Research for an improved EAF (from EAF Guidelines section 5)
5.  Threats to implementing EAF (from EAF Guidelines section 6)
TAble 2
options to manage fishing (section 3.2 in the fAo eAf guidelines)
3.2.1 Technical measures
3.2.1.1 gear modifications that improve selectivity
Size selectivity of target species
Non-target species selectivity
3.2.1.2 Other gear issues
3.2.1.3 Spatial and temporal controls on fishing
“Area closures that permit some fishing may require a large enforcement effort and can therefore be costly. Allowing 
certain categories of fishing activity can also create loopholes which undermine the intentions of the closure. Management 
authorities need to consider the likely degree of compliance and enforcement costs in establishing closures...”
3.2.1.4 Control of the impact from fishing gear on habitats
“Fishing gear that touches or scrapes the bottom during fishing operations is likely to produce negative impact on the biotic 
and abiotic habitats... Use of towed gear with reduced bottom contact is a technical option in such areas. Prohibition of 
certain gear in some habitats is another, e.g. trawling in coral reef and seagrass areas. A third option is to replace a high-
impact fishing method with one with less impact on the bottom, e.g. trapping, longlining or gillnetting.”
3.2.1.5 Energy efficiency and pollution
“Energy optimization can be achieved through improved efficiency of fishing gear as well as through improved management 
that lead to less fishing effort being required.”
3.2.2 Input (effort) and output (catch) control
3.2.2.1 Controlling overall fishing mortality
Capacity limitation 
Effort limitation 
3.2.2.2 Catch controls
3.2.3 ecosystem manipulation
3.2.3.1 Habitat modifications
Preventing habitat degradation
Providing additional habitat
3.2.3.2 Population manipulation
Restocking and stock enhancement
Culling
Intentional introductions
3.2.4 Rights-based management approaches
“Each type of use right has its own properties, advantages and disadvantages, and the ecological, social, economic and 
political environment varies from place to place and fishery to fishery. Therefore, no single system of use rights will work 
under all circumstances. It is necessary to devise the system that best suits the general objectives and context for each case, 
and this system may well include two or more types of use rights within a single fishery or geographic area.”
EAF requires that all the uses and users of a fishery resource be considered and reconciled, and that interactions between 
different fisheries within the designated geographic area be taken into account.
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TAble 3
legal and institutional aspects of eAf (section 4.2, fAo eAf guidelines)
4.2.1 legal
EAF is… likely to require more complex sets of rules or regulations that recognize the impacts of fisheries on other sectors 
and the impact of those sectors on fisheries. It may be desirable to regulate the major and more or less constant intersectoral 
interactions through the primary legislation. This could apply, for example, to laws controlling coastline development and 
coastal habitat protection, the establishment of permanent MPAs, and the creation of cross-sectoral institutions. 
4.2.2 Institutional
The development and implementation of EAF policy and legislation will most naturally be undertaken by the national 
fisheries department or designated management agencies (at national level) and the fisheries management organizations 
(at regional level). A major problem in EAF development may stem from disparities between the ecosystem and jurisdictional 
boundaries and these disparities will need to be addressed…
The number of conflicts will inevitably increase under EAF as the number of stakeholders and objectives increase.
EAF will require adherence to the same principles of transparent and participatory management… such as devolution 
of decision-making and management responsibility; building capacity at the devolved level; appropriate participation 
of stakeholders in decision-making; improved transparency and dissemination of more information; establishment (or 
confirmation) of appropriate systems of user-rights.
While some level of devolution of responsibility and authority to the lowest levels (the local community) will be desirable, 
this decision must be reconciled with the need to ensure that management decisions and actions are coordinated and 
consistent at the higher levels required by EAF in each case. This will require effective institutional structuring to coordinate 
decisions and actions at the broader geographical and fishery scales required by EAF. 
Limiting access and implementing appropriate systems of access rights are essential for successful and responsible fisheries 
under TROM (FM Guidelines, 3.2) and are expanded for EAF. Under EAF, it must be recognized that the access rights system 
will frequently need to encompass other uses in addition to the use of the target resources currently included in TROM. 
4.2.3 educating and informing stakeholders
Successful implementation of EAF will require that stakeholders (including management agencies) understand and accept 
the need for this more inclusive approach to fisheries management, and management agencies should actively promote 
such understanding and acceptance. 
Conversely, scientists and management authorities need to appreciate and use the knowledge of fishers themselves about 
the ecosystem, along with that of their representatives and communities. 
4.2.4 effective administrative structure
Administrative structures under EAF will continue to reflect the variety of government systems that exist under TROM and 
related management approaches. However, they will have to be better integrated with more effective roles in auditing or 
oversight.
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TAble 4 
Research for an improved eAf (Chapter 5 in the fAo eAf guidelines)
some relevant areas of research that would lead to improved ability to implement effective eAf are listed below. The order does 
not reflect any particular priority.
5.1 ecosystems and fishery impact assessments
1. Obtain better information on how ecosystems function, especially in terms of interspecies interactions, and how these 
lead to higher ecosystem properties.
2. Expand knowledge of how fishing impacts target stocks.
3. Conduct research into the impact of fishing on non-target species through bycatch and discarding and what it is doing 
to food-web interactions, habitats and biodiversity. 
4. Develop appropriate multispecies bio-economic models, as well as extended ecological models that include the economic 
and social dimensions.
5.2 socio-economic considerations
5. Conduct research into the factors that influence the day-to-day behaviour of vessel operators/skippers, especially with 
regard to the choice of fishing gear and fishing ground, and levels of discarding.
6. Apply economic valuation methods, including the pros and cons of different methods in different circumstances.
7. Apply an integrated environmental and economic accounting framework to the assessment and analysis of the interaction 
between fisheries and other sectors of the economy.
5.3 assessment of management measures
8. Conduct research and develop technology in the area of fishing gear and practices to improve gear selectivity and reduce 
the impact of gear on ecosystems.
9. Develop strategies/procedure to assess and integrate traditional ecosystem knowledge into management. 
10. Identify the species (and ecosystems) that are suitable for restocking/ stock enhancement programmes, and develop 
more adequate release strategies for them. 
11. The potential of MPAs (a biodiversity conservation measure) as a fisheries management measure needs to be better 
assessed, including research to clarify where MPAs will be most effective.
12. Artificial habitats are another area for research in terms of their usefulness and effectiveness for fisheries. 
13. Culling is controversial topic requiring further research. A thorough review of global experiences would be 
informative.
5.4 assessment and improving the management process
14. The many steps in the management process itself… could benefit from further research. For instance, research is needed 
on how better to compile data for management plans, how to evaluate management performance, and how to include 
uncertainty and risk assessments in the process.
15. Development of better participatory processes is critical, and sociological research on how to improve the consultation 
process with stakeholders will become increasingly important. Sociological research will also be required for assessing the 
impact of different management measures on the varied stakeholders and minimizing undesirable impacts.
16. Better ways of communicating the implications of different management strategies need to be developed.
5.5 monitoring and assessments
17. The broadening of issues to be considered in the context of EAF will also require the development of simpler, more rapid 
appraisal methods [and] adaptive management approaches to assist with data-poor situations.
18. Develop several analytical techniques to underpin the decision-making process, including analyses to assist in setting 
reference points, and to evaluate potential decision rules. 
19. Although specific objectives, indicators and reference points will vary among fisheries, a set of generic indicators needs 
to be identified. 
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TABLE 5
Threats to implementing eAf (Chapter 6 in the fAo eAf guidelines)
benefits of 
Avoiding or 
overcoming 
the Threat
Costs in 
Avoiding or 
over-coming 
the Threat
1. The mismatch between expectations and resources (both human and financial) will need 
to be carefully managed. EAF has much to offer, but lack of investment in the process will 
certainly slow progress and might mean failure in the end. The differing timetables of the 
political and the management process may also mean that insufficient commitment and 
resources are made available. EAF is a long-term commitment with long-term benefits, which 
may be difficult to present convincingly to governments, which normally work in shorter 
cycles, and especially when EAF competes with short-term socio-economic objectives. 
2. Difficulty may be foreseen in reconciling competing objectives of the multiple 
stakeholders. In some, perhaps many, cases the participatory process may be insufficient for 
finding compromises that satisfy all stakeholders. Conflicts may then require higher-level 
intervention to determine the relative priorities and possibly, compensation.
3. Insufficient or ineffective participation of stakeholders in the development and 
implementation of EAF may occur, even when competing objectives can be reconciled. This 
deficiency could be caused by a number of factors including: an unwillingness of stakeholders 
to participate openly and transparently in the process or to make concessions…; inadequate 
and fuzzy user rights that fail to recognize long-term interests and responsibilities leading 
to poor stewardship; a lack of access to necessary information; inadequate consultation 
process or arrangements; insufficient resources being invested to improve fisheries and their 
management; a lack of capacity to participate effectively…; and hidden agendas.
4. The time and cost required for effective consultation with a wide range of stakeholders 
could be substantial.
5. Insufficient knowledge will continue to be a constraint. Biological uncertainty is recognized 
as a substantial problem in management of fisheries under “TROM”, and the combined 
biological and ecological uncertainty under EAF will be even greater. One manifestation of 
this will be an inability in some instances to identify meaningful, cost-effective indicators for 
important objectives. The sum of these uncertainties will require robust and precautionary 
approaches that could cause substantial difficulties in some cases for certain stakeholders, 
both social and economic. A further source of uncertainty is a widespread lack of adequate 
knowledge of fleet and fisher behaviour and dynamics.
6. A lack of adequate capacity for informative compilation and analysis of the available 
information will often add to the uncertainty. In cases where there are or have been 
inadequate monitoring and data storage systems in place, the problems will be particularly 
acute. 
7. Insufficient education and awareness will also be a problem. This will apply to all 
stakeholders in exercising their responsibilities, including the fishery management agencies 
and the public, who will need to be better educated on their roles.
8. Equity issues will always be difficult to resolve in relation to responsibility for ecosystem 
degradation, between fisheries and other economic activities such as agriculture (including 
forestry), chemical industries, urban and coastal development, energy and tourism. 
9. Aligning the boundaries of the ecosystems and of the jurisdictions of the management 
authorities (whether at regional, national or sub-national levels), as well as between 
jurisdictions of the different authorities responsible for competing sectors, will continue to 
be a challenge. Transboundary issues will require particular attention. As foreseen in the 
United Nations Fish Stock Agreement (UNFSA), EAF measures adopted by different countries 
sharing an ecosystem will need to be compatible across the whole geographical range of 
the ecosystem.
10. Another impediment … is illegal stakeholder behaviour: illegal fishing, lack of 
implementation of flag state and port state responsibilities, and misreporting. While these 
types of practices continue, it is difficult to see how the principles and processes outlined 
in these guidelines can be implemented successfully, especially on the high seas. The 
compliance agreement and the international plan of action on illegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing should play a useful role in changing this situation for the future.
11. Poverty is a major threat to EAF. While poor coastal dwellers have few other options 
to derive livelihoods, fishing will continue to be the occupation of last resort for growing 
and displaced populations, resulting in excessive fishing effort, depletion of resources and 
ecosystem degradation. This will often occur in desperate circumstances where the incentive 
to care for the ecosystem is overshadowed by daily necessities.
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APPendIx 6.2
Related environmental decision-making tools
The following are decision-making tools that are commonly used in environmental 
economics/decision making, which, with certain adjustments in their application, may 
be relevant for an EAF context. Unless otherwise noted, the material in this appendix 
has been abridged from Pearce et al. (2006). 
environmental impact assessment (eIA) or environmental assessment (eA)
EIA is a systematic procedure for collecting information about the environmental 
impacts of a project or policy, and for measuring those impacts. It ignores non-
environmental impacts and it ignores costs. It may not account in a detailed way for the 
ways in which impacts vary with time. EIA is an essential input to CBA. Most EIAs 
do make an effort, however, to assess the significance of environmental impacts. Some 
may go further and give the impacts a score (the extent of the impact) and a weight 
(its importance). Weights might be derived from public surveys but more usually are 
determined by the analyst in question. Unlike CBA, EIA has no formal decision rule 
attached to it (e.g. benefits must exceed costs), but analysts would typically argue that 
its purpose is to look at alternative means of minimising the environmental impacts 
without altering the benefits of the project or policy.
strategic environmental assessment (seA)
SEA is similar to EIA but tends to operate at a “higher” level of decision-making. 
Instead of single projects or policies, SEA would consider entire programmes of 
investments or policies. The goal is to look for the synergies between individual 
policies and projects and to evaluate alternatives in a more comprehensive manner. 
An SEA is more likely than an EIA to consider issues like: is the policy or project 
needed at all; and, if it is, what are the alternative options available? In this sense, 
SEA is seen to be more pro-active than EIA which tends to be reactive. Proactive 
here means that more opportunity exists for programmes to be better designed (from 
an environmental perspective) rather than accepting that a specific option is chosen 
and the task is to minimise environmental impacts from that option. Again, while it 
encompasses more issues of concern, SEA remains non-comprehensive as a decision-
guiding procedure. Issues of time, cost, and non-environmental costs and benefits do 
not figure prominently. Relative to the benchmark of CBA, SEA goes some way to 
considering the kinds of issues that would be relevant in a CBA. 
Cumulative impacts assessment (CIA)
Cumulative impacts or effects assessment (CIA) refers to systems for measuring impacts 
on the natural and social environments that either (a) take place so frequently in time 
or so densely in space that they cannot be assimilated; or (b) occur when the impacts 
of one activity combine with the activities of another in a synergistic manner (CEARC, 
1988). Significant cumulative environmental impacts are often the result of aggregated 
or synergistic individual impacts, even if one by one, they are considered insignificant. 
Hence it is essential to effectively assess and manage for cumulative impacts, not 
only their individual components. However, cumulative effects can be difficult and 
expensive to assess. Methods are required which can address multiple projects, multiple 
resources and the interactions among impacts. Employing CIA may be necessary in 
EAF due to the large number of activities impacting on any ecosystem.
life cycle analysis (lCA)
LCA is similar to EIA in that it identifies the environmental impacts of a policy or 
project and tries to measure them. It may or may not measure the impacts in the same 
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units, any more than EIA tries to do this. Typically, when attempts are made to adopt 
the same units they do not include money, although some LCAs have done this. The 
chief difference between EIA and LCA is that LCA looks not just at the impacts directly 
arising from a project or policy, but at the whole “life cycle” of impacts. Included in the 
analysis would be the environmental impacts of primary resource extraction and the 
impacts from landfill, incineration etc. LCAs proceed by establishing an inventory of 
impacts and then the impacts are subjected to an assessment to establish the extent of 
impact and the weight to be attached to it. Relative to the benchmark of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, LCA is essentially the physical counterpart to the kind of environmental 
impact analysis that is required by a CBA. In itself LCA offers no obvious decision 
rule for policies or projects. Though widely advocated as a comprehensive decision-
guidance tool, LCA does not (usually) consider non-environmental costs and benefits. 
Hence it is not a comprehensive decision guide. However, if the choice context is one 
where one of several options has to be chosen, then, provided other things are equal, 
LCA operates like a cost-effectiveness criterion (see below).
Risk assessment (RA)
Risk assessment involves assessing either the health or environmental risks (or both) 
attached to a product, process, policy or project. Risk assessments may be expressed 
in various ways:
•	As the probability of some defined health or ecosystem effect occurring, e.g. a 1 
in 100 000 chance of mortality from continued exposure to some chemical.
•	As a number of incidences across a defined population, e.g. 10 000 premature 
deaths per annum out of some population.
•	As a defined incidence per unit of exposure, e.g. X percent increase in premature 
mortality per unit air pollution.
•	As a “no effect” level of exposure, e.g. below one microgram per cubic metre there 
may be no health effect.
Risk assessments may not translate into decision rules very easily. One way they 
may do this is if the actual or estimated risk level is compared to an “acceptable” level 
which in turn may be the result of some expert judgement or the result of a public 
survey. A common threshold is to look at unavoidable “everyday” risks and to judge 
whether people “live with” such a risk. This may make it acceptable. Other procedures 
tend to be more common and may define the acceptable level as a no-risk level, or even 
a non-risk level with a sizeable margin or error. Procedures establishing “no effect” 
levels, e.g. of chemicals, define the origin of what the economist would call a “damage 
function” but cannot inform decision-making unless the goal is in fact to secure that 
level of risk. Put another way, “no effect” points contain no information about the 
“damage function”.
Comparative risk assessment (CRA)
CRA involves analysing risks but for several alternative projects or policies. The issue is 
then which option should be chosen and the answer offered by CRA is that the option 
with the lowest risk should be chosen. Efforts are made to “normalize” the analysis so 
that like is compared to like. For example, one might want to choose between nuclear 
energy and coal-fired electricity. One approach would be to normalise the risks of one 
kilowatt hour of electricity and compute, say, deaths per kWh. The option with the 
lowest “death rate” would then be chosen. However, in this case, the normalization 
process does not extend to cost, so that CRA may want to add a further dimension, 
the money cost of generating one kWh. Once this is done, the focus tends to shift to 
cost-effectiveness analysis – see below. A further problem concerns the nature of risk. 
“One fatality” appears to be a homogenous unit, but if people are not indifferent to 
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the manner of death or whether it is voluntarily or involuntarily borne, then, in effect, 
the normalization has failed. Once again, one can see that CRA is not a comprehensive 
decision-guide since the way it treats costs (if at all) may not be all-embracing. Nor 
would CRA deal with benefits. 
Risk-benefit analysis (RbA)
RBA tends to take two forms, each of which is reducible to another form of decision 
rule. In other words, RBA is not a separate procedure. The first meaning relates to 
benefits, costs and risks, where risks are treated as costs and valued in money terms. 
In that case the formula for accepting a project or policy would be: [Benefits – Costs 
– Risks] > 0. This is no different to a CBA rule.
In the second case the RBA rule reduces to CRA. Benefits might be standardized, 
e.g. to “passenger kilometres” and the risk element might be fatalities. “Fatalities per 
passenger kilometre” might then be the thing that should be minimized. As with CRA, 
cost may or may not enter the picture. If it does, then RBA tends to result in CBA or 
cost-effectiveness analysis.
Risk-risk analysis (RRA)
RRA tends to focus on health risks and asks what would happen to health risks if some 
policy was adopted and what would happen if it was not adopted. The “with/without” 
focus is familiar in CBA. The novelty tends to be the fact that not undertaking a policy 
may itself impose costs in terms of lives or morbidity. For example, a policy of banning 
or lowering consumption of saccharin might have a justification in reducing health risks 
from its consumption. But the with-policy option may result in consumers switching 
to sugar in place of the banned saccharin, thus increasing morbidity by that route. The 
advantage of RRA is that it forces decision-makers to look at the behavioural responses 
to regulations. Once again, however, all other components in a CBA equation are 
ignored, so the procedure is not comprehensive.
health-health analysis (hhA)
HHA is similar to RRA but instead of comparing the risks with and without the 
behavioural reaction to a policy, it compares the change in risks from a policy with the 
risks associated with the expenditure on the policy. As such, it offers a subtle focus on 
policy that is easily overlooked. Since policies costs money, the money has to come 
from somewhere and, ultimately, the source is the taxpayer. But if taxpayers pay part 
of their taxes for lifesaving policies, their incomes are reduced. Some of that reduced 
income would have been spent on life-saving or health-enhancing activities. Hence 
the taxation actually increases life risks. HHA compares the anticipated saving in lives 
from a policy with the lives lost because of the cost of the policy. In principle, policies 
costing more lives than they save are not desirable. HHA proceeds by estimating the 
costs of a life-saving policy and the number of lives saved. It then allocates the policy 
costs to households. Life risks are related to household incomes through regression 
analysis, so that it is possible to estimate lives lost due to income reductions. Once 
again, the procedure is not comprehensive: policies could fail an HHA test but pass a 
CBA test, and vice versa.
Cost-effectiveness analysis (CeA)
The easiest way to think about CEA is to assume that there is a single indicator of 
effectiveness, E, and this is to be compared to a cost of C. Suppose there is now just a 
single project or policy to be appraised. CEA would require that E be compared to C. 
The usual procedure is to produce a cost-effectiveness ratio (CER). Notice that E is in 
some environmental unit and C is in money units. The fact that they are in different 
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units has an important implication which is, unfortunately, widely disregarded in the 
literature. A moment’s inspection shows that the ratio is perfectly meaningful– e.g. it 
might be read as US dollars per hectare of land conserved. But the ratio says nothing 
at all as to whether the conservation policy in question is worth undertaking. In 
other words, CEA cannot help with the issue of whether or not to undertake any 
conservation. It should be immediately obvious that this question cannot be answered 
unless E and C are in the same units. CEA can only offer guidance on which of several 
alternative policies (or projects) to select, given that one has to select one. By extension, 
CEA can rank any set of policies, all of which could be undertaken, but given that at 
least some of them must be undertaken. 
A further issue with CEA is the process of selecting the effectiveness measure. In 
CBA the principle is that benefits are measured by individuals’ preferences as revealed 
by their willingness to pay for them. The underlying value judgement in CBA is 
“consumer” or “citizen sovereignty”. This amounts to saying that individuals are the 
best judges of their own well-being. Technically, the same value judgement could be 
used in CEA, i.e. the measure of effectiveness could be based on some attitude survey 
of a random sample of individuals. In practice, CEA tends to proceed with indicators of 
effectiveness chosen by experts. Rationales for using expert choices are a) that experts 
are better informed than individuals, especially on issues such as habitat conservation, 
landscape, etc., and b) that securing indicators from experts is quicker and cheaper than 
eliciting individuals’ attitudes.
multicriteria analysis (mCA)
MCA involves multiple indicators of effectiveness, and is one of the more widely used 
means of selecting among very different alternatives faced by decision-makers. In MCA, 
different effectiveness indicators, measured in different units, have to be normalised by 
converting them to scores and then aggregated via a weighting procedure. Policy or 
scheme cost in an MCA is always (or should always be) one of the indicators chosen. 
The steps in an MCA are as follows:
•	The goals or objectives of the policy or investment are stated.
•	These objectives are not pre-ordained, nor are they singular (as they are in CBA 
which adopts increases in economic efficiency as the primary objective) and are 
selected by “decision-makers”.
•	Generally, decision-makers will be civil servants whose choices can be argued to 
reflect political concerns.
•	MCA then tends to work with experts’ preferences. Public preferences may or 
may not be involved.
•	“Criteria” or, sometimes, “attributes” which help achieve the objectives are 
then selected. Sometimes, objectives and criteria tend to be fused, making the 
distinction difficult to observe. However, criteria will generally be those features 
of a good that achieve the objective.
•	Such criteria may or may not be measured in monetary terms, but MCA differs 
from CBA in that not all criteria will be monetised.
•	Each option (alternative means of securing the objective) is then given a score 
and a weight. Pursuing the above example, a policy might score 6 out of 10 for 
one effect, 2 out of 10 for another effect, and 7 out of 10 for yet another. In turn, 
experts may regard the first effect as being twice as important as the second 
but only half as important as the third. The weights would then be 2, 1 and 4 
respectively.
•	 In the simplest of MCAs, the final outcome is a weighted average of the scores, 
with the option providing the highest weighted score being the one that is “best”. 
More sophisticated techniques might be used for more complex decisions.
Assessing the impacts of EAF management 79
•	To overcome issues relating to the need for criteria to be independent of each 
other (i.e. experts’ preferences based on one criterion should be independent of 
their preferences for that option based on another criterion), more sophisticated 
techniques might be used, notably “multiattribute utility theory” (MAUT). 
MAUT tends to be over-sophisticated for most practical decision-making.
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APPendIx 6.3
fAo indicators for sustainable development of capture fisheries
ecological criteria
Catch structure catch structure refers to the size of fish, species composition and numbers, and the trophic 
level of each species in the catch. Shifts in the catch structure are strong signals of potential non-sustainability 
in the fishery. 
Area and quality of important or critical habitats critical habitats (e.g. Mangrove systems or coral reefs) 
provide critical and direct support for fisheries production and are important for biodiversity in general and 
as source of food for exploited species. Change in the area of habitat, as measured using habitat inventory 
tools, can indicate changing conditions in the environment that could be caused by fishing, or might affect 
fishing activities. 
Fishing pressure - fished vs. Unfished areas not all areas within any given fishing grounds are fished with 
equal intensity as fishing grounds are not usually considered to be homogeneously productive. Thus some 
areas will be more intensively fished because of a greater perceived return or catch rate. In addition, reserves 
etc. are used to protect spawning stocks, or sensitive young life stages from harvesting or other detrimental 
effects. 
economic criteria
Profitability in the absence of major market distortions such as extensive subsidies or the existence of price 
controls, profitability is the single most important economic criteria. Low or negative profitability usually 
indicates that fish stocks are exploited in an economic wasteful manner and fishing capacity and effort are 
excessive on both economic and biological grounds. 
Value of fishing entitlements where management is done through transferable entitlements such as 
individual transferable quotas, the resource rent becomes capitalized in the value of the entitlement. In 
theory, the entitlement is worth the sum of the discounted stream of future profits or rent (i.e. The net 
present value). In the absence of speculative trading, a change in the market price of quota entitlement, thus, 
reflects a change in the, by market participants, estimated profit potential of the fishery. Such a change can 
occur as a result of a decline in stock abundance, a drop in fish prices or an increase in fishing costs. 
Subsidies apart from failing to effectively regulate access to the fishery, the single most important cause for 
economic waste and overfishing is the provision of subsidies for fishing inputs such as for fuel and for the 
construction and purchase of fishing vessels and gear. 
social criteria
Employment changes in the total amount of paid labour or employment in a fishery can be an indicator of 
both the condition of a fishery and its value to the local populations that may be dependent on fisheries for 
their livelihood. 
Protein consumption change in per capita fish consumption, and fish consumption as a proportion of total 
protein consumption, are important criteria that relate to the significance of the contribution of fisheries 
to the livelihood of coastal communities, and can be related to the community pressure for sustainable 
development of fisheries.
Tradition and culture the loss of traditional practices can indicate substantial changes in fishing practices, and 
may signal the loss of traditional fisheries management systems and reduced controls in loosely organized 
and subsistence fisheries. 
governance/institutional criteria
Capacity to manage the capacity to manage fisheries depends on available human and financial resources as 
well as on the existence of competent institutions. An economically sound fishery should make acceptable 
returns on investments after the costs of management are accounted for. In many fisheries, however, returns 
are marginal or negative and, as a consequence, the costs of management are considered to be an extra 
burden. Fisheries management also requires an adequate institutional base, including a set of regulations 
and a system to generate and enforce them. 
Compliance regime compliance regimes assess the extent to which the rules designed to keep fisheries 
sustainable are applied in practice. The existence and effectiveness of compliance assessment regimes can 
be evaluated by examination of fisheries management plans and, in subsistence fisheries, examination of 
traditional practices.
Transparency and participation fisheries managed exclusively by “top-down” approaches are found to be at 
high risk of non-sustainability. Transparency and participation do not guarantee sustainability, but fisheries 
are unlikely to achieve sustainability without them. Transparency and participation can be evaluated by 
assessment of the fishery’s management plan, particularly in the structural and functional elements that 
permit effective participation of fishers in the decision-making process.
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7.  Incentive mechanisms for 
applying eAf
InTRoduCTIon
The previous chapter discussed the range of benefits and costs involved in implementing 
the EAF. It was noted that these benefits and costs arise over varying time frames – 
some in the short-term, some only after considerable time has passed – and at various 
scales (e.g. local, regional, national, international), impacting in differing ways on the 
many individuals and entities within the fishery – thus having significant distributional 
implications. These realities lead to a challenge in implementing the EAF, namely that 
not all participants will necessarily see the prospect of receiving positive net benefits 
from EAF management (in the short term, at least). There is, in other words, a gap 
between the shifts in behaviour needed for full EAF implementation, and what can be 
expected to occur “naturally” simply as a result of individuals pursuing their own self-
interest as driven by the set of EAF benefits and costs. 
There will be a need for additional measures of various sorts to induce fishery 
participants (and others) to change behaviour in keeping with EAF management. Such 
measures supporting positive behavioural change could be socio-cultural, economic, 
legal or institutional in nature. This chapter reviews a range of such measures, all of 
which involve the use of “incentives” towards behavioural change, i.e. considerations 
that an individual will factor into their decision making and which lead to a result 
more in keeping with desired societal directions (in this case, effective implementation 
of EAF). 
As FAO (2005a) notes: “Incentives work indirectly through affecting those 
factors that lead to particular individual or collective choices…”. From an economics 
perspective, one might view an incentive as an influence on the profit-maximization of a 
fishery participant (i.e., increasing profits for EAF-compatible actions and conversely), 
while from a sociological perspective, incentives might be social constraints on 
behaviour (e.g. resulting from peer pressure and cultural institutions). 
Often those speaking of incentives are implicitly referring to “positive incentives”, 
i.e. those that reward participants (perhaps by giving them something, such as 
fishing rights) rather than negative incentives which penalize them (e.g. with fines 
for undesirable behaviour). In reality, however, both of these forms are incentives 
to modify behaviour. From the perspective of EAF implementation, then, a key 
requirement is to determine which set of incentives provides the most effective results 
with the least negative impacts. 
The above has provided general motivation for the role of incentives – and indeed 
the full range of social, economic and institutional measures – in inducing behaviour 
in support of EAF objectives. But what exactly are these measures seeking to achieve? 
What behaviour is it that needs to be modified? First, looking broadly at the fishery 
reality, a key element is to encourage a longer-term view, placing greater value on 
ecosystem health and sustainability of fish stocks. This may require certain forms 
of incentives, such as use rights, management rights or community stewardship 
actions, to increase the possibility that participants choose to engage in long-term 
conservation. Second, there is a need for modifications to specific behaviour – e.g. to 
reduce dumping, discarding and high-grading of fish, or to restrict fishing gear that is 
particularly damaging to aquatic ecosystems. Incentives to achieve such ends may need 
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to be carefully targeted on specific situations and specific participants. Overall, then, 
we can envision an “incentives toolkit” from which appropriate incentives are drawn 
to meet specific requirements. 
As noted above, incentives are often classified as “positive” or “negative”(“disincent
ives”). These may also be considered as “carrots” and “sticks”, with the “carrots” being 
positive incentives that induce desired behaviour (just as a carrot hanging in front of a 
horse can induce it to move forward) and the “sticks” being disincentives in the form of 
penalties for undesirable behaviour (a stick being used on a horse that will not move in 
the desired direction). The major focus of conventional natural resource management 
has been on establishing sets of regulations, with penalties (“sticks”) imposed for non-
compliance with the regulations, i.e. for illegal activities. This is a similar situation to 
that of pollution regulation, in which polluters are penalized, if caught, for exceeding 
prescribed levels of pollutants. 
However, in a fishery context, with a large number of participants, ranging over 
large areas, apprehending the rule-breakers (i.e. creating adequate enforcement of the 
disincentives) has proven a challenge. This reality has led to a recognition that the use 
of “sticks” needs to be balanced with greater use of “carrots”, the positive incentives 
inducing desired behaviour, in the hope that the need to find and punish rule-breakers 
will diminish. Indeed, it has been suggested that suitable incentives will provide “fishers 
with the incentives and the mandate to be co-custodians, with other stakeholders, of 
the marine environment” (Grafton et al., 2005). 
On the other hand, the trend towards the use of positive incentives has created a 
risk of over-reliance on such measures, just as in the past there was an over-reliance on 
disincentives (“sticks”). The theory of crime and punishment indicates clearly that no 
matter how rules or regulations are formed, there will always be a certain proportion of 
those subject to the rules and regulations who do not comply with them. It is important 
to the integrity of the entire management system, and the continuing support of law-
abiding participants, that these rule-breakers be apprehended and punished as much 
as possible. Thus, despite the difficulties noted above with enforcement of negative 
incentives, suitable “sticks” are crucial. 
Note that the need for a balance of both “carrots” and “sticks” holds whether one 
is dealing with a centralized or a decentralized fishery management system. Indeed, 
law-abiding fishers in a co-management arrangement, those involved in their own self-
regulation, are the first to call for strict enforcement of rules, and large penalties for rule-
breakers. It is thus important to seek out an appropriate balance in a context-sensitive 
manner. As FAO (2005a) notes: “Making better use of incentives, in conjunction with 
appropriate enforcement systems, could help to improve compliance and regulation.”
This chapter will thus discuss both the “carrots” – positive incentives for shifting 
fisheries towards EAF – and the “sticks” in the form of disincentives. The following 
section briefly reviews options for financial, social, and institutional incentives in the 
application of EAF management, while the subsequent section focuses on the economic 
analysis of some specific incentives.
TyPes of InCenTIves And TheIR eAf ImPlICATIons
The EAF Guidelines touch on some measures to align incentives in support of 
EAF – such as improving the institutional framework, developing collective values, 
and creating and using market and non-market incentives. The idea of measures to 
“align incentives” is to provide a more efficient alternative to conventional top-down 
“command and control” approaches to fisheries management. The latter have had 
limited success in meeting sustainable development objectives, due to a range of factors 
including insufficient information about the resources, inadequate control efforts, 
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and lack of political will38. Ward et al. (2004) discuss the desirability of shifting the 
focus from conventional “incentive blocking instruments” towards more “incentive 
adjusting instruments”. 
This section furthers the coverage of incentives in the EAF Guidelines by discussing 
social, economic, legal and institutional incentives that may help explain what drives 
individual and group behaviour. With this understanding comes further knowledge 
on what policy and management tools could be used as incentives to induce fishery 
participants to adopt specific EAF-appropriate measures, or more generally to support 
implementation of EAF management. Some specific examples of possible incentives 
may include: 
•	providing educational programs, for adults and for children, to raise awareness of 
the role of healthy ecosystems in supporting fisheries, and the impacts of fishing 
and other human activities on those ecosystems;
•	developing legal frameworks and participatory governance arrangements (co-
management) that involve stakeholders in developing regulations for fishery 
management, and EAF in particular, thus building support (“buy-in”) for that 
management;
•	providing secure access rights to fishery participants, so their decisions will be 
made on a longer-term basis rather than in a situation in which future access is 
uncertain;
•	developing positive economic incentives to make behaviour in accordance 
with EAF more profitable (i.e. to increase benefits or decrease costs of EAF 
implementation); and
•	 imposing disincentives against illegal behaviour, in the form of appropriate 
penalties (e.g. monetary fines, social exclusion or imprisonment) along with 
effective enforcement. 
From this range of possibilities, we see that incentive systems can involve:
•	 Institutional incentives (e.g. fisheries management systems and participatory 
governance arrangements that induce support from stakeholders); 
•	Legal incentives (e.g. effective legislation creating positive “carrots” as well as 
“sticks” in the form of significant penalty structures with effective enforcement 
capability);
•	Financial/material incentives (e.g. win-win measures, such as the use of excluder 
devices in fishing gear, which can actually increase profits, by reducing fishing 
costs, even as they meet the goal of reducing bycatch); and
•	Social incentives (e.g. community-based institutions and social environments 
that create peer pressure on individuals to comply with agreed-upon community 
rules).
It is clear that incentives can take many forms – some being of quite general 
applicability, and others being very specific to particular circumstances. For the 
remainder of this chapter, we focus on the commonly-advocated approaches for 
creating incentives supportive of policy goals, such as EAF, clustered into the four 
incentive systems mentioned above.
Institutional incentives
Institutional failures have been pointed out as the main obstacles to effective fisheries 
management. In particular, rather than limited biological knowledge being the major 
reason behind the lack of implementation of EAF management or the failure to achieve 
management objectives, more important are institutional causes such as: low levels 
of compliance due to limited legitimacy of the management process and objectives, 
38 See, for example, Kompas and Gooday (2007), Grafton et al. (2005), and Ward et al. (2004).
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conflicts that have not been mediated or resolved, lack of enforcement mechanisms in 
place, inadequate institutional set-up for management due to it having been imported 
from a different context, etc. (Degnbol, 2004). On the flip side, an institution that 
promotes transparency, cooperation, trust, and participation on the part of stakeholders 
can help create the incentives necessary for application of the EAF. 
This section reflects on some of the ways that proper institutional arrangements 
can promote sustainable use of resources through the holistic, integrated, and 
participatory application of the EAF. Mechanisms discussed here include coordination 
and integration of planning and management, devolution of decision-making and 
management responsibility, conflict resolution, knowledge management, monitoring 
and control, education, stakeholder involvement, capacity building, and use and 
management rights. Most of these are in fact relevant to any form of management, 
although some are especially necessary in the face of the increased complexities, 
uncertainties, stakeholder groups implied within the EAF.
Increased coordination, cooperation and communication between relevant 
institutions
Due to its wider scope of management, the ecosystem approach requires increased 
coordination, cooperation and communication between relevant sectors (agriculture, 
tourism, commercial- and non-commercial fisheries, communities etc.) and regulatory 
institutions (ministries, etc.), on and between regional, national and sub-national/
community levels, in order to manage fisheries effectively.
Increased cooperation is needed because the increased management scope requires 
more assistance from every institution, stakeholder and use sector. There also needs 
to be coordination between, and clarity of, the responsibilities of each player in the 
process (e.g. information gathering, research, management, law enforcement) in order 
to ensure coherency in management of the resources, and improved efficiency in the 
application of such management. 
At a regional level, one factor that increases the need for coordination and 
cooperation between sectors and other institutions is the disparity between ecosystem 
and jurisdictional boundaries (such as exclusive economic zones [EEZ]). Not only does 
this require intersectoral and institutional coordination and cooperation nationally but 
also internationally. 
Flexibility in the cooperation and coordination is also needed as ecosystem 
boundaries (e.g. those of a large marine ecosystem [LME]) may vary seasonally and 
annually, requiring flexibility in agreements between relevant agencies and nations 
(EAF Guidelines). 
As the development and implementation of EAF policy and legislation will often be 
undertaken by the national fisheries department or designated management agencies 
at a national level, and by regional fisheries management organizations at the regional 
level, these institutions will need to cooperate and coordinate their work (EAF 
Guidelines). 
At a sub-national level, it has been suggested that devolution of decision-making and 
management responsibility to organizations or groups lower than the central national 
level, for example to coastal communities, may improve compliance, improve the 
cost-effectiveness of management and make use of traditional management practices. 
A decentralization of management responsibility will, however, need to account for 
ecosystem boundaries which perhaps will require intercommunity coordination and 
cross-scale linkages (EAF Guidelines). 
Increased information and managing uncertainties in the decision-making process
Moving from conventional fisheries management to EAF management requires more 
information not only on species interactions, critical habitats, etc., but also on how 
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different sectors and stakeholders benefit from and impact on ecosystem services. 
This information will aid in the process of taking decisions on the most appropriate 
management measures and use of resources within a multiobjective context, but it may 
also assist in raising awareness of the need for management among the public at large 
and at a community level. Information thus needs to be gathered and disseminated at 
all relevant levels of governance.
In addition, a desire to incorporate a broader range of ecosystem factors into the 
management process, in the absence of a complete information set, will require the 
ability to manage resources within a context of increased uncertainty. Hence, the 
management framework will need to acknowledge these uncertainties and incorporate 
them into the decision-making process.
Increased stakeholder involvement
As an increased scope of management of the sort needed in the EAF, requires a 
broadened definition of stakeholders, mechanisms will be needed to allow for this 
range of stakeholders to be included in the management process, to improve the 
effectiveness of EAF. 
The benefits of increased stakeholder involvement are numerous and include the 
following, as presented in FAO (1995c):
•	 ensuring that alternatives serving a broad range of interests are considered; 
•	helping to gather data or information, identify gaps in data or information, and 
identify those who might provide data or information in the future; 
•	providing transparency and accountability regarding the decisions taken and the 
process by which those decisions were reached; 
•	 accustoming stakeholders to the need for difficult choices in order to manage 
aquatic resources effectively; and 
•	building a broad base of commitment to chosen options, by creating an 
environment that rewards participation in discussions of benefits, risks and costs 
of the various options, and that provides a meaningful basis for informed consent 
to recommendations.
However, it is important to realize that a participatory approach may lead to higher 
costs of management. These can stem from, for example, an increase in the number 
of meetings held during the planning process and a more developed information 
dissemination effort. In addition, an increased number of stakeholders means an 
increased number of objectives and interests to be balanced. In order to reconcile 
multiple objectives/interests, mechanisms for conflict resolution may be necessary.
Institutional mechanisms for facilitating the implementation of the EAF
In facing the above-noted additional challenges to be addressed institutionally in the 
move towards EAF management, what mechanisms can be used, or what changes can 
be made to existing frameworks in order to address these issues? Some of these are 
considered here.
Coordination and integration
To address the need to increase coordination and integration, through suitable strategies 
at the various different levels of governance, Scialabba (1998) distinguishes two broad 
institutional set-ups for increased coordination and integration:
1. Multisectoral integration involves translating common goals into independent 
sectoral planning. This can be done by coordinating the institutions, sectors 
and/or agencies that are actually in charge of managing fisheries and/or 
multisectoral uses of the ecosystem, through a common policy. It can also 
occur by bringing related stakeholders, institutions and/or sectors together to 
agree on strategies for working towards common goals.
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2. Systematic integration likely implies that a new, integrated institutional 
structure is created, in keeping with the broad systems approach of EAF (and 
of the larger framework of integrated management within which EAF may be 
embedded). Suitable management, development and policy initiatives are then 
placed within this new institutional framework. 
The second of these has a logical appeal, in reflecting a comprehensive response 
to the comprehensive challenge of an ecosystem approach. However, at a national 
level, one is faced with a number of agencies each with its own mandate – notably, 
it may often be the case that the Fisheries authorities will take the lead role in 
EAF implementation. Given this multiplicity of agencies involved, it may be more 
straightforward to coordinate the work between the existing institutions or ministries 
(i.e. multisectoral integration), rather than setting up a new institutional framework 
within which management, policy and development functions are integrated through 
broad administrative responsibilities that overlap the traditional areas of responsibilities 
of certain ministries. A choice to working within existing frameworks (multisectoral 
integration) also reflects the fact that line ministries may be reluctant to accept changes 
in their core responsibilities, for fear of the financial ramifications and perceived power 
shifts within the system (Scialabba, 1998). 
As an additional note, it is important to mention that when functioning traditional 
institutions exist on a community level, and are regulating exploitation of fisheries 
resources, there should be a focus on strengthening such mechanisms instead of 
introducing new ones (FAO, 1998). The idea here is that if the existing mechanisms 
are already respected and well-functioning, there is no need to introduce new and 
unfamiliar mechanisms, as these may be less effective and indeed counter-productive. 
In situations where it is deemed preferable to coordinate actions, activities and 
responsibilities within an existing multifaceted framework rather than integrating 
into a single institution, what would be required for creating effective coordination? 
Scialabba (1998) has suggested some prerequisites:
•	 adoption of a holistic approach to governance; 
•	 agreement on goals and policies at the national, sub-national and sector levels; 
•	 agreement on respective roles, jurisdictional boundaries, provision of resources 
and responsibilities at different levels of governance; and
•	provision for effective negotiation (bargaining) between different levels of 
governance, between these and the line ministries, between ministries, and between 
government and civil society groups that use and manage aquatic resources.
In order to promote more effective coordination, a well-defined communication 
strategy will be necessary. Scialabba (1998) also suggested some examples of ways of 
improving communication between relevant sectors, institutions and/or stakeholders:
•	 information sharing and transfer; 
•	 joint education and training, when appropriate; 
•	 joint assessment and acceptance of costs and benefits of environmental changes 
and proposed policy interventions, when appropriate;
•	 learning from policy experience; 
•	 joint project and policy monitoring and evaluation; 
•	participation by all stakeholders; and
•	balance between top-down and bottom-up processes.
Devolution of decision-making and management responsibility
As noted above, devolution of decision-making and management responsibility to 
institutions or groups lower than the central national level (e.g. to coastal and riparian 
communities) has been proposed as potentially effective given the right circumstances. 
However, this requires that (1) management decisions and actions are coordinated and 
consistent at higher levels, in order to make EAF management effective (EAF Guidelines), 
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and (2) such administrative changes are accompanied by capacity-building among local 
decision-makers (FAO, 1998), as well as other human and financial mechanisms. 
In addition, moves to more devolved management may need to deal with problems 
related to existing local structures. For example, situations could arise in which local-
level institutions are dominated by members of a certain social or economic group, 
who may or may not fully represent the interests of all those likely to be affected by 
a change in fisheries management. Therefore, it is important that local institutions 
and stakeholder representatives responsible for fisheries management are trusted and 
respected by all stakeholders, especially in cases of decisions regarding the distribution 
of compensation and access to resources (FAO, 1998).
Conflict resolution
Establishing mechanisms for conflict resolution can be important in stakeholder 
involvement processes, by aiding in the reconciliation of multiple objectives. 
Administrative procedures and dispute resolution offices may be formal ways of 
anticipating and resolving conflicts between and within institutions. 
Also at a local level, traditional/religious institutions (e.g. customary courts and 
assemblies) may provide appropriate and respected conflict resolution mechanisms 
for certain kinds of disputes. However, in terms of dealing with resource distribution 
and control, the appropriateness of such institutions will depend on the extent to 
which the authorities of such tribunals are seen as representative and independent, 
without vested interests or influence by a certain group of the community (FAO, 
1998). Understanding of local institutions and cultures is a necessary ingredient in the 
development of devolved management processes.
Whatever structure is used at a local or community level, additional funding may be 
required for conflict resolution (Scialabba, 1998). This would be needed to cover the 
costs of:
•	building up local capacity for conflict resolution, by training and educating third 
parties for mediation, facilitation and arbitration in disputes; and
•	 carrying out the negotiations, including locating mediators or experts – potentially 
external if local expertise is lacking.
Knowledge management
In applying the EAF, it is clear that more and/or different information will be 
needed to assist the decision-making process. Managing a more complex system, 
with interactions between an increased number of stakeholders and also between 
components of the ecosystem itself, conveys a need for a new dimension of knowledge 
that goes beyond focusing solely on natural science and technology. In addition to 
the need/desire for increased knowledge of this complex system, there will also be an 
increased need for dealing with uncertainty in the decision-making process. A good 
deal of this information may be supplied by existing research institutions; however, 
research may not be sufficient to solve all issues of uncertainty or, additional research 
may come at too high a cost. In these cases, the best available information should be 
used, implying both scientific research as well as the use of traditional knowledge. In 
the case where uncertainty still exists, this knowledge gap would have to be dealt with 
through the decision-making process (Degnbol, 2002).
To further this point, Degnbol (2004) suggests that, ultimately, there will be economic 
limitations if the requirements for understanding, precision and implementation 
efficiency are to be maintained, while the complexity of issues to be addressed increases 
as well as the number of stakeholders involved. Given the complexity of the systems to 
be managed, it is thus not feasible to depend on a management approach based solely 
on quantifiable predictability, but rather, there is a need to accept an approach based 
on weak predictability and adaptation. 
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Using indicators rather than assessments based on complex models of processes, 
for example, allows for low-cost observations reflecting features of the ecosystem, 
which can be recognized and accepted by fishermen, scientists and other stakeholders. 
Indicators that represent ecosystem health may inform the decision-making process of 
management, without pretending to grasp all details or capture all possible outcomes. 
Ideally, indicators can summarise the outcome of complex, underlying processes which 
may not be fully understood. In identifying indicators of local relevance, the use of 
indigenous knowledge is essential (Degnbol, 2004). 
In the Framework for Action of the UNESCO/ICSU World Conference on 
Science for the Twenty-first Century (in ACFR, 2000), the importance of traditional 
knowledge systems is stressed, not only because they harbour information as yet 
unknown to modern science, but also because they are expressions of other ways 
of living in the world, other relationships between society and nature, and other 
approaches to the acquisition and construction of knowledge. Linking science with 
other knowledge systems is likely to inform both sides. On the other hand, Campbell 
and Salagrama (2000) (in ACFR, 2000) suggest that, since the size and scale of many 
social and environmental problems have increased vastly, using indigenous knowledge 
in local areas, in isolation from the outside world, is often inadequate to cope with 
these new challenges. This implies a need to generate new knowledge as well. 
Different sources of knowledge for management may have institutional implications – 
for example, management decisions may have less legitimacy if the knowledge base is 
not shared among stakeholders. Overall, the knowledge base needs to be relevant to the 
local context and it has to be considered valid by stakeholders (Degnbol, 2004).
Public education
In order to understand why it is important to use an ecosystem approach to fisheries 
and what this entails, it is imperative to inform and educate not only the fishermen and 
those involved in the production system, but also the public in general and the local 
communities, through some system of public education. 
Education for stakeholders in fisheries and aquatic ecosystems leads to a greater 
understanding of the needed measures and changes in resource use, and this – in 
combination with participatory approaches to management – can lead to a greater 
willingness to adjust and comply with new rules and regulations. Informing the general 
public could, as well as increasing the understanding for the need for such an approach, 
also help increase general support and add an inducement to the fisheries industry/
sector to implement EAF changes. 
Public participation/stakeholder involvement 
In order to attain the holistic and integrated approach which the EAF is supposed to 
represent, public participation and stakeholder involvement are essential. Although 
there are several levels of public participation, from minimal information sharing 
(dissemination of information to affected or interested groups), through consultation 
(feedback sought from affected or interested groups prior to decision-making), to 
participation by multiple stakeholders in the actual decision-making process, the EAF 
promotes as great a level of participation as possible. As participatory methods can 
help achieve reconciliation of multiple objectives; exchange of knowledge; and increase 
of understanding (Scialabba, 1998), they are important tools in legitimising the EAF 
management system among stakeholders.
Stakeholder involvement can also take many forms, such as shared decision-
making (consensus building), collaborative decision-making (co-partnerships), and 
empowerment (self-management) (Scialabba, 1998). Essentially this is related closely 
to co-management – the participation of communities/resource users together with 
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governmental institutions in sharing decision-making, planning and implementation 
roles. Co-management was discussed as a policy framework in Chapter 3. 
EAF management can incorporate all of these forms of participation, perhaps in 
different forms for different contexts. Shared decision-making should help in the 
application of agreed-upon management plans, as acceptance will have been fostered 
through the participation process. However, naturally, it will be difficult to achieve 
consensus among an increased number and variety of stakeholders; therefore, it is 
important to allow sufficient time for a participatory process to work properly, likely 
more time than in top-down management systems.
Examples exist in which stakeholders, including the fishing industry, have led the 
promotion of change, such as through creating “best practice” guidelines, and this kind 
of leadership may prove to be an important factor in the application of the EAF.
From an institutional perspective, FAO (2005a) has identified that successful 
co-management requires not only empowerment of the community/ies through 
devolution of power to a local level, but also:
•	Effective institutions, particularly local institutions – e.g. who facilitates the 
process and the scale of the process, i.e. what should really be addressed under 
co-management.
•	Adequate resources for implementation, since participation in meetings, 
monitoring, enforcement and management involve costs which can be high. 
•	An enabling policy and legislative environment, including a robust enforcement 
mechanism and sanctions system to ensure compliance with locally agreed rules. 
An example of the institutional set-up of co-management within one multisectoral 
example is presented in Box 12.
Communities and other resource users are to a certain extent empowered by 
becoming co-managers of resources, yet further strengthening of their organizations and 
capacity enhancement is required for a successful continuation of this co-management 
(Kumar, 2005). Empowerment requires both interventions at the community level and 
outside the community:
•	 Interventions at the community level include increasing the sense of unity through 
improved organization, assistance in capacity development, etc.
•	More broadly, community organizations can be involved in networking at village, 
local, regional and national levels.
•	At a governmental level, work can be done to create an enabling environment by 
providing conducive policies, and a legal and regulatory framework, etc. 
In co-management as well as in the empowerment process, it is important to 
recognize the fact that women and youth tend to be underrepresented in traditional 
institutions and decision-making mechanisms for dealing with natural resource use. 
However, such decisions still affect these groups (FAO, 1998).
Monitoring, control and surveillance
Only in the recent past has monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) been recognized 
as an integral part of fisheries management and not merely a police function to punish 
law breakers. MCS is now being recognized not only for its role in protecting fisheries 
from IIU fishing, both national and international, but also for its role in providing 
necessary biological, economic, and social information for management and as a means 
to provide a backbone to management implementation. In fact, without MCS, there 
can be no certainty that pre-determined management objectives will be realized. For 
simplicity, MCS has been described by its three components (Flewwelling, 1995):
•	Monitoring fishing activities, notably fishing effort characteristics and resource 
yields;
•	Control over the regulatory conditions under which the exploitation of the 
resource may be conducted; and
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•	Surveillance – the specifics of observations required to maintain compliance with 
the regulatory controls imposed on fishing activities.
There are two parallel approaches to effective MCS – one is the preventive approach 
of compliance measures, and the other is the deterrent/enforcement approach. The first 
approach includes (adapted from Flewwelling et al., 2002):
−	enhancement of community/fisher awareness and understanding of management 
practices and MCS through seminars, public awareness and information, 
education, and communication campaigns;
BOx 12
west Coast vancouver Island Aquatic management board
In a move to develop an integrated and participatory approach to the management of coastal 
activities affecting marine resources on the West Coast of Vancouver Island (WCVI), in 
British Columbia, Canada, an initiative in community-based co-management began in 2001. 
Approval by multiple levels of government of the terms of reference for the regional Aquatic 
Management Board was seen as an important step forward. These Terms of Reference (ToR) 
state that the aquatic resources should be managed on an ecosystem basis.
The Board functions as a forum for shared decision-making - in which “those with 
authority to make decisions, and those who will be affected by that decision, will jointly 
seek an outcome which reconciles/accommodates all interests concerned”. On the Board, 
coastal communities and others affected by aquatic resource management can work 
with governments in matters of integrated management of aquatic resources in relevant 
management areas. 
The Board consists of 16 members – eight from governments and eight non-
governmental. The former include two representatives each from the federal, provincial, 
regional and aboriginal (indigenous) governments. The non-governmental representatives 
reflect a diversity of geographical locations and resource interests in the management area. 
The Board members are to be appointed on the basis of the Board’s vision and purpose, 
their skills, knowledge and experience, and base of support, rather than to represent 
individual groups or organizations.
Some of the principles mentioned in the ToR are as follows:
•	 Shared Responsibility – the governments, coastal communities, and other stakeholders 
affected by the use of the aquatic resources are jointly responsible and accountable 
for integrated resource management.
•	 Inclusivity – coastal communities and others affected by the resource management 
should have the opportunity to participate in the formulation and implementation 
of management decisions.
•	 Flexibility – administrative structures and processes should be flexible and expected 
to evolve in order to accommodate the continuous management process. 
Some of the key objectives are to:
•	 consolidate information relating to different aquatic resource uses and utilization to 
provide a holistic picture of the health of ecosystems within the management area;
•	 integrate expertise and knowledge from First Nations (indigenous people/tribe), 
local, scientific, and other sources;
•	 ensure opportunities for coastal communities and others affected by the resource 
management to participate in all aspects of integrated management, protection and 
restoration of aquatic resources.
The Board has been operating for several years and received a positive review from a 
recent independent assessment body (see Pinkerton et al., 2005). For more information, 
visit the Board’s website: http://www.westcoastaquatic.ca  
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−	participatory management development to promote ownership of the 
management regime and input into the regulatory/control aspect of management 
(laws and regulations) in preparation for acceptance by the fishers of their joint 
“stewardship” role for the management of their fisheries in partnership with 
government;
−	peer pressure towards voluntary compliance and support for the management 
regime;
−	the institution of accurate and verifiable data collection regimes; and
−	surveillance and verification for compliance.
On the other hand, the deterrent/enforcement approach, seeks to ensure compliance 
by fishers who resist the regulatory regime. This approach includes inspection, 
investigation, prevention and court proceedings to enforce the law. It is a necessary 
complementary approach to that of voluntary compliance, which would fail if 
stakeholders see non-compliant fishers successfully evading the law and receiving 
economic returns from their illegal activity, at the expense of the fishers who comply 
(Flewwelling et al., 2002).
In establishing and operating an MCS system, in addition to infrastructure and 
equipment costs, those on the human side include (Kelleher, 2002):
•	Development of institutions and human resources, which often includes 
coordination among institutions responsible for MCS at the national (or 
international) level, and practical training of fisheries inspectors and operational 
personnel;
•	Personnel – in general terms it can be said that the higher the incomes in a country, 
the greater will be the proportion of the recurrent MCS costs attributable to staff;
•	Administration and coordination – the administrative costs of MCS are difficult 
to isolate from those of other administrative tasks, as they are closely intertwined; 
and
•	Costs to fishermen – a restriction on a fisherman’s activities incurs a cost. If the 
costs of compliance are high, the risk of violation is also high.
In order to achieve an effective MCS system, one must bear the following findings 
in mind (Flewwelling et al., 2002):
•	Each MCS system must be adapted to the cultural, geographic, political and legal 
framework of the state or region concerned as there are no universally applicable 
models; 
•	An absolute requirement for a successful MCS system is political will of the state, 
or strong national government support of a regional body;
•	The operational character of the system will depend on management decisions;
•	When establishing an MCS system, legal and policy considerations must always 
be taken into account;
•	National and regional MCS activities must complement each other; and
•	Stakeholder involvement is key to successful implementation of management and 
MCS plans.
In terms of legislation, an MCS system needs to be based on clear legal rules that 
set out the rights and responsibilities of the various parties, in order to be effective. 
These rules should provide effective and efficient legal procedures and mechanisms for 
implementing those rules consistently. It is therefore important to review the existing 
domestic legislation to ensure that it prescribes norms that are appropriate to achieve 
the desired fisheries management objectives and contains provisions that facilitate 
effective enforcement (Flewwelling et al., 2002). As a part of the coordination process, 
there needs to be an agreement on who is responsible for what (e.g. jurisdictional 
boundaries) – i.e. what roles different institutions should have (Scialabba, 1998). 
In general, strengthening a national MCS regime will involve addressing the 
following key issues:
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a)  ensuring that fisheries administrators and enforcement officers can exercise 
all powers available to coastal, port and flag States under international law 
(this will usually require reviewing the powers of enforcement officers under 
domestic law and strengthening procedures under which the States grants 
authorization to fish);
b) increasing regional and international cooperation in order to reduce the 
incidence of IUU fishing, including measures to support the enforcement of 
fisheries conservation and management measures on the high seas and in areas 
under the jurisdiction of other States;
c)  increasing the transparency of fishing efforts by improving monitoring 
programs (particularly by requiring the use of VMS);
d)  facilitating the use of information derived from monitoring and surveillance 
(particularly from new VMS technologies) to promote compliance; and
e)  strengthening existing sanctions and extending the range of compliance 
mechanisms available to enforcement officers (adapted from Flewwelling et al., 
2002).
In order to attain a cost-effective MCS system, the cooperation of the fishing industry 
and fishers is essential. Lack of participation in fisheries management, including MCS 
planning and implementation exercises, may often result in non-compliance. It is thus 
vital that stakeholders are involved in the development of acceptable, responsible and 
sustainable management planning and implementation. Involved stakeholders will 
not only know and understand the rules and the rationale for their development, but 
will also be more inclined to comply with them voluntarily. This may increase or 
even reduce the costs of the MCS, whilst simultaneously increasing its effectiveness 
(Flewwelling et al., 2002; Gitonga, undated).
Capacity-building
As mentioned throughout this document, the EAF will require a more holistic 
and integrated way of thinking about fisheries management, in order to take into 
consideration the multiple needs and desires of societies, beyond conventional fishery 
aspects. It will thus also require increased stakeholder involvement/participation in 
order to achieve this “new” way of thinking, and setting economic and social objectives. 
Within the institutional framework, capacity-building may be required in relation to:
•	 Improved institutional linkages within the fisheries management system: capacity 
is needed particularly to build the ecosystem-wide and cross-sectoral skills and 
experience needed to smooth the way towards applying a holistic and participatory 
approach to fisheries management (Scialabba, 1998).
•	Participation: capacity building is needed both to facilitate such a process 
(mediation, negotiation, conflict resolution, etc.) and in order for the participants 
to have sufficient information/training to be able to participate in a meaningful 
way.
•	Monitoring, Control and Surveillance.
•	Research: the capacity is needed to undertake new areas for research, such as 
cross-sectoral disciplines.
In addition, there are the requirements of capacity development in certain technical 
areas that require more emphasis on understanding ecosystem structures, habitat 
restoration methods, marine protected areas, and measures to deal with bycatch 
reduction, etc. (Macfadyen and Huntington, 2003).
Institutions involved in fisheries management, both in industrialized and developing 
countries, may therefore need to change to allow for these new requirements. However, 
it is not simply about adjusting institutions according to new needs – equally important 
is building/developing capacity to handle these new requirements. Capacity must be 
developed to translate the underlying principles of EAF management into policy goals 
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and then into operational objectives that can be achieved by applying management 
measures (Macfadyen and Huntington, 2003).
Capacity development has been defined as “the process by which individuals, 
groups, organizations, institutions, and societies develop their abilities – both 
individually and collectively – to set and achieve objectives, perform functions, solve 
problems and to develop the means and conditions required to enable this process” 
(UNDP, 1997, in Macfadyen and Huntington, 2003). This definition highlights two 
important features of capacity development: Firstly, this is a process and not a passive 
state – individual development becomes a part of a sustainable shift in performance 
and collective behaviour (Macfadyen and Huntington, 2003). Secondly, there are thus 
four levels at which capacity development can take place. These are: in individuals, in 
organizations/institutions, in sectors and networks, and in the overall environment in 
which the first three function (Macfadyen and Huntington, 2003): 
•	At the individual level, the focus is on enabling individuals to embark on a 
continuous process of learning, building on existing knowledge and skills, and 
extending these in new directions (Fukuda-Parr et al. 2001). This level refers to the 
individuals operating within the other three levels, or being affected by them.
•	At the sector/network level, there is a need for coherent sector policies and 
strategies, as well as co-ordination across sectors. Thus, initiatives may focus on 
issues such as policy reform or service delivery as a way of increasing capacity at 
the sector level (Macfadyen and Huntington, 2003).
•	At the organizational/institutional level, organizational structures, processes, 
resources and management issues have been of great importance and the focus has 
been on assistance in the form of technical assistance, budgetary or infrastructure 
support, or support for institutional linkages (Macfadyen and Huntington, 2003). 
Existing capacities or initiatives should be sought out and allowed/encouraged 
to develop, considering the construction of new institutions only if this is not 
feasible (Fukuda-Parr et al. 2001). 
•	 In order to create an enabling environment, initiatives at the societal level tend 
to focus on the principles of good governance. High levels of commitment and 
mechanisms to resolve conflict support an enabling environment, whereas low 
accountability and high levels of corruption contribute to disabling the policy 
environment (Macfadyen and Huntington, 2003).
Capacity building must involve a process of individual capacity development, 
during which new knowledge and the abilities of individuals eventually feed into and 
contribute to an institutional, sectoral or societal change, be it a systemic or a structural 
improvement. At the same time, a change in the collective behaviour may support new 
levels of performance and form new patterns of behaviour. This process is not linear 
and individuals need to continue building on existing core skills and capacities, so the 
process requires time. Another aspect linked to the time requirement is that capacity 
development as a process may produce uncertain or intangible results that are not easily 
measurable. Quick-fixes with predictable and easily measurable results are therefore 
not feasible. Lastly, the permanence and sustainability of capacity development, and the 
changes it entails, depend on ways to retain the acquired knowledge/abilities/capacities 
(e.g. keeping institutional knowledge in the face of high turnover) (Macfadyen and 
Huntington, 2003).
Capacity development is not a new concept and the following key lessons, adapted 
from Macfadyen and Huntington (2003), have thus been drawn from previous 
activities: 
•	Capacity development initiatives must be participatory in design, implementation 
and monitoring. Initiatives must build on core capacities and be a two-way 
process of knowledge transfer.
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•	 Initiatives must provide for flexible and suitable learning pathways, i.e. capacity-
building must be adapted to the local situation and local requirements. One size 
does not fit all.
•	Approaches must take cognizance of the overall societal/political context in which 
initiatives operate.
•	There is need for much better integration of initiatives based on regional, 
geographical, intra-sectoral, intersectoral, and vertical linkages.
•	Appropriate incentives must be built into capacity development initiatives.
•	Those delivering capacity development may themselves require capacity 
development for effective delivery.
Askvik (1993, referenced in Hersoug, 2004) presented some general problems in 
the process of capacity development that merit consideration when designing and 
implementing a capacity building programme:
•	Rapid turnover of staff due to qualified people disappearing during the project 
period. Since the people taking part in the training often acquire valuable 
qualifications, they may be found attractive in other work areas and may be 
tempted by higher salaries offered in those other areas.
•	Knowledge, per se, does not always give authority in an organization/institution. 
Sometimes newly trained staff cannot apply this new knowledge in the organization, 
e.g. because the leader has not given his consent. A way of getting around this, 
though, is to start by training the top leadership.
•	A lack of coordination in the process may lead to increased differences in the same 
institution. 
As an end note, it should be stressed that attaining adequate institutional capacity 
is vital, not only to achieve a well-functioning system of EAF management, but also 
in order to sustain it. It is, however, important to bear in mind that it is not feasible 
to expect the creation of a completely new system. Changes will more often be 
incremental and build on existing capacities, because institutional adjustments and 
related capacity development are costly and time-consuming, and may therefore be 
restrained by lack of financing. 
Use and management rights
Recognizing and/or assigning rights in fisheries represents a mechanism to be clear 
about who has access to the fishery (i.e. to go fishing) and to what extent, as well as 
who has the right to be involved in fisheries management itself. While the existence of 
rights over the use and management of the fishery does not necessarily constitute an 
incentive as such, once in place, the hope is that they will create desired incentives. 
Some key considerations with regard to rights arrangements (see Charles, 2002) are 
as follows:
•	A system of use rights is an institutional mechanism by which fishers, fisher 
organizations and/or fishing communities hold rights and some security of tenure 
over access to a fishing area, the use of an allowable set of inputs, or the harvest 
of a quantity of fish. If use rights are well established, there is increased clarity 
with respect to who can access the fishery resources and how much fishing each is 
allowed to do. This implies that fishers will have greater security; they know that 
with use rights, they are securely in the fishery for a certain time period to come. 
•	Management rights – rights to be involved in managing the fishery – reflects the 
need, as noted in the Code of Conduct (Paragraph 6.13), to “facilitate consultation 
and the effective participation of industry, fishworkers, environmental and other 
interested organizations in decision-making with respect to the development of 
laws and policies related to fisheries management…”. This has led notably to 
the emergence of co-management arrangements involving joint development of 
management measures by fishers, government and possibly local communities. 
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Through use rights and management rights, it is hoped that greater incentives will 
be in place to increase the possibility that participants will:
1. adopt a longer-term perspective on the fishery, since (with conditions of open 
access removed) their use rights are secure over a longer-term, so protecting 
“the future” becomes more compatible with their own long-term interests, in 
keeping with the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, 
2. support and comply with management regulations, since those with management 
rights have been involved in developing the regulations in the management 
process, and 
3. engage in greater cooperation, since one’s well-being may become more closely 
intertwined with that of others. 
Use rights can be divided into two sub-components (Charles, 2002): access rights – 
e.g. territorial use rights (TURFs) and limited licensing – and withdrawal rights (further 
separated into input and output rights). For a review of experiences with use rights and 
output (quota) rights in fisheries management, see FAO 2000a and 2001b, respectively. 
FAO (1982) provides a discussion on the conditions affecting the successful creation 
and maintenance of TURFs, which may be found across the globe and have usually 
developed in situations with historic roots of community-based management of natural 
resources.
While use rights and management rights have been well-discussed in the general 
fisheries literature, there are some specific considerations that need addressing with 
respect to EAF implementation. In particular, as EAF implies a broader scope of fisheries 
management (to include multiple species, the aquatic ecosystem, the range of societal 
objectives, and any interactions with other economic sectors, amongst other aspects), 
use and management rights within such a context will need to deal with other “users”of 
the ecosystem beside the specific stakeholders in the fishery being addressed. Other 
fisheries, aquaculture, offshore oil and mining activities, eco-tourism and/or coastal 
tourism, shipping, urban development, coastal industries, and other aquatic-based 
human endeavours all vie for resources and impact on the ecosystem along with fisheries. 
Just as rights may be allocated to use specific fishery resources and to be involved in 
managing those resources, so too may there be rights arrangements for others – perhaps 
in the context of integrated coastal and ocean management, or integrated watershed 
management. While this goes beyond EAF per se, clearly it is a reality that must be taken 
into account, and which bears very much on the broader goal of ecosystem health, which 
necessarily involves more than just those within the fishery. 
In summary, the judicious recognition or adoption of use rights and management 
rights can help align incentives to desired EAF policy, but this is not a simple task, and 
indeed taking the wrong approach can produce results contrary to the aims of EAF 
management. In particular, a rights system will always have accompanying benefits 
and costs (and varying distributional impacts of each) so there is a need to assess 
these aspects (as well as monitoring any negative impacts of the measures). Thus it is 
important to understand the relationship between rights and incentives, which will 
vary from case to case.
legal incentives
The long-term prospects of applying EAF will be enhanced by clear and facilitating 
legal arrangements, supporting the corresponding policy frameworks (see Chapter 3) 
and institutional frameworks (discussed in this chapter). A supporting legal framework 
can provide the legal basis for many of the required changes by, amongst other things:
•	providing a framework for coordination and integration; 
•	defining roles and responsibilities; 
•	providing a framework for the management processes; and
•	providing legal mechanisms for conflict resolution.
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At an international level, the EAF is currently supported mainly through voluntary 
instruments – such as the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, the Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries and the Reykjavik Declaration – rather than in binding 
international law. This results in little explicit recognition of EAF within the legal 
frameworks of regional fisheries organizations and arrangements (FAO, 2003a).
At a national level, the EAF is frequently not an integral part of national fisheries 
policy and legislation. This leads to weak capability for cross-sectoral consultation and 
cooperation, and the failure to consider, or a legal inability to act on, external influences 
such as pollution and habitat deterioration in current fishery management regimes. 
Furthermore, implementing EAF effectively not only requires suitable fisheries 
legislation but would also benefit from suitable legal frameworks in other sectors. 
Thus, existing legal instruments in fisheries, and in other sectors that interact with or 
impact on fisheries, need to be assessed and adjustments to those instruments made 
where needed and where possible (FAO, 2003a). 
This section will briefly discuss the role of a supporting legal framework in 
implementing EAF.
How can a legal framework help in the implementation of EAF? 
A legal framework can specify the policy-making entity, the geographical area the 
policy covers, the stakeholders bound by the policy, the institutions respectively 
responsible for implementing and for enforcing the management plan, and how 
interinstitution jurisdictional disputes will be resolved. This reduces overlap and 
conflicts both between sectoral management institutions and between different tiers of 
government, by delineating roles and responsibilities (FAO, 1997). 
The legal framework should provide the legal backbone for implementing EAF and 
its relevant principles and policies by supplying the following support:
•	Coordination and integration, roles and responsibility 
As mentioned above, effective application of EAF will require coordination and 
integration of sectoral and institutional responsibilities and activities as a way of 
dealing with the increased management scope. The legal framework can facilitate this 
by defining interconnections and integration of management authorities (broadening 
from a traditional single-sector focus). By defining the institutional structure for 
fisheries management and empowering this structure with the corresponding authority, 
roles are set out at each level of governance, which is essential as it sets out who is 
entitled to administer and control the use of the fisheries resources (FAO, 1997).
•	Framework for management processes
A legal framework can also provide a framework for management processes. For 
example, it can supply the basis for formulation, monitoring and implementation of 
fisheries management plans, including the necessary powers to formulate appropriate 
management measures and enforce the related fisheries regulations (FAO, 1997).
•	Legal status of rights system
A legal framework provides the legal status of a rights system. For example, it may 
set out who is in charge of determining allocation of total allowable catch (TAC), and 
what the guidelines for such allocation are (Van Anrooy et al., 2006).
•	Pro-poor legislation
A legal framework constitutes a way of supporting small-scale fisheries, of which 
many are poor, by legislating pro-poor policies, as mentioned in Chapter 3. For 
example, the legal framework can ensure that various rights of small-scale fishers and 
fishworkers are enshrined in law, thereby preventing an erosion of such rights through 
social, economic and political marginalization (FAO, 2005b).
•	 International norms and agreements
A legal framework describes the requirements (e.g. at a national level) for the 
application of international norms and agreements, including recommendations by 
regional fisheries bodies.
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•	Conflict resolution
Another important function of any fisheries legal regime is to establish the 
institutional arrangements and procedures necessary to reduce potential conflicts and 
facilitate their resolution when they occur. As conflicts between different stakeholders 
are likely to arise, having formal procedures and a transparent dispute settlement 
process may facilitate the implementation of EAF (FAO, 1997).
What is required of the legal framework? 
•	Flexibility
The legal framework needs to be flexible and responsive to various changes, for 
example changes in the knowledge base, and biological, ecological and socio-economic 
changes. However, simultaneously it needs to be stable enough to provide continuity. 
At a national level, the primary legislation lays down principles and policies and is 
generally broad in scope, and should specify the “functions, powers and responsibilities 
of government or other institutions involved in fisheries management” (Chapter 4.3.1 
iv of FAO, 1997). It may also reflect varying degrees of detail of implementation, such 
as the main features of a specific mechanism (e.g. that controlling the allocation of 
fishing rights). Responsible fisheries management requires, however, that the primary 
fisheries legislation should, as far as possible, not be subject to frequent changes, hence 
the primary legislation may provide the necessary continuity (FAO, 1997). As many 
interactions between fisheries and other sectors will be dynamic, it may be preferable to 
rely on agreed rules instead. This is consistent with the advice in the EAF Guidelines, 
namely that routine management control measures needing frequent revision should be 
included in subordinate legislation, rather than in the primary legislation.
•	Harmonization
As ecosystems are often covered by several overlapping legal regimes (maritime, 
forestry, water, agriculture, etc.), and also frequently overlapping national legislation, 
there is a need for harmonization between fisheries legislation and the other sectors’ 
sets of legal instruments, both within and between nations (FAO, 1997). One example 
of such harmonization is a project set up in the Benguela Current Large Marine 
Ecosystem (BCLME) region. This ecosystem is shared by three countries – Angola, 
Namibia and South Africa. The aim of the project is to facilitate harmonization of 
these countries’ national environmental policies and legislation for marine mining, 
dredging and offshore petroleum exploration and production activities in the region. 
The project has identified areas of similarity and differences in terms of policies and 
legislation, and their implementation, and drew up draft guidelines on areas where 
regional harmonization would be beneficial, e.g. standardized water quality criteria and 
environmental management reporting (BCLME Programme website).
financial/material incentives
Financial incentive mechanisms that are created outside existing markets are based 
on the idea of establishing a situation in which economic actors/agents are convinced 
that it is in their private interest to make the socially correct choices.39 The underlying 
rationale, from an economics perspective, for why such incentives are needed is 
described in Appendix 7.1. The key point is that in the absence of incentive-aligning 
corrections, market failures will continue to exist, leading to outcomes that are not 
socially optimal. 
In the EAF Guidelines, the discussion on financial measures is divided into two 
categories: market-based incentives (e.g. ecolabelling and tradable rights) and non-
market-based incentives (taxes, subsidies). The distinction is made to reflect the idea 
39 For example, these may be market-based incentives, which contrast with “command and control” 
approaches that may have excessive information and MCS demands on the governing and governed 
bodies. For further discussion of market-based approaches, the classic reference is Tietenberg (2004).
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that, in the former, a buyer and seller interact in the market to determine the price of 
a good or service; whereas, in the latter, it is the governmental authority defining and 
imposing changes to the profit function of the fishery. 
In this report, the discussion has been separated into “carrot” and “stick” incentives 
categories – we refer below to “economic incentives” as the “carrots” that promote 
desired behaviour, and “economic disincentives” as the “sticks” that penalize 
undesirable behaviour.
Positive monetary incentives (the carrot)
The use of positive incentives may be split into three categories: conservation price 
differentials, best-practice/conservation payments, and rights-based incentives. From 
an economic perspective, all of these seek to shift cost and revenue curves with the aim 
to attaining a socially optimal level of fishing effort. In addition, positive economic 
incentive instruments would, in theory, allow actors to determine for themselves the 
least cost means of obtaining a given management objective.
Price differential payments are one form of recognition by consumers of the values 
they hold for ecosystem goods and services, and serve as market signals to industry and 
governments. For example, these payments may take the form of higher prices paid 
for “ecolabelled” products, which establish a mechanism for identifying sustainably 
produced products and may relate to price premiums or export certificates. The most 
well-known environmental labelling standard40 for sustainably managed fisheries is 
the Marine Stewardship Council ecolabel, which is an attempt to allow consumers to 
promote environmentally responsible stewardship of fisheries resources. The impact 
on the international market has begun to make itself felt as large retailers pick up on 
the movement and, perhaps, the price differentiation.
In his July, 2000 article, J. Kurien voiced several concerns regarding market-
based incentives, such as eco-labels, and their role in sustainable development. 
Many of these concerns were mirrored and discussed in the FAO Technical Paper, 
“Product Certification and Ecolabelling for Fisheries Sustainability” FAO (2001a). 
Box 13 provides a brief summary of the opportunities and concerns voiced regarding 
ecolabelling schemes.
A similar labelling system exists in the marine aquarium fishery sector through the 
Marine Aquarium Council (MAC) certification label. From its Internet site41 the MAC 
mission is “to conserve coral reefs and other marine ecosystems by creating standards 
and certification for those engaged in the collection and care of ornamental marine life 
from reef to aquarium”.
Other attempts to affect consumer choices include fair-trade labels, good fish 
guides42, and the fish fairs, such as the Slow Food/Fish movement. Such instruments are 
geared towards the providing of information to consumers regarding the circumstances 
leading to the availability of offered products (e.g. fishing practices, stock status, and 
management regimes). The fair-trade labels and Slow Food/Fish movement differ from 
the ecolabels and purchasing guides in that the focus is on the social and economic side 
of the fishery, as apposed to mainly biological arguments. For example, the Fairtrade 
Labelling Organization (FLO)43 “exists to improve the position of the poor and 
disadvantaged producers in the developing world, by setting the Fairtrade standards 
and by creating a framework that enables trade to take place at conditions respecting 
40 Other labelling schemes for capture fisheries exist, such as the Frozen at Sea Fillets Association’s Ocean 
Wild Mark and the Earth Island Institute “Dolphin Safe” label.
41 http://www.aquariumcouncil.org/
42 These guides present lists of fish products ranked by some measure of biological sustainability and are 
usually focused on specific markets to assist consumers in their consumption choices of fish products 
commonly found in local markets or supermarkets.
43 http://www.fairtrade.net
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their interest”. The FLO estimated premiums for fair-trade labelled coffee of over 
US$22 million in 2003. If applied to fisheries, such labels may support small-scale 
fisheries using traditional sustainable fishing practices. 
Best-practice/conservation payments are transfers to individual fishers and/or 
the fishing industry/community as a whole, from governments or other institutions, 
to compensate for some or all costs of implementing sustainable fishing practices. 
Such practices may include the use of best-available technologies (e.g. turtle exclusion 
devices, VMS) or restrictions on fishing patterns (e.g. no-take zones or seasons). These 
transfers may be considered as payments from those who benefit from conservation or 
best-practices to those who bear the direct costs of their implementation. 
Along these lines are competitions to engage and reward the fishing industry in the 
design of fishery-specific technology. Such crossroads between regulatory mechanisms 
(i.e. the requirement of technological change) and allowing industry participation 
through the design of the most appropriate and lost cost options have met with some 
BOx 13 
Possible opportunities and concerns surrounding ecolabelling of fish products
Opportunities
Environmental
•	 Ecolabelling could provide the needed economic incentives for better long-term 
stewardship and availability of natural resources important for national economic 
welfare
•	 Ecolabelling may generate political support for improved environmental management 
and to raise environmental standards through consumer choice
Economic
•	 Ecolabelling provides one of the least-coercive market-based mechanisms to improve 
conservation outcomes
•	 The economic benefits from ecolabelling may not be limited to price premiums 
received through ecolabels.
•	 Additional financial and technical resources may be mobilized in the ecolabelling 
process
•	 Consumer consciousness of environmental concerns is likely to grow in both the 
North and the South
Concerns
•	 Lack of transparency and opportunities for participation in the development of 
products standards
•	 Trade imbalances and decreased competitiveness may occur through the misuse of 
ecolabelling schemes
•	 High costs of bringing fisheries management practices into compliance with 
ecolabelling schemes, following the certification process, and maintaining certifiable 
status; which may fall disproportionately on small suppliers
•	 Inadequate institutional frameworks may make individual, voluntary compliance 
difficult
•	 Lack of international standards/guidelines may increase the burden on governments 
to monitor multiple schemes
•	 Consumer price premiums might not translate into higher incomes for the fishers
•	 National management sovereignty may be affected 
Source: FAO, 2001a
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success as creativity from within the industry is rewarded and the process tends to 
increase acceptance of use (see, for example, NFCC, 1994). 
Conservation payments can occur when the non-use/existence benefits of certain 
resources are higher than the extractive use benefits. In these cases, the opportunity 
costs of not using the resources need to be compensated, either through direct or 
indirect transfers. This is especially important in small-scale fisheries that depend on 
the extractive uses for their livelihoods. Direct payments have been used by specific 
conservation projects in which fishing communities are paid to maintain a given 
habitat or not to use a resource. Unfortunately, such payments are usually constrained 
by the longevity of the given project, in that once the project has finished, so do the 
conservation payments. Ferraro and Kiss (2002) present a review of current debates 
regarding direct payments to conserve biodiversity.
Other conservation payments have focused on indirect transfers focusing on 
training or other livelihood diversification methods, based on the thesis that reducing 
fishing communities’ vulnerability will naturally increase their ability to sustainably 
use and management fisheries resources (SFLP 2006).
Eco-tourism is another market-based conservation mechanism targeting the 
substitution of extractive uses of resources to non-extractive uses. Essentially, payments 
from tourism compensate for lost fishing revenues and may provide for alternative or 
diversified livelihood sources. Box 14 provides the results of one review analyzing the 
potential of eco-tourism as a substitute for commercial whale shark fishing. However, 
as is often the case for substitutes, negative impacts on ecosystems may occur (e.g. 
pollution, crowding, and noise from boats and divers), thereby warranting caution in 
their use. In addition, the demand for eco-tourism may not be sufficient and stable 
enough to guarantee conservation of habitats and commercial species and this demand 
may only pertain to highly valued species, such as sharks, whales and turtles. 
Monetary disincentives (the stick)
Economic disincentives within an EAF context mirror the “polluter pays” and 
“user pays” principles (PPP and UPP, respectively) used in the allocation of costs of 
pollution prevention and control measures and sustainable development paradigms.44 
These principles attempt to correct for existing market failures by internalizing into 
the production decision-making process the costs of using natural resources and of 
negative impacts on the ecosystem. Such principles have become standard policy in 
dealing with issues of water and air pollution, and hazardous chemicals/waste, while 
their application to the fisheries sector has been slower to materialize. 
Coffey and Newcombe (2001) have provided an analysis of the current and potential 
use of PPP in European fisheries and the generalized results are presented here. The 
authors differentiate among a number of objectives for the use of economic instruments 
(e.g. taxes, charges, and levies45) in line with the PPP/UPP: in this discussion we look at 
(a) cost recovery for fisheries management, (b) paying for resource use, and (c) paying 
for environmental damage prevention or alleviation. 
Cost recovery for fisheries management46 is generally through taxes/levies; while 
not really a “stick” incentive measure, this will change the private profit functions 
44 The polluter pays principle means that the polluter bears the expenses related to any pollution prevention 
and control measures; meaning that these costs are reflected in the cost of goods and services which cause 
pollution in production and/or consumption. The user pays principle is a variation on the polluter pays 
principle that “calls upon the user of a natural resource to bear the cost of running down natural capital” 
(UNSD, undated).
45 The word taxes will be used interchangeably in the text for taxes, charges, fees, and levies.
46 In Australia, for example, cost recovery for fisheries management “means that the commercial fishing 
industry pays for those costs directly related to fishing activity, while the Commonwealth government 
pays for management activities that may benefit the broader community (as well as the industry) and that 
satisfy a range of specific community service obligations” (Cox, 2000).
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of fishing activities and may instil a sense of ownership of the results of management 
as a direct link is made between the benefits of management and their costs (Cox, 
2000).47 The use of cost recovery mechanisms has, for the most part, been applied 
only within the OECD countries but explicit research on applying cost-recovery 
mechanisms elsewhere and implicit use within fisheries co-management regimes is 
47 The OECD has proposed further that including industry in the decisions about and in the provision and 
payment of management services is highly likely to create incentives to improve the fishery’s performance 
and to increase the cost-effectiveness of management services (OECD, 2003).
BOx 14
“A live shark is worth more than a dead one”
R.T. Graham (2004) studied this argument with respect to whale sharks. The following 
extracted text presents her review of relative studies and conclusions: 
“In Taiwan, whole whale sharks sold for US$7 116 for a 2 000 kg individual and 
US$21 400 for a 10 000 kg shark, with retail prices for meat ranging from US$4.9–17.2 kg. 
By comparison, in Ningaloo Reef, Western Australia, whale shark tourism revenues are 
estimated at Aus$4.7 million (US$3.1 million) for a two-month season and a more recent 
estimate (for 2002) is Aus$12 million (US$7.8 million). From visitor surveys conducted 
in Belize in 2002, the value of a six week whale shark tourism season was estimated at 
US$3.7 million nationally and US$1.35 million to the five stakeholder communities of 
the Gladden Spit Marine Reserve. This site on the Belize Barrier Reef hosts a seasonal 
congregation of whale sharks that feed on the eggs of snappers. There are at least 12 
additional sites worldwide for predictable sightings of whale sharks, (Mexico-Baja, South 
Africa, Mozambique, Honduras, the Seychelles, Galapagos (Ecuador), Thailand, Maldives, 
India, Japan, Malaysia and Philippines). With land-based tours from US$40–266 per day 
and luxury live-aboard tourism worth considerably more, global whale shark tourism 
could be worth conservatively at least US$47.5 million annually. With the exception of 
Australia, the majority of this revenue is captured by developing countries and presents a 
considerable incentive to conserve whale sharks. 
Ascertaining a value for an individual shark is complex, particularly if the population 
is unknown and the shark migrates between several tourism sites. In Belize, a minimum 
of 106 individuals have been photo-identified, and many travel throughout the Belize 
Barrier Reef returning yearly to feed. Using the 2002 Belize whale shark tourism survey 
results, each shark is worth at least US$34 906 annually. A similar annual value of US$33 
500 for each grey reef shark Carcharhinus amblyrhynchos was recorded in the Maldives. 
If whale sharks live to at least 60 years old, then an individual might be worth US$2 094 
340 over its lifetime providing it repeatedly visits the tourism site. Several whale sharks 
tagged in Belize have moved between Gladden Spit and tourism sites in Honduras and 
the Yucatan, Mexico, therefore producing greater revenue. If each site generates as much 
as Gladden Spit, then a whale shark’s value could effectively be tripled to give US$104 
718/individual/yr for the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef. Immigration of new individuals to 
Gladden Spit yearly suggests that the regional population is larger, thereby decreasing the 
individual value of each shark. Nevertheless, the economic argument for protecting whale 
sharks is undeniable.” 
Note: references included in the original text have been removed.
Source: Graham, 2004
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occurring.48 However, in cases where revenues are collected from fisheries activities, 
more often than not these revenues go directly to the central government budget and, 
therefore, the link between benefits and costs of management services cannot be made 
and fisheries authorities continue to base their management activities on governmental 
appropriations.
Paying for resource use – often through license/access fees, taxes, and tradable 
or auctioned quotas – is an acknowledgement within the fisheries sector of the value 
of natural resources, much as in the use of land, water, or other natural resources. 
Historically, access to fisheries resources was free and all profits from the use of these 
resources were either dissipated, in the case of open access fisheries, or kept by the 
fishing industry. Governments and, hence, societies, had not insisted on payments for 
the use of these natural resources. However, with the onset of the Law of the Sea in 
198249 and the idea of national ownership/stewardship of marine resources, the idea of 
private individuals paying society for the use of natural resources has gained ethical 
acceptance and jurisdictional backing. 
The level of such payments would depend on the particular fishery and the economic 
concept of resource rent, which is the return to the resource owner50 from the use of a 
natural resource. In an open access fishery, rents are largely dissipated, i.e., there would 
be little or no rent to be had, and thus no rent extraction is possible. Moving from an 
open access fisheries to a socially regulated fishery would increase the available rents, 
all or some of which can be collected by society through appropriate rent collection 
in the fishery.
As an example of rent in fisheries, a review of capture fisheries management systems 
in the Indian Ocean countries (FAO, 2006a) revealed that resource rent recovery 
schemes, other than license fees, were uncommon within the large-scale and small-
scale capture fisheries of the region. However, such schemes have been used within 
the recreational fisheries sub-sector. This difference between the sub-sectors may 
reflect whether access to the resources is assumed as a right (without payment) or as a 
privilege.
Third country access agreements (i.e. foreign fleets paying for the right to fish in 
another country’s EEZ) have been used in cases where national fishing fleets do not 
have the capability of exploiting certain stocks and the coastal nation could benefit 
from rent extraction through collection of lump-sum fees and taxes. These agreements 
have been wrought with criticisms (e.g. IEEP, 2003) but with the growth of information 
sharing51 experience and monitoring capabilities52 such agreements may be able to 
benefit national economies while ensuring sustainable harvest levels.
Paying for environmental damage prevention or alleviation – either through 
bearing the costs of appropriate technology or through paying fines for damages 
inflicted – can be a politically palatable use of economic incentives, as it relates to a 
given “bad” action. The fining of actions that have negatively affected ecosystems is 
quite common; however, these cases tend to involve actors outside of the fishing sector 
who have damaged habitat, such as oil spills or dock building.53 
48 See, for example, the analysis by Keizire (2001) of fisheries management financing in Uganda, and the 
Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission (APFIC, 2005) work regarding the implementation of fisheries co-
management. 
49 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982. See http://www.un.org/Depts/
los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm
50 “In relation to fisheries, a “rent” is generally thought of as the difference between total revenues obtained 
from the fishery and the total costs (estimated at their opportunity costs) of employing the various 
factors of production that together make up the enterprises participating in the fishery.” FAO (2000b)
51 To this aim, WWF has created a “Handbook for negotiating fishing access agreements” (Martin et al., 2001). 
52 See FAO (2002) for guidelines on monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) aspects within access 
agreements.
53 See Chapter 8 External Financing for the EAF. 
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Fining of fishing activities that have harmed the ecosystem (e.g. dynamite fishing, 
destructive anchoring, discarded bycatch, and incidental fishing of marine mammals) 
could be implemented. However, is more common at present for effort to focus 
on attempting to limit such actions through regulations such as no-take zones, 
gear restrictions and bycatch limits. This may be because a regulatory approach is 
administratively easier to implement (Coffey and Newcombe, 2001) or perhaps the 
calculation of fines is excessively complicated, e.g. if the necessary knowledge regarding 
the value of lost ecosystem goods and services54 is not available. 
One economic disincentive in use with respect to harmful fishing activities is the use 
of trade barriers. An economic incentive in support of sustainable fishing practices is the 
granting of export permits for the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES)55 listed species. CITES was developed to 
minimize the effect of international trade on commercial species threatened with 
extinction (Appendix I species) or exploited unsustainably (Appendix II species). 
Trade in Appendix I species is all but prohibited; while trade is permitted for Appendix 
II-listed species if the related fishing practices are proved sustainable (i.e. the species 
“was legally obtained and if the export will not be detrimental to the survival of the 
species”). If the potential exporter is unable to prove the sustainability of the fishery, 
exportation rights are not granted. In theory, sustainable management of fisheries 
should keep the commercial species from being placed on the CITES listing. Box 15 
presents one example in which a sustainable management regime has enabled the 
Jamaican Queen Conch fishery to be labeled as a fishery of “least concern” for its 
queen conch resources.
54 See Chapter 2 Human Values of Ecosystem Services.
55 See http://www.cites.org/
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CITes’ reward for sustainable Queen Conch fisheries management in Jamaica
Until 1999, Jamaica was the world’s largest producer of queen conch. Most of this 
was fished on the Pedro Banks, a large undersea area that is the habitat for one of the 
Caribbean’s largest and most important queen conch stocks. In the early 1990s, Jamaica’s 
landings of Pedro Banks conch topped 3 000 tonnes per year. Jamaica also conducted its 
first conch stock assessments in the early 1990s. Recognizing a decline in the resource, the 
Jamaican government introduced annual catch and export quotas, implemented in 1994 
in Jamaica’s first conch fishery management plan. MSY for queen conch was calculated 
at 700-1 300 mt/year. Unfortunately, illegal fishing is now rampant on the Pedro Banks, 
much of it by foreign vessels that simply ignore Jamaican law. In the years 1999-2002, 
illegal harvest was estimated to account for 40 percent of the conch fishing on the Pedro 
Banks. Jamaica conducted its third conch stock assessment in 2003. Although this stock 
assessment suggested a total allowable catch of 900 tonnes, Jamaica set its conch export 
quota at 500 mt to allow for some inevitable losses to illegal fishing. The Caribbean 
Fishery Management Council’s regional workshop on queen conch stock assessment 
and management noted that Jamaica employs a visual-census conch survey as a fishery-
independent monitor of conch populations. Based upon the findings of its September 
2003 Significant Trade Review, CITES considers Jamaica to have an adequate conch 
management regime and relatively healthy queen conch populations. Jamaica is one of 
only two Caribbean conch-exporting nations to earn the CITES designation of “least 
concern” for its queen conch resources.
Source: extracted from Cascorbi, 2004.
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The current lack of information regarding the social and economic impacts of CITES 
listing inhibits making conclusions regarding its role as an incentive for implementing 
EAF management with regards to traded species. FAO (2004b) provides a brief 
description of three categories of increased costs related to CITES listing: administrative 
costs (start-up training and capacity building and recurring research, processing, and 
monitoring and control costs); management impacts (developing effective management 
within and without the fisheries sector) and social and economic implications (short-
term impacts on employment, income, and food security versus long-term positive 
impacts on stock productivity, the possible creation of legal markets, and the shifting 
of fishing effort to substitute fisheries). 
Other trade barriers, such as the United States dolphin-safe tuna policy, create 
incentives to implement sustainable fishing practices. However, the effectiveness of such 
policies on sustainable practices may prove ineffective if other markets are available.
Although the PPP concept may now be found in more and more nations’ fisheries 
legislation, and is applied in relation to the impacts of non-fisheries activities on 
fisheries habitats56, it is difficult to claim a wide-spread use of such economic 
instruments. Coffey and Newcombe (2001) presented a few considerations as to why 
the use of economic disincentives with respect to environmental damage/control may 
prove difficult and these have been summarized and complemented in Box 16. Implicit 
in the shift towards PPP is the removal of perverse incentives (minimizing “harmful” 
subsidies) as, without doing so, effort will continue to rise; making ineffective and 
inefficient attempts to internalize the environmental costs of fishing activities.
Markets and prices
The role of market prices in sustainable development has tended to be understated. The 
absence of a market can cause problems, as noted in Chapter 2 concerning the challenge 
of placing proper values on ecosystem services when markets for these services do 
not exist. However, even when they are present, markets may provide incorrect 
signals regarding ecosystem services. Price ceilings or price floors set by governments, 
subsidies, and market failures send signals to users of ecosystem services that differ 
from what the true or societal value/price would dictate. Under-pricing of ecosystem 
services leads to overuse and probably waste of these services. Equally important, 
over-pricing may impact people’s ability to use the services for basic needs, such as for 
food and livelihoods, even while these higher prices would benefit those selling goods 
produced from the ecosystem services.
It is important to note that prices, such as fishery input prices (e.g. petrol, kerosene, 
labour), directly impact on fishers’ production activities. Prices also impact our ability 
to manage resources. If, for example, prices are very high for a certain species of fish, 
management measures aiming to reduce effort in this fishery will prove difficult, as the 
incentive to cheat is correspondingly high. 
As shown in the next section, prices and their related profits are not the only 
motivating factor driving individual decisions, but they are certainly important 
enough to seek an understanding of them, and include them when designing any 
EAF management plan. Not only will management and policy measures relating to 
ecosystem services impact markets and trade, but markets and trade will impact on our 
ability to manage. 
social incentives
Whereas economic incentives imply material rewards or punishment, social incentives 
typically imply more intangible social rewards or punishment (i.e. approval or 
disapproval from others, and the related feelings of pride or shame) (Lindbeck, 1997). 
56  See Chapter 8 External Financing for the EAF. 
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BOx 16
Challenges in applying the PPP to the eAf management
Linking cause and effect
•	 impacts of fishing practices on ecosystems may be slow to appear and difficult to pinpoint 
due to ineffective monitoring, uncertainty regarding causes and effects, and a general lack of 
information
•	 unlike most point-source damage, the source of damage in fisheries cannot easily be traced back 
to an individual, although it may be possible to identify groups of vessels or fleets that have been 
fishing in a defined area
Institutional considerations
•	 command and control regulations may be easier to administer than taxes (e.g. gear and temporal 
restrictions)
•	 politically acceptable tax levels may be too low to serve as disincentives (i.e. better to risk the fine 
if caught) 
•	 setting taxes at appropriate levels may be difficult in the face of damages to non-market values and 
services (i.e. where does the social cost curve lie?)
•	 perverse subsidies may be in place; hence, contradicting or rendering ineffective the PPP
•	 economic instruments are not the panacea and should form one part of a complete management 
regime
Social considerations
•	 small scale operators may face special difficulties in adapting to changing environmental requirements 
and may have a limited ability to pass on the costs of compliance or taxation to consumers
•	 certain taxes, such as flat taxes, may be regressive and affect the small-scale fisheries 
disproportionately
•	 if stakeholders are not included in the process leading to a tax, great resistance will be met in cases 
where access to the resources was previously effectively free, i.e. fishing seen as a right and not a 
privilege and, therefore, rent free
•	 there may be large up-front effects on the fishing industry (i.e. changes in effort levels)
•	 different taxes (i.e. whether direct or indirect, or whether targeting access, output or input) 
will affect individual choices differently; therefore, the tax system applied must depend on the 
characteristics of the fishery
Unintended consequences
•	 taxing one activity may incite individuals to misreport that activity or shift to other activities that 
are not taxed and which may have stronger negative impacts on the ecosystem
•	 there is a risk of double taxation if a new tax is established in a management regime already using 
licence fees or other forms of fishing rights; hence already capitalizing on the fishery’s rent capacity
Source: amended from Coffey and Newcombe (2001)
Social incentives relate to the ways group behaviour and group interactions occur and 
form the context in which an individual makes decisions. Such incentives include moral 
structures, religious beliefs, peer pressure, gender relations, policy, social preferences, 
norms, rules, ethics, traditional value systems, social recognition, trust among the 
various stakeholders, and common interests. Each one of these incentives may have 
strong impacts on how an individual or a group makes decisions. 
Religious beliefs, for example, may form the basis of how a community relates to 
the environment, ranging from the idea of the world being created for human benefit, 
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to that of humans being a part of nature, that is to be respected. In other words, one’s 
beliefs can lead to strong environmental consciousness or to a sense that ecosystems 
can be exploited without limits based on ensuring sustainability of the resources. 
Much of the previous discussion relating to institutional incentives overlaps with 
social incentives in that the institutional incentives affect groups of individuals, 
such as public awareness, transparency, education, capacity building, participatory 
processes, and sense of ownership/stewardship. These are all example of positive social 
incentives. 
Moral structure, ethics, social relations, and peer pressure are also powerful 
incentives to engage or not to engage in an activity. Human beings are gregarious by 
nature, so the need to conform to what the society or community expects of them can 
be very strong. Risk of social ostracism can be a very strong deterrent against breaking 
established rules. Understanding the social organizations and, hence, social incentives 
in place will help decision-makers understand how individuals and communities make 
choices regarding their use of ecosystem services.
Social incentives may prove as potent as their monetary cousins in influencing 
individual and social behaviour and may lead to collective action impacting decision-
makers in a common move towards sustainable development (Grafton et al., 2005). 
Perverse incentives
Perverse incentives are, from an EAF point of view, any policy or management 
measures that incite people or groups to act in a way that negatively impacts on an 
ecosystem’s ability to provide services or, in other words, that lead to inefficient use of 
ecosystem resources. Examples of perverse incentives include:
• subsidies leading to over-investment in fishing capacity in a fishery in which 
management is unable to control fishing effort; 
• buy-back programmes in which receipts from the sale of older boat are reinvested 
in modernized boats, thereby increasing fishing capacity
• contradictory regulations leading people to ignore the laws all together; 
• laws against selling of bycatch that lead to increased discards; and 
• governmental inducements for use of fishing methods with relatively great 
negative impacts on the ecosystem (e.g. modernization subsidies leading to greater 
use of bottom-contact gears).
Logical reasoning would suggest the abolishment of existing perverse incentives as 
a first step to EAF management. This could also provide substantial budgetary savings 
and greater credibility in the governance system.
ConClusIons
The four categories of incentives discussed above (legal, institutional, economic, and 
social) require different sets of procedures and knowledge bases, and affect individuals 
and groups differently. Therefore, some incentives may be more effective than others 
depending on the situation at hand. In addition, no one single incentive measure will 
make an unsustainable fishery sustainable. Thoughtful and creative mixes of these 
incentives will increase the probability of obtaining desired results. The elimination of 
perverse incentives, and efforts to obtain a better understanding of the motivations of 
fishers and other users of ecosystem services, will help determine which incentives to 
consider.
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Notes: “Private” indicates the perspective of the fishing industry in which externalities of fishing activities have not been taken into 
account; “Conventional Management” indicates a fishing industry in which some externalities have been incorporated through 
the management system; and “EAF” indicates a fishing industry in which all externalities have been incorporated (i.e., is socially 
optimal). 
- For a discussion of applied fisheries models and their assumptions, see Hannesson (2003).
APPendIx 7.1
An economic analysis of the need for appropriate incentives 
From an economics perspective, the need for appropriate incentives arises from the 
need to address a range of market failures caused by the realities of public goods, 
externalities, monopolies, etc. – ones which are such that the costs and/or benefits to 
society of individual actions are not internalized (i.e. not reflected in the price), leading 
to results that are not socially optimal. 
The most obvious fisheries example of such market failures is the “failure of the 
commons”, in which the race to fish (i.e. if fisherman X does not fish the fish, fisherman 
Y surely will) is fed by an inability of the resource users to maximize the value (rent) 
of the aquatic resources. Waiting for a fish to reach a mature post-spawning stage, or a 
higher price class, means risking not catching that fish at all. This situation is classically 
portrayed as in Figure 7 by the open-access level of effort, EOPEN, at which all economic 
rent is dissipated and fishing effort is both economically and biologically excessive.
In this same figure, EMEY-P represents the profit maximizing effort level that would 
occur if, for example, the actors in the fishery were able to control fishing effort to the 
“maximum economic yield” level, representing a move towards economic efficiency. 
However, at this level of fishing effort, it is possible that some impacts to society were 
not incorporated into the private decision making process; therefore, representing 
a socially sub-optimal level of fishing effort. The results of such market failures in 
fisheries may include discarded bycatch, incidental fishing of marine mammals and 
birds, and impacts on habitats in which the social costs of fishing are higher than the 
private costs imposed by the market. 
This may be represented in Figure 7 by the difference in fishing effort EMEY-P – EEAF 
> 0, where EEAF represents the theoretically socially optimal level of fishing effort in 
which all social costs have been incorporated into the fishery. 
An intermediary effort level – representing what could be the output of current 
fisheries management in which some sustainability concepts have been incorporated 
Fishing effort
Revenue 
$
TC Private
TC EAF
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E EAF
TC Conventional management
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E OPEN
FIGURE 7 
The eAf and the gordon-schaeffer model
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FIGURE 8 
hypothetical examples of management measures and their effects on the socially  
optimal level of fishing effort
Example 1 Implementation of  by- catch reduction devices
Example 2 Creation of a marine reserve
Difference EAF-Private
after
Fishing effort
TCPrivate
TCEAF
TRPrivate
EMEY-PEEAF
TCPrivate /
TCEAF /
EMEY-P /EEAF
/
Difference EAF-Private 
before
EOPEN
Fishing effort
TCPrivate
TCEAF
TRPrivate
TCEAF/
EMEY-P/EEAF/
TRPrivate/
EMEY-P
EEAF EOPEN
Difference EAF-Private
after
Difference EAF-Private
before
Revenue 
$
Revenue 
$
Note: the symbol ‘/’represents the value of the variable after the given change (i.e. TR shifts to TR/ after 
the creation of the marine reserve.
into fisheries management and have manifested themselves through, for example, taxes, 
fees or quotas – would be ECM. The existence and placement of the underlying Total 
Cost curve (TCConventional Management) would depend on the current management regime in 
a given fishery.
Moving from EOPEN to EMEY-P (or ECM) could be associated with the implementation 
of traditional fisheries management practices, independently of an ecosystem-based 
management regime. Moving from EMEY-P to EEAF could represent the incremental 
changes that would reflect an ecosystem-based management regime. 
In order to demonstrate the effects of EAF-based management measures on fisheries 
production functions and, hence, effort levels, two fictitious and simplified examples 
are provided in Figure 8: one in which bycatch reduction devices are introduced into a 
fisheries and one in which a marine reserve system is put into place. The former affects 
Incentive mechanisms for applying EAF 109
the cost function of the fishery; while the latter affects its revenue function. Both relate 
to technical measures within the management “tool box” available to fisheries managers 
(the reader is referred to Chapter 3 of the EAF Guidelines for further discussion.
In the first hypothetical example, it is assumed that bycatch reduction devices lower 
the Total Cost to society (TCEAF) of the fishing activity by, for example, decreasing 
bycatch or fishing mortality of non-targeted species. The Total Private Cost (TCPrivate) 
is assumed to decrease with the use of bycatch reduction devices due to, for example, 
increases in fishing efficiency and decreased time dedicated to culling unwanted 
bycatch (other things being equal).
Total net social welfare increases when the difference (EMEY-P – EEAF) > (EMEY-P/ 
– EEAF/). Of course, the ultimate effect on effort in the fishery would depend on the 
biological and production functions of the specific fishery and, in the case where effort 
decreases, the resulting social and economic impacts would need to be addressed.38 
In the second hypothetical example, a marine reserve is created to improve the 
productivity of the given ecosystem by protecting specific fishery grounds and 
allowing spill-over of the increased production. In such a case, the revenue function for 
the fishery, therefore, shifts outward; benefiting the fishery. The example assumes that 
the cost structure of the fishermen has not changed but that the Total Cost to Society 
decreases due to increased habit and species protection.
In both cases, the final effort level in the fishery, EMEY-P, may not be identical to the 
socially efficient level, EEAF; however, the difference between the two has decreased. 
As with any management regime, a suite of management tools would be necessary to 
close this gap.
38 Valdimarsson and Metzner (2005) present a matrix describing ways in which EAF management may 
affect social welfare and commercial profits.
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APPendIx 7.2
Kenya and lake victoria
Despite attempts to control fishing pressure through setting and implementing 
fisheries regulations, the Kenyan government continued to observe declining fish 
stocks in Lake Victoria. A new approach was introduced by the Fisheries Department 
(the Department) – stakeholder participation in the fisheries management as a way to 
assure sustainable resource use was applied to various fisheries ecosystems. In 2000, 
the Department began consultations with communities at a grass-roots level in order 
to increase awareness of both the fish stock trends, and of the role communities could 
play in reversing this trend.
A stakeholder meeting for the Kenyan section of Lake Victoria was organized by 
the Department in 2001, which was attended by all stakeholders and key players in 
the industry, including Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization (LVFO) Secretariat and 
the research coordinators for the Lake Victoria (regional) research and environmental 
management projects. The main outcomes of this meeting were various fisheries 
management measures which could possibly reverse the decline. 
One suggested measure consisted of closed seasons and areas. At the end of the 
first closed season, there was an abundance of good quality target fish and a recovery 
of non-target fish such as tilapia. During the closed period, the fishers participated in 
the surveillance and law enforcement, for example by reporting those who violated the 
new regulation with respect to closed seasons. The second closed season, in 2003, was 
therefore less resisted and through general consensus, it was also decided to ban any 
trade in the target fish (omena) during the closed season to discourage illegal fishing 
activity due to available market. 
Another outcome of the meeting was an expressed willingness of fishers to actively 
participate in the management of the Lake Victoria fisheries. This resulted in the 
formation of Beach Management Units (BMUs), which are being developed to assist 
communities in taking the lead in fisheries management. The results of this approach 
were:
•	A decline in destructive fishing gears.
•	An increase in resource friendly gears.
•	The apparent decline in Nile perch landings which could be attributed to the 
integrated concerted law enforcement effort that reduced the harvesting of large 
volumes of immature fish, whose market has been significantly reduced.
•	Facilitation of development of strategies for conflict resolution and sustainable fish 
stocks utilization in several Kenyan fisheries waters, which could be attributed to 
the ongoing fisheries stakeholders’ meetings.
•	Higher compliance, achieved due to involvement of stakeholders in the policy-
making process from the outset. Resource users ended up policing themselves, 
encouraged by the sense of ownership stemming from the participatory approach. 
This lightens the government’s burden in regard to law enforcement.
It should be noted that there are still prevailing surveillance weaknesses to be 
addressed, resulting from lack of surveillance facilities such as patrol boats and engines 
for both the Department of Fisheries and the fishing community. 
Source: (Gitonga, undated)
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APPendIx 7.3
The bunaken national marine Park co-management initiative
In 1991, Bunaken National Park (BNP), Indonesia, was formally established as a 
marine national park and has since become one of Indonesia’s most well-known marine 
ecotourism destinations. Within the park there are 22 villages with more than 30 000 
inhabitants of whom most make a living from a combination of fishing and farming. 
Due to a history of insufficient stakeholder involvement, the park has suffered frequent 
conflicts and ineffective park management. Before 1998, the management was in the 
hands of the Ministry of Forestry’s Bunaken National Park Office (BTNB). Local park 
users, especially fishers and the dive tourism industry, were not effectively involved in 
the management process. In addition, there was minimal funding for conservation and 
management industry, the enforcement system was ineffective, and the park zoning 
system was either misunderstood or ignored by the local people.
Conversely, the goal of the Bunaken National Park initiative was to develop 
an effective and sustainably financed model of multistakeholder co-management 
of a national marine park, in collaboration with the USAID’s Natural Resources 
Management Program (NRM). Below follows a description of the components of the 
co-management initiative, and thereafter a list of lessons learned from the project.
Components of the Co-management Initiative
•	Participatory zonation revision of BNP. NRM assisted the BNP Office (BTNB) 
to work with the two primary park user groups (local villagers and the marine 
tourism sector) to revise the park’s zonation system, realizing that a well-designed, 
easy to understand and thoroughly socialized zonation system is the foundation 
for effective management of the park.
•	 Improved villager involvement in BNP management decisions through 
institutional development of the BNP Concerned Citizen’s Forum (FMPTNB). 
The FMPTNB is now active in all 22 villages in BNP and serves to represent the 
aspirations of approximately 30 000 villagers in management decisions, as well as 
serving to socialize management policy to its constituents.
•	Fostering private sector involvement in BNP management. NRM provided 
technical assistance to the North Sulawesi Watersports Association (NSWA) 
and actively fostered the involvement of other private sector groups in BNP 
management.
•	Facilitation of multistakeholder co-management of BNP via institutional 
development of the BNP Management Advisory Board (DPTNB). NRM provided 
development support to the executive secretariat of the DPTNB, which consisted 
of representatives from national, provincial and local government agencies, village 
stakeholders, the private tourism sector, academia, and environmental NGO’s. The 
DPTNB represented a drastic departure from the traditional Indonesian model of 
top-down management of MPAs, and strived to make decentralized, participatory, 
transparent and accountable MPA management a reality.
•	Development of a portfolio of sustainable conservation financing mechanisms 
for BNP. A ground-breaking decentralized park entrance fee system placed 
the DPTNB on the road to financial self-reliance. Other components in the 
developing financing portfolio include an international volunteers system to 
lower management costs, diversified government agency support, in-kind support 
from the local dive tourism sector, national and international grant support, visitor 
center merchandising and a possible endowment fund.
•	Development of an effective 24-hour patrol system for BNP. An experimental 
joint patrol system involving park rangers, water police officers and local villagers 
proved highly effective in decreasing destructive fishing practices in the park.
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•	 Institutionalization of a scientific monitoring program to monitor effects of 
management activities on park resources. In conjunction with WWF Wallacea, 
NRM is supporting park stakeholders in monitoring coral condition and reef fish 
stocks. 
lessons learned
•	 It is necessary to balance ecological values with socio-economic values to generate 
essential stakeholder political support for conservation of protected areas in 
regions with population pressures and/or priorities on economic growth and 
development.
•	Building informed participation is a long-term process, requiring extensive 
capacity building and facilitation. Villagers, government and non-government 
stakeholders with long-term involvement in conservation management provide 
more innovative solutions and productive support for conservation management.
•	Park managers and the rangers tasked with field management of the park 
commonly lack the community facilitation skills critical to ensuring broad 
stakeholder support and understanding of park management objectives. Training 
in facilitation skills for these park management personnel is an essential capacity-
building measure before co-management can be effectively implemented.
•	Co-management starts with the development of constituency-based partnerships, 
and then evolves to true co-management when the constituency-based partnerships 
then start working with each other. The evolution to co-management results 
in collaboration among often competing constituencies. Strong constituency 
partnerships provide a solid foundation for co-management.
•	Community conservation campaigns through schools, mosques and churches can 
build effective local support for and pride in conservation initiatives. People will 
support conservation of their environment if they take pride in it. Of course, pride 
alone will not achieve conservation. Also important are economic incentives and 
enforcement of rules and regulations.
•	Decentralization of conservation management works when roles and 
responsibilities are clear, and when there is a shared vision of goals and objectives. 
Decentralization does not work when there is competition over management 
authority or significant divergence in goals and objectives. Decentralization also 
stimulates stronger grass-roots democracy and principles of good governance.
•	Co-management requires active involvement of all relevant stakeholders. This 
is site specific in nature. In Bunaken it includes dive operators, communities, 
different levels of government, universities and NGOs. 
•	The composition of multistakeholder co-management boards is absolutely 
critical to their success. The optimal ratio of governmental to non-governmental 
representatives and those advocating different functions of the protected area 
(economic development, conservation, sustainable resource use) will vary from site 
to site, but will have profound consequences for the effectiveness of these boards. 
There must be a balance among the competing interests – this will not always 
imply equal numerical representation; in many cases the stakeholder group(s) that 
are the most hesitant to advocate strong positions may require a larger allocation 
of seats on a multistakeholder board to achieve truly equal representation.
•	Community stakeholders support patrol and enforcement programs, as they are 
directly linked to increased livelihoods. Many illegal activities within protected 
areas come from outsiders. Communities with a stake in conservation management 
or sustainable utilization of park resources have a strong and rational interest in 
seeing rules and regulations enforced so natural resources are sustained.
•	“Alternative livelihood programs” aimed at stakeholders currently involved in 
destructive activities in the coastal zone are ineffective and largely rejected by local 
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communities. Community conservation/improvement programs should focus 
on rewarding those that have chosen sustainable livelihoods, while those that 
persevere with destructive activities should be dealt with by a strong enforcement 
system.
•	Local self-financing mechanisms are key to providing local stakeholders with the 
fuel to manage local conservation interventions. Decentralized co-management 
requires the capacity to generate and then manage finances locally.
•	Development-oriented stakeholders, particularly from government, support 
conservation when it can be linked to regional economic development. 
Source: Adapted from Erdmann et al., undated.
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8.  external financing for the eAf 
InTRoduCTIon
In Chapter 6, a range of potential costs and benefits related to EAF management were 
described. Chapter 7 described mechanisms to internalize – through suitable incentive 
mechanisms – some of these costs and benefits into the fishing actor’s decision making 
process, thereby addressing some of the costs related to the EAF (e.g. cost-recovery 
and rent recovery). As great a use as possible of these mechanisms, to internalize the 
costs of EAF implementation, minimizes the need for external funding. Such self-
sustainability is a desired route to EAF implementation. 
However, if internal mechanisms cannot cover all implementation costs – a 
possibility given the potential for additional EAF-related costs (administrative, 
cultural, educational, and physical) and varied scales of benefits (local, regional, and 
global) – those costs will need to be covered either (1) through general government 
coffers and through the relevant authorities’ budgets, or (2) through external financing 
arrangements. The appropriate route to financing will depend not only on the financial 
situation at hand (e.g. whether or not a government is able to cover EAF implementation 
costs) but also on the question of who should be paying those costs – and in particular 
the extent to which the beneficiaries of adopting an ecosystem approach to fisheries are 
in fact those who pay the costs of implementing it. 
This chapter considers these matters, identifying potential sources of funding to 
complement government and fisheries’ sources. These sources are organized into two 
categories: (1) the polluter pays principle; (2) conservation mechanisms.
Many of the financing sources described here are derived from their use in other 
sectors, such as forestry and agriculture; however, experience in their application 
to aquatic ecosystems is being gained as recognition of their value (as described in 
Chapter 2) is increasing. Examples of their application to fisheries ecosystems are 
presented within the text.
“PolluTeR PAys” fInAnCIng
Financing EAF implementation through a “polluter pays” approach involves collecting 
revenues from those using the natural resource and/or causing ecosystem damage, 
and using those funds to finance positive moves to EAF management. In addition 
to the polluter-pays and user-pays incentive mechanisms described in Chapter 7, 
governments and fisheries associations have begun reclaiming the restoration costs 
in dealing with ecosystem damage inflicted by actors outside of the fishery sector 
(e.g. upstream activities, changes to habitats, pollution, and destructive practices). 
Individuals convicted of damaging are required to either pay fines, which may or may 
not be directly related to damage costs, or more directly to repair the damage or pay 
for work related to the conservation and protection of the affected habitat. Box 17 
provides a few examples of penalties imposed on non-fisheries sectors from ecosystem-
damaging activities and how the resulting funds have been kept within the fisheries 
sector to improve fish stocks and fish habitat. 
exTeRnAl ConseRvATIon fInAnCIng
Two realities come together to influence the potential to finance EAF through another 
channel, that of “conservation financing”. First, related to “polluter pays” is the idea 
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of “beneficiary pays”, in this case implying that those receiving the benefits of EAF 
implementation should pay the costs required to achieve those goals. 
Second, given a global increase in environmental awareness (i.e. the recognition of 
the goods and services provided by ecosystems and the need to minimize damaging 
impacts on these ecosystems), a desire to improve human conditions (i.e. decreasing 
hunger and poverty: improving livelihoods), and the hopes of holistic, decentralized 
natural resource management (i.e. through good governance, participatory processes, 
community-based management, and integrated resource management), the possibilities 
for garnering international funding sources for EAF activities are numerous (e.g. donor 
countries, international trust funds, development banks, funding facilities). 
Combined, these two possibilities may lead to initiatives for the global community 
to financially support EAF efforts, particularly in jurisdictions that otherwise might be 
unable to afford such efforts. However, three caveats need to be considered:
•	First, understanding the various and appropriate sources of funding requires 
a large and, perhaps, daunting investment on the part of fisheries managers. 
For example, some funding sources may target sector-specific activities; while 
others, may target specific issues, such as biodiversity or marine protected areas. 
Accounting systems and even vocabulary may vary significantly across sources 
and funding sources may or may not be tied to certain conditions, economic or 
otherwise.
•	Second, as EAF management is likely to comprise both development and 
conservation components; no one source of funding is likely to cover all EAF 
needs. Hence, a portfolio approach to funding will be necessary; however this 
increases the time and energy devoted to developing and using these funds.
•	Third, there is a crucial issue of institutional sustainability to consider when 
utilizing external funds – i.e., ensuring that long-term arrangements are in place 
so that EAF implementation is not jeopardized when the specific funding period 
ends. 
In recognition of these complexities, guides to finding relevant financing sources 
have been developed and many of which are freely available on-line; although not 
BOx 17
examples of non-fisheries polluters paying for fishery ecosystem damages
Canada – Under the Federal Fisheries Act, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans 
(DFO) Canada uses fines from habitat violations to restore damaged fish habitat. The 
convicted offender pays money directly to repair fish habitat or enhance fish stocks, often 
through local non-profit environmental groups. For examples of such convictions, see 
DFO (2004).
United Kingdom – the Anglers’ Conservation Association (ACA) represents its members 
in court cases against private and public entities polluting British lakes and rivers. Money 
collected is kept within member fishing clubs and used in rehabilitation trust funds. See 
http://www.a-c-a.org/whatwedo.html for examples.
United States of America – The Columbia River Estuarine Coastal Fund was established 
in 2004 through the collaboration of the Foundation, the Service and the US Attorneys 
for Oregon and the Western District of Washington from fines imposed on shipping 
companies that illegally discharged oily waste into the Pacific Ocean near the mouth of the 
Columbia River. Conservation and restoration projects will be funded with $1.2 million in 
community service payments from polluters. See http://www.nfwf.org
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necessarily directed towards fisheries and the EAF. The following guides are focused 
on conservation and protected areas funding sources. Very importantly, some of these 
guides provide detailed business planning for marine protected areas and other skills 
to assist fisheries managers in planning their financial needs assessments and donor 
funding requests. These guides can be used to enhance the innovation of stakeholders 
in collective or collaborative financing initiatives to diversify funding sources. Of 
particular interest may be private-public partnerships that appeal to both foundations 
and bilateral donors. Perhaps most critically, the guides can be used to suggest feasible 
options for self-financing and reducing dependence on external funds over the medium 
to long term.
 The major categories of international funding described in these guides are:
•	Bilateral & Multilateral donors
•	Biodiversity Enterprise Funds, 
•	Debt for nature/environment swaps, 
•	Environmental Funds, 
•	 the Global Environmental Facility, and 
•	Foundations. 
A sampling of financing guides available on-line include the following:
•	WWF Guides:
 (available at http://www.worldwildlife.org/conservationfinance/)
Financing Species Conservation
Financing Marine Conservation: A Menu of Options
Raising Revenues for Protected Areas
Center for Conservation Finance Business Plan
Conservation Finance e-Resources
•	Conservation Finance Alliance Guide (with a special focus on marine parks/
reserves):
http://www.conservationfinance.org/  
•	Debt for nature/environment swaps guide:
Debt Swaps for Sustainable Development - A Practical Guide for NGOs
http://biodiversityeconomics.org/finance/topics-42-00.htm
Institutions that can support dept swaps
http://www.undp.org/seed/unso/concepts&programs/pub-htm/swap-eng6.
htm
•	GEF funds guides:
The A-Z of the GEF - An NGO Guide to Participation in the GEF
http://www.gefweb.org/Partners/partners-Nongovernmental_Organ/ngo_
guide/ngo_guide.html
•	EU funds guide:
http://www.hbl.lv/engl/esfondi/fondi-zfi.php
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/fisheries/news_corner/corner_en.htm
Appendices 8.1 and 8.2 provide a first-glance look at the GEF and at “debt for 
nature” or “debt for environment” swaps. Boxes 18 and 19 include examples of the 
portfolio approaches to funding used for MPA and coastal resource management.
ConClusIons
Since EAF implies a broadening of attention in fisheries management beyond simply 
fish stocks and fishing fleets, to matters relating to aquatic ecosystems and related 
human systems, there is often an assumption that the costs of implementing EAF 
will be higher than under conventional management. While this is not necessarily the 
case, certainly there needs to be attention paid to financing the introduction of new 
approaches. This chapter has accordingly focused on how to make EAF feasible in 
terms of provision of financing from outside the fishery sector itself – complementing 
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BOx 18
Coastal resource management financing in the Philippines
Salamanca and Luna (2002) presented an historical perspective of coastal resource 
management (CRM) in the Philippines and discussed “the factors that are thought to 
have played crucial roles, the formal institutions that underpin its development, and the 
issues that need to be addressed for CRM to fully succeed.” Within this report and a 
related background article (Salamanca, 2003), the authors estimated the financial needs 
and sources of funding for 290 coastal resource management projects and activities from 
1974 to 2000. Over this period, approximately US$230 million were spent on activities 
undertaken to manage the coastal zone and its resources through various implementers 
(i.e. integrated, multisectoral, government-led, NGO-initiated, and fisherfolk-led) and 
various focuses (i.e., livelihood, education, research, advocacy, conservation, population, 
etc.). The authors estimated that approximately US$9 000 per km2 of coral reef was spent 
over the sixteen-year period to protect the nation’s 26 000 km2 of reefs.
While studying the financial investments, the authors also investigated the sources 
of funds and found that 63 percent of the funding came from 44 international sources 
(i.e. bilateral and multilateral sources, debt for nature swaps, the international NGO 
community, and international philanthropic organizations); 36 percent from the Filipino 
government, and one percent from local donors; thus, highlighting the importance of 
international sources of funding.
Sources: Salamanca and Luna (2002); Salamanca (2003)
BOx. 19
marine protected area costs and financing in the mediterranean
In 2006, the World Conservation Union (IUCN) Centre for Mediterranean Cooperation 
organized the Conference on Sustainable Funding of Protected Areas in the Mediterranean 
Region. A background document (Lopez Ornat and Jimenez-Cabellero, 2006) was 
prepared to estimate the costs necessary to “properly” manage marine protected areas 
in the Mediterranean, the available budgets across the region, the gaps in financing, and 
potential sources of funds.
Based on the budgets calculated for three marine national parks, four marine reserves, 
and three high seas fisheries reserves in the Mediterranean, the authors estimated that 
the costs required for protecting and managing high seas fisheries reserves would range 
from approximately US$1 to $12/hectare/year; while marine parks and reserves costs 
would range from $60 to $1 200/ha/yr. The wide ranges derive from differences in size, 
intensity of protection measures, surveillance and control needs, research activities, and 
management responsibilities. From these cost estimates, the authors estimated total costs 
for MPAs in the Mediterranean of approximately $200 million/year to over $600 million/
year; one-third of these costs to be borne by non-EU countries. The authors estimated 
that current public and international sources of funding in the non-EU countries cover 
only 15 percent of what would be needed to maintain MPAs in their countries.
The authors then proposed a funding strategy that would decrease reliance on 
governmental budgets and foundation; using international funds in the medium-term; and 
moving towards market-based funding (e.g. conservation subsidies, concessions and fees, 
and the tourism sector) in the long run.
Source: Lopez Ornat and Jimenez-Caballero (2006)
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the discussions earlier in this report on using incentives and institutions internally in 
the fishery to support EAF implementation. 
 The search for EAF financing from outside the fishery that is not only one-time 
but actually sustainable in nature, is clearly a daunting task. In reviewing the literature 
on the topic, and drawing on discussions of the Expert Consultation connected with 
this document, several issues appear, both with regard to the external funding of EAF 
activities (the focus of this chapter), and more broadly, the balance of incentive-based 
(internal), governmental, and external funding sources. The following are some of the 
issues arising:
•	Under what circumstances can EAF implementation be self-financing through 
suitable incentive arrangements? If there is remaining financing needed for EAF 
implementation, how should the balance of benefits and costs involved in EAF 
management be reflected in the balancing of sources for this financing?
•	 If external financing is needed, how do we ensure post-project sustainability once 
the funding ends? Is this really possible?
•	Will basing funding on incremental costs bias projects towards high-technology 
solutions over low-cost, indigenous solutions?
•	How can the environmentally-based projects that are part of EAF implementation 
properly address poverty issues and other human-oriented goals? 
•	Given imperfect monitoring and control, how can funds being spent be utilized 
most effectively? Will success indicators be incorporated automatically into 
projects to limit “donor fatigue”?
•	Since reducing pressure on the fishery resources is a common component of EAF 
implementation, and this implies a need to shift fishery inputs into other uses, are 
there enough alternative livelihood possibilities and eco-tourism to go around?
These issues reflect some of the key challenges of EAF management – from the 
distributional impacts, to use of appropriate technology and management schemes, 
to the links of fisheries to the broader socio-economic environment and alternative 
livelihoods. All of these need to be addressed on a case-by-case basis in order to make 
the implementation of EAF both feasible in the short term and sustainable in the long 
term.
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APPendIx 8.1
The global environmental facility and the eAf
The institutional structure of gef
A complete and up-to-date description of the GEF may be found at http://www.
gefweb.org/.
In brief, GEF is the financial mechanism for the implementation of four international 
conventions: the Convention on Biological Diversity; the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change; the United Nations Convention to Combat 
Desertification; and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. The 
GEF provides grants to pay for the incremental costs (i.e. those beyond status quo or 
“normal” activities) of implementing these conventions. 
The GEF structure follows a mix of the UN Assembly and World Bank Council 
formats. The Council comprises 32 member countries (generally representing blocks of 
members), meets twice a year, and is the main governing body, setting policy directions 
as well as approving any full-size projects. The Assembly is made up of every member 
states (176), meets four years, and sets the overall priorities of the Facility. The GEF 
Secretariat, inter alia, coordinates all projects and drafts the policies and strategies.
The Implementing Agencies (IA) (i.e. World Bank, UNDP, and UNEP) are 
responsible for creating project proposals and for managing GEF projects along with 
the Executing Agencies (e.g. FAO, ADB). Implementing Agencies have direct access 
to GEF funds (i.e. do not need to pass through another agency to have money), while 
the Executing Agencies (EA) are moving towards direct access arrangements (e.g. FAO 
has direct access to GEF project funds in restricted focal areas).
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are highly encouraged to participate in 
GEF activities and assist in the design, execution, and monitoring of projects, although 
there are certain complications vis-à-vis governments and the national Focal Points. 
The Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel (STAP) provides technical advice to 
the GEF and comprises, inter alia, a roster of experts who review full-size project 
proposals. This roster system is currently under review and may have impacts on 
fisheries-related projects, depending on the experts chosen to review projects. 
The Monitoring and Evaluation Unit is a detached unit within GEF that conducts 
evaluations of GEF projects. The last review of GEF itself was conducted by an 
independent external evaluation firm but the hope is that the M&E Unit would take over 
this role. The review concluded that some positive environmental impacts could be seen, 
linked to GEF projects; however, there remained coherency and cohesiveness problems 
across the portfolios and that there was a need for systematic reporting on indicators to 
monitor and evaluate GEF projects. The M&E Unit performs an annual review of GEF 
projects and noted that, on average, the project preparation process lasts three years. This 
lengthy time frame came up as a major concern repeatedly throughout the familiarization 
seminar. The GEF Secretariat hopes to improve this time frame in the future and promotes 
the use of small grants programme (http://sgp.undp.org/), the Development Marketplace 
Partnership programme, and the Small and Medium Enterprise Programme (http://www.
ifc.org/enviro/EFG/GEF-SME-Program/gef-sme-program.htm) to shorten the process 
(i.e. small sums involved and no Council approval needed).
The gef project cycles
The following is a graphic presentation of the GEF project cycles for full- and medium-
sized projects. The rectangles represent executing/implementing agency input and the 
circles represent GEF secretariat interventions. 
The Project Development Facility funds may be used in the development of a 
project concept document and include three size categories, leading to a range of 
project types:
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- Full-sized Projects (> US$1 million) 
- Medium-sized Projects (< US$1 million) 
- Enabling Activities under expedited procedures (varies but <US$500 000) 
- Small Grants Program (<US$50 000)
- Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Program. 
Incremental costs and co-financing
Incremental cost and co-financing of projects are integral to the idea of GEF; however, 
they may also be the most difficult to understand or estimate. The official definitions 
provided by GEF are the following:
Incremental cost - The additional cost that the GEF funds between the cost of an 
alternative project that a country would have implemented in the absence of global 
environmental concerns, and a project undertaken with global objectives in mind.
Co-financing - Non-GEF resources committed to a project. Sources of co-financing 
include implementing agencies, other bilateral or international funding agencies, 
recipient countries, NGOs, and the private sector.
It is well advised to review existing GEF project documents for examples relating to 
fisheries and the EAF. One example relating to incremental costs analysis from a GEF-
financed project on conservation and sustainable use of the Belize barrier reef complex 
and a spread-sheet example for co-financing calculations (UNEP budget sample) may 
be found at http://dgef.unep.org/kc/refmanuals/.
Advantages and disadvantages of gef funding
As is the case with all funding sources, planners should understand the pros and cons 
before investing in processes. The Conservation Finance Alliance Guide offers the 
following list for consideration:
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gef fisheries-related projects
Past, current, and pipeline fisheries- and aquatic resources- related projects mainly fall 
within the Biodiversity and International Waters focal areas of GEF. A list of GEF co-
funded projects relating to EAF is available through the GEF project database: http://
gefonline.org/home.cfm. Note that experiences may be gained from non-fisheries 
projects, such as those touching on community-based integrated terrestrial ecosystem 
management.
Advantages disadvantages
The GEF is an important source of large-scale grant 
funding.
Can take a long time (three years or more) and 
significant commitment of resources to secure 
funding, particularly for full-size projects.
The GEF structure, grant selection process, and 
portfolio is publicly accessible. Information on all 
past and present projects can be found on the GEF 
web site.
The diverse range of actors involved in the project 
cycle can make project approval a complex process.
The GEF seeks to “mainstream” global biodiversity 
concerns into the regular project portfolios of the 
three IAs.
Project proponents must learn to successfully 
negotiate complex project development procedures 
of IAs.
The GEF funds a wide variety of institutions, including 
governments, NGOs, and the private sector. In 
particular, the GEF has become an important source 
to support NGO-led conservation projects.
Only incremental costs related to realizing global 
biodiversity benefits are funded directly.
GEF has been the major funder of Conservation 
Trust Funds (see chapter on CTFs).
Short funding cycle limits potential to achieve 
financial sustainability.
GEF provides funding to support other innovative 
finance mechanisms, such as environmental 
investment funds, and is currently examining other 
innovative opportunities for deploying its capital.
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APPendIx 8.2
debt-for-nature swaps – how they work 
The following text is taken directly from Resor (1997). Another interesting article on 
debt-for-nature swaps and protected areas is Thapa and Sasidharan (2003).
A debt-for-nature swap involves purchasing foreign debt, converting that debt into 
local currency and using the proceeds to fund conservation activities. The key to the 
transaction lies in the willingness of commercial banks (or governments) to sell debt 
at less than the full value of the original loan. This seems counterintuitive: why would 
any lending institution holding a promissory note for US$1 million, for instance, be 
willing to part with it for just half that amount? The answer lies in the hard economic 
fact that many developing countries have not been able to repay their debts in full, and 
may never be able to do so. As a result, commercial banks may prefer to sell debts at a 
discount rather than wait for an uncertain repayment in the future. 
While no two debt-for-nature swaps are the same, they usually include the following 
steps: 
1.  An indebted country establishes general guidelines for a debt-for-nature 
programme and invites participation from conservation organizations. 
2.  An international conservation organization and local private and public 
organizations reach agreement on a conservation programme. 
3.  The participating conservation organizations verify that sufficient funding will 
exist for the debt purchase or that debt donations or partial forgiveness may be 
possible. 
4.  The partners request government approval for the swap, usually from the 
central bank and the Ministry of Finance, and often from the government 
ministry that has jurisdiction over the relevant sector where the proceeds will 
be used. 
5.  Specific terms of the swap are negotiated, including the exchange rate 
from foreign currency to local currency, the redemption rate and the local 
investment instrument. The purchase price depends on the secondary market 
price of the debt, which is determined by the market’s view of the credit 
history and repayment expectations for the particular country. The amount 
of conservation funds generated depends on the redemption rate, which is 
the percentage of the face value debt that is redeemed in local currency. The 
redemption rate is sometimes 100 percent of the face value debt, but it is often 
less depending on negotiations among the parties involved. The redemption 
rate must exceed the purchase price of the debt by a large enough margin to 
make the transaction worth while. 
6.  The debt is acquired and is presented to the central bank of the indebted 
country which cancels the debt and provides funds in local currency, either in 
the form of cash or bonds. 
7.  The conservation projects are implemented over the life of the agreed 
programme.
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9.  synthesis and final observations
summIng uP
In fisheries worldwide, the ecosystem approach has been increasingly accepted as a 
key “vehicle” for developing and improving fisheries management. Reflecting this 
direction, the FAO published in 2003 its Technical Guidelines on the Ecosystem 
Approach to Fisheries (EAF). Those guidelines, in defining what is meant by the EAF, 
focus on aspects within the ability of fisheries management bodies to implement, while 
recognizing the fisheries sector’s responsibility to collaborate in a broader multisectoral 
application of the EA. That definition lays out a bold vision for the EAF:
an ecosystem approach to fisheries (EAF) strives to balance diverse societal objectives, by taking 
account of the knowledge and uncertainties of biotic, abiotic and human components of ecosystems 
and their interactions and applying an integrated approach to fisheries within ecologically meaningful 
boundaries 
This makes clear that implementation of the EAF is a human pursuit, taking place 
in the context of societal and/or community objectives, which inherently reflect 
human aspirations and values. Thus to be successful in an EAF process, the social 
and economic forces at play need to be understood, the incentives and disincentives 
driving human behaviour need to be investigated, and actions need to be undertaken 
in terms of fishery governance and corresponding institutional arrangements. All 
this is needed so that management can induce outcomes in the fishery compatible 
with societal objectives, by managing a range of human interactions with the fishery 
ecosystem, whether technical, economic, social or institutional. Furthermore, an 
ecosystem approach, even if focusing on the fisheries sector, must deal to some extent 
with interactions with other uses of the aquatic environment; it is bound to lead into 
interactions with multiple sectors of human activity beyond the fishery. 
Indeed, adoption of EAF management will, on the one hand, ensure that we take 
into account impacts of the larger system (the ecosystem and relevant human elements) 
on fishery management, and at the same time, ensure that the broader consequences 
of management actions are assessed. The EAF deals with the “bigger picture” around 
fisheries, specifically to allow us to encompass relevant factors affecting and interacting 
with management from across the fishery system and beyond. EAF management (1) 
looks at managing target fish species and fishing activity within the context of the 
ecosystem, (2) looks at the fishery within a larger context of households, communities 
and the socio-economic environment and (3) considers fishery management in a 
broader institutional context of managing multiple resource uses. 
Given this, the need to understand the human components of the fishery system 
in implementing an ecosystem approach is clear, as humans are part of, depend on, 
and affect the ecosystem in which they live, work, and play. The challenge lies in 
implementation. 
This report has attempted to provide support in meeting that challenge, by building 
on the EAF Guidelines, providing a focus on the human dimensions (i.e. political, 
legal, cultural, social, economic and institutional aspects). Grounded in the belief that 
the application of the EAF must be holistic, integrated, participatory, and adaptive, the 
report has consolidated a range of available knowledge and experience relevant to EAF 
implementation, from social, economic and institutional viewpoints, and examined the 
manner by which these aspects can be practically incorporated, as well as highlighting 
the remaining gaps in both knowledge and implementation. The report has covered 
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a wide range of topics – indeed, seeking to provide an overview of as many major 
topics as possible, rather than a comprehensive treatment of any one topic, and yet 
we recognize that not all possible topics were dealt with here. Furthermore, no topic 
was dealt with fully, as we sought a widely-accessible level of discussion rather than a 
detailed state-of-the-art one. 
The first part of the report focused on the human context for an ecosystem approach 
to fisheries, with introductory and background material essential to understand prior 
to embarking on EAF initiatives. This began with coverage of key concepts and issues, 
discussion of social, economic and institutional considerations involved in EAF, and 
links of EAF to two other major approaches related to fisheries, namely the livelihoods 
approach and integrated management. This was followed by an exploration of the 
many values humans place on ecosystems, including the value of such ecosystem 
services to human well-being – socially, culturally and economically – and how an 
understanding of these values can help in implementing EAF. The final two chapters 
of Part I examined a series of policy, legal and institutional frameworks (such as the 
Millennium Development Goals, the precautionary approach and co-management 
approaches) as well as social and economic considerations (such as employment and 
livelihoods, poverty, food security, traditional knowledge and distributional aspects). 
Part II of the report moved into aspects related to facilitating the implementation 
of EAF. Initial steps include the setting of appropriate boundaries, scale and scope for 
EAF implementation, as well as assessing, a priori, the impacts resulting from EAF 
management in terms of potential benefits and costs, from social, economic, ecological 
and management perspectives. Relevant here are decision-making tools for assessing 
EAF, such as cost-benefit analysis, indicator frameworks and bio-economic models. 
For sustainable and effective EAF management, it is crucial to create and/or utilize 
incentive mechanisms and institutional arrangements for promoting, facilitating and 
funding the EAF; the report examined various forms of these – institutional, legal, 
financial and social incentives. Finally, in exploring the implementation of EAF, the 
matter of external (non-fisheries) financing was examined – through means such as 
“polluter pays” and external conservation financing, including debt-for-nature swaps.
Key AsPeCTs
In seeking to address the context, tools and methods relating to human dimensions of 
the EAF, this report has covered a great deal of ground. It would be impossible to sum 
up all the messages coming from this analysis, but the following are three key aspects 
one might keep in mind in moving forward with EAF implementation:
entry points 
Human dimensions – social, economic and institutional – can be simultaneously 
drivers, constraints, and/or supports for EAF implementation, and in addition, there 
can be social, economic and institutional impacts of that implementation. In other 
words, the human considerations crucial to the ecosystem approach to fisheries can be 
approached through four major “entry points”:
•	 social, economic and institutional factors are often driving forces, motivations 
behind the need for and the move to EAF management – drivers may be at any 
scale (from local to international), and could range from international treaty 
obligations, to crises and conflicts within the fisheries, to adoption of a future 
framework for achieving sustainable development;
•	 the potential costs and benefits to individuals and society of applying the EAF will 
have social, economic and management components, as well as ecological ones 
– and since there are many choices to be made in applying an EAF, there will be 
tradeoffs related to each alternative, so it is important to assess the benefits and 
costs of each option;
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•	 social, economic and institutional instruments are all useful in the application of 
EAF, and in particular these arise in terms of the institutions utilized within EAF 
management and the incentives that are created or drawn upon for EAF adoption; 
and
•	 social, economic and institutional factors can all play roles in supporting or 
constraining the implementation of EAF management – these can include power 
and governance structures, economic “push” and “pull” mechanisms driving 
fishing activities, sociocultural values and norms associated with fishing, and 
external contexts (e.g. global markets and political changes) that have an impact 
on fisheries. 
human realities
As noted at the beginning of this report, the EAF needs to incorporate the human (and 
ecosystem) considerations that have a clear interaction with fisheries management, i.e. 
which will typically need to be taken into account for effective fisheries management. 
To this end, three human-oriented realities must be taken into account in the 
implementation of an EAF: 
•	First, EAF must take place in the context of societal and/or community objectives, 
which inherently reflect human aspirations and values. 
•	Second, as EAF takes into account interactions between fisheries and ecosystems, 
this includes a wide range of complexities relating to human behaviour, human 
decision making, human use of resources, and so on. 
•	Third, implementing the EAF is a human pursuit, with implications in terms of 
the institutional arrangements that are needed, the social and economic forces at 
play, and the carrots (incentives) and sticks (e.g. penalties) that can induce actions 
compatible with societal objectives. 
The importance of policy, institutions and incentives
The ecosystem approach to fisheries can be operationalized at very concrete levels, 
such as measures to reduce bycatch or to reduce impacts of fisheries on the ocean 
habitat. These can be important and immediate measures to improve ecosystem health. 
At the same time, however, it is crucial to look at a broader picture in the fishery – at 
how policy is formulated, how institutions are functioning, and how incentives move 
the fishery in a desired or undesirable direction. 
Consideration of policy and institutional aspects highlight the need in EAF 
for structured decision-making processes, grounded in the accepted set of societal 
objectives, and governed by a suitable set of operating principles. Fishery objectives 
underlie the criteria for judging success, while principles influence the choices made 
of policy and management measures to best meet the stated objectives. These are 
drawn from many sources, such as national legislation, international conventions, and 
“approaches” including the precautionary approach and the ecosystem approach. 
In implementing the EAF, each jurisdiction or community must weigh its options 
and choose what is considered the best direction, to meet objectives in a manner 
compatible with principles. This effort will involve making trade-offs (e.g. between 
socio-cultural, ecological and economic objectives) and taking into account the 
possibilities for cooperation (or conflict) with other jurisdictions/communities. 
In considering EAF policy, it is important to note that this can be developed 
at multiple scales, from the international to the national, district or local scales. 
Governance must be “nested” across these various scales, as well as being linked across 
sectors, i.e. connecting the fishery to other components of aquatic use, recognizing that 
other national policies (beyond fisheries) also relate to ecosystems. 
With respect to institutions for EAF, these can be formal (e.g. governmental), 
informal (e.g. based on community cultural systems) or economic (e.g. markets). A 
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fundamental requirement is legitimacy of the institutions, notably whether they are 
seen to be fair and transparent, with suitable participation of those affected. In the 
latter regard, co-management and community-based management can be key policy 
directions, where appropriate. This leads into the key question of who is or should be 
involved in the EAF policy domain. There will likely be more players than is typically 
the case in conventional fisheries management, particularly when EAF examines 
aspects that cross sectoral lines. Indeed, there will eventually need to be linkages 
beyond fisheries to multisectoral institutions, to assess the impacts of interactions and 
cumulative impacts, while developing cohesive and integrated policy, e.g. in a context 
of integrated coastal and ocean management
Finally, with respect to incentives, the report has emphasized that these can come 
in many forms, from legal to social and cultural, to economic and financial. The key 
challenge is to create or reinforce incentives that shift human behaviour in a way that 
supports the goals of the EAF. To accomplish this, clearly one needs to know not 
only what instruments can be utilized, but also how people are likely to respond to 
those measures. In other words, it is not enough to simply promote incentives as a 
tool for EAF – one must understand both the tools available and the context of the 
fishery. There is no single answer to the question of incentives: for example, fishing 
use rights systems are often advocated as a means to provide suitable incentives, but 
many choices are to be made in this regard, such as those between individual rights or 
community rights, and between various co-management systems. One needs to assess 
the objectives, the principles being followed, and the context of the fishery and its 
broader environment, in order to make wise choices in this regard. 
InfoRmATIon needs foR deCIsIon-mAKIng
A major factor inhibiting the adoption and implementation of EAF management is 
a sense that the information requirements are simply too great for it to be feasible. 
After all, if an adoption of the ecosystem approach in a given fishery requires a deep 
understanding of the related ecosystem, how many fisheries around the world would be 
ready? In a data-sparse fishery, it might be argued that while the EAF may be suitable 
in better-studied or wealthier fisheries, it could not work in a fishery with a limited 
knowledge base. However, in the well-studied and heavily-managed fishery, it can still be 
felt that the knowledge of the ecosystem is insufficient for EAF implementation. In other 
words, every fishery might be considered lacking in information needed for the EAF. 
So how much and what kind of information is really required to implement and 
sustain EAF? It is important to recognize that the EAF is an “approach” not a set-in-
stone methodology that must be applied in an all-or-nothing manner. The “toolkit” 
described in this report, and the material found in the various fisheries management 
and EAF guidelines, can be utilized on any scale (e.g. from a local community fishery 
to a national or regional scale) and to any extent, from a small incremental move 
beyond conventional management through to a wide-ranging and comprehensive 
implementation. For example, a modest focus on dealing with bycatch issues, rather 
than all multispecies interactions, in a given fishery, or a pilot project to look at EAF 
management in a local bay, rather than a whole nation, both reflect less data-intensive 
and indeed less expensive means to progress on EAF management. 
Specifically in the case of developing countries, applications of the EAF that are low 
in data needs may be most appropriate. For example, instead of demanding extensive 
quantitative measurements of each relevant factor, it can be possible to work with 
checklists based on qualitative assessments. The more limited is the information base, 
the more important is the idea of a “risk analysis” that focuses, for example, not on 
calculating precise fish stock predictions, but rather on assessing the risks inherent in 
each scenario being considered. This is very much in the spirit of the precautionary 
approach: taking action on conservation decisions despite the uncertainties being faced, 
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and lacking the information that would be preferred. The question becomes: in the 
face of many uncertainties, and with various choices available in terms of management 
actions, what level of risk is society willing to accept, and what does this tell us about 
the management choice? 
Of course, over time, there will be a need for research within EAF management. 
This can be carried out with a multidisciplinary approach, to connect and integrate 
the analyses of the various scientists into a single management model, reconciling 
the various underlying assumptions, perspectives, and biases. Such an approach is 
preferred over having those studies independent of and divergent from one another, 
in which case there is a risk that managers will miss the overall message. To this end, a 
multidisciplinary team approach to research and analysis can be effective. For example, 
sociologists and anthropologists can identify the relevant groups in a community 
and their goals and objectives. Biologists can develop the stock dynamics affecting 
production. Economists can provide a framework for integrating these different results 
into a cohesive model. These and other necessary fields can be used to develop a single 
set of outcomes from an assessment of management alternatives.
ClosIng CommenTs
In recognizing that the EAF is indeed an “approach” rather than a strict recipe to 
be followed, and can be either costly or inexpensive depending on the extent of its 
implementation, it becomes clear that an ecosystem approach, to some extent, is 
indeed appropriate for adoption in every fishery. While some fisheries may embark on 
a major shift to EAF management, changing processes from data collection through 
to institutional design, in other fisheries (notably data-sparse small-scale fisheries), a 
low-cost EAF implementation that is less demanding of financial and human resources 
will be more suitable. The key point is that the EAF “way of thinking” can be adopted 
in all cases. 
What is crucial, however, is to realize that the various human dimensions – the 
social, economic and institutional aspects – will vary from fishery to fishery. While 
information on these may be limited, they need to be taken into account as much as 
possible, right from the start, so EAF implementation can proceed in a feasible and 
effective direction. Furthermore, on an ongoing basis, use of adaptive management and 
learning processes, to build and improve EAF over time, can allow EAF systems to 
adjust over time, as new experiences and new knowledge become available. 
It is worth noting in conclusion that there has been some progress in meeting the 
challenge of EAF implementation, both in terms of moving towards an improved 
understanding of social, economic and institutional aspects relating to fishery 
management (and EAF in particular), and in terms of developing tools and instruments 
to improve management by taking this understanding into account. As noted earlier, 
efforts of countries to address aspects of EAF have arisen in three main categories: 
•	 Issue-based technically-oriented actions, such as reducing bycatch, increasing gear 
selectivity, reducing harmful impacts of fishing gear, and protecting and restoring 
critical habitats;
•	 Implementation of institutional changes as part of national EAF measures, 
such as increasing stakeholder involvement in fisheries management, creating 
multidisciplinary and/or intersectoral advisory committees, and using community-
based management tools; and
•	Broadening national information systems to include factors such as ecosystem 
models, multidisciplinary information in risk assessments and cost-benefit 
analyses, local and/or traditional knowledge, and participatory information 
systems.
There is much still to be done globally to bring the human dimensions more fully 
into consideration in implementing EAF management. Nevertheless, there have 
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been many moves in this direction, and the momentum is building – with the clear 
recognition that a better understanding and incorporation of the “people side" is 
crucial to EAF implementation in fisheries worldwide.
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Annex
Process-oriented methodologies 
and information management 
tools for use in eAf 
implementation
Prepared by Patrick McConney with Merle Sowman, Cassandra De Young and 
Anthony Charles
This Annex describes some of the methods and tools commonly used to: 
•	 ensure that policy and planning processes run smoothly; 
•	 acquire the information that is needed for these processes.  
To assist the reader in determining what tools or methods could be used in developing or 
implementing various aspects of the EAF, we pose for each of them three questions: 
•	“What is the nature of the method or tool?” 
•	“Why is it important?” 
•	“How is it used in EAF?” 
The space here to answer these questions is limited. In each case there is a body of 
literature that provides background to the method or tool, describes appropriate use 
in greater detail and reviews application in various situations. Readers are advised to 
consult this literature for further information and guidance. 
This Annex is organized into two parts, on process-oriented and information 
gathering methodologies and tools. Within each of the two sections in this annex, the 
methods and tools are presented in alphabetical order. Some apply more to large-scale 
situations, such as a large marine ecosystem, while others are more appropriate for local 
or community levels. Many of them are interdisciplinary to lesser or greater extents, 
but some are more akin to generic skills than any particular academic discipline. 
It is tempting, but potentially misleading, to categorize them as low or high cost. 
Inexpensive methods may become costly when aggregated over large geographic 
areas, numbers of sampling units, or other factors of scale and scope. Several methods 
complement each other, such that they can operate in parallel, be nested within others 
or allow others to be nested within them. Readers are advised to determine the mix 
of methods and tools that fit the given context, including the capacity to use them 
successfully, rather than to seek a neat hierarchy or blueprint for selecting or applying 
them. 
The methods and tools presented in this Annex are not exhaustive. Additional 
methods and tools exist which may be equally appropriate in the many different 
situations in which EAF may be applied. The references and descriptions serve only as 
starting points for seeking the most appropriate from among the many options.
PRoCess meThodologIes
Process methodologies are the sets of skills and mechanisms used to efficiently and 
effectively implement policy, planning and management activities that involve groups 
of people interacting, often in decision-making. They provide structured approaches 
to reaching desired outcomes.
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Conflict management and negotiation
What is it?
The goal of conflict management is not to avoid conflict, but to apply skills that 
can help people to express their differences and solve their problems for win-win, 
or mutually beneficial, outcomes (McConney et al., 2003). Conflict management is 
facilitated negotiation that works best under the following conditions:
•	All the disputing parties are known 
•	Willingness to negotiate resolution
•	Reaching resolution is important for all
•	Parties trust conflict management method 
•	A mutually beneficial outcome is a possibility
•	Parties have authority to make deals
•	Funds, time and other resources are available
•	Resolution is desirable in the wider context
Why is it important?
Conflicts are almost inevitable in multistakeholder situations such as EAF, and they 
are not necessarily negative. They may cause more equitable power relationships to 
emerge, correct bad fisheries management practices or improve EAF policy. The issue 
is how to manage conflicts in order to reach (at least temporary) solutions in the most 
appropriate and least disruptive or harmful manner.
How is it used in EAF?
It is useful at many points in policy and planning cycles, and management as well, 
to reduce the actual or potential levels of conflict amongst diverse stakeholders 
so that decision processes can be more positive and productive. Being social 
interactions, conflicts have many dimensions that should be properly understood 
before interventions are made, and this necessitates human dimensions research. Often 
there will be more than one source of conflict. Correct identification of the nature of 
the source of the conflict requires getting past the symptoms until the root cause(s) are 
reached. Potential sources of conflict include:
•	Relationships – values, beliefs, prejudices, past injustices, poor communication
•	 Information – poor quality information, misinformation, differing 
interpretations
•	 Interests – perceived or actual; substantive/physical or intangible/perceptual
•	Structures – institutions, authority, resource flows, time constraints, financing
There are several stages in conflict management. The following apply to most 
methods:
•	 Initiation – a stakeholder or outsider invites help to manage the conflict
•	Preparation – conflict analysis, information sharing, rules, participant selection
•	Negotiation – articulating interests and win-win options, packaging desired 
options 
•	Agreement – concluding jointly on best option package, recording final decisions
•	 Implementation – publicizing outcomes, signed agreement (optional), 
monitoring
In the highly technical situations common in EAF negotiations, there may be 
serious disparities in the capacities of stakeholder groups to interpret and use the 
information provided. In such situations it may be necessary, as part of the process, 
to allocate specialist expertise to groups in need. Mutually beneficial outcomes can 
usually only be realised if participants progress from negotiating on the basis of 
positions to negotiating in keeping with their underlying interests (Fisher et al., 1981). 
Positions may change, but interests are likely to remain the same, or be modified upon 
understanding the interests of the other side(s).
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Consensus building
What is it?
Closely related to conflict management, consensus building is the term used for a 
number of collaborative decision-making techniques in which a facilitator or mediator 
assists diverse or competing interest groups to agree on contentious policy issues, 
management objectives, or other matters for which consensus rather than majority 
decisions are being pursued. Visioning and collaborative problem solving are examples 
of consensus processes (Susskind et al., 1999). Consensus building tends to be a fairly 
informal, but structured, process for discussing issues and sharing perspectives while 
respecting interests and seeking ways of working together for mutual benefit.
Why is it important?
Similar to conflict management, consensus building plays an important role in helping 
decision processes to be more positive and productive. It can be employed prior to a 
conflict developing and hence reducing the need for conflict management. It is often 
essential to reach consensus rather than a majority decision when the dissenters have 
the power to thwart the decision that they disagree with, or to instigate and fuel levels 
of conflict that de-rail the process.
How is it used in EAF?
In EAF, consensus building is especially important at the levels of policy goals and 
plan objectives where reaching harmonious agreement on big issues paves the way 
for subsidiary agreements on numerous smaller technical and institutional issues. For 
example, an agreement on how agricultural and fisheries development should mesh 
with tourism may set the stage for comprehensive watershed and coastal management 
encompassing both terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems. Without consensus at a higher 
policy level on how these economic sectors are either related or integrated, using and 
interpreting sectoral performance indicators could be difficult. 
delphi method
What is it?
The city of Delphi was where people came to consult the oracle housed in Apollo’s 
temple who forecasted the future. The purpose of the Delphi technique is to elicit 
information and judgments from a group to facilitate problem-solving, forecasting, 
planning, and decision-making (Neuman, 1994). It often involves paneling a group of 
experts on a particular topic to determine consensus on an issue. This method is used 
both for information acquisition and in process.
Why is it important?
There are many variations of the Delphi method, and while some can be used in 
face-to-face meetings, most seek to avoid physically assembling the experts. Instead, 
information is exchanged via email these days. This takes advantage of experts’ 
creativity while facilitating group involvement and interaction. Delphi is designed to 
reap the benefits, but reduce the liabilities, of group problem-solving. This is important 
in EAF because ordinary meetings of diverse experts with different disciplinary 
backgrounds and academic or professional status can be difficult to manage even with 
a facilitator. Such meetings are expensive to organize if the experts reside in different 
corners of the world. 
How is it used in EAF?
The Delphi technique can be used in the EAF to overcome many of the constraints 
associated with getting the best available scientific advice in the most cost-effective 
and efficient manner (Landeta, 2006). If, for example, expert opinion were required on 
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some aspect of ecosystem interactions at a particular site, a panel of carefully selected 
experts would be assigned to answer a series of questionnaires in which the questions 
are usually formulated as hypotheses or propositions. Each round of questioning 
is followed with the feedback on the preceding round of replies, usually presented 
anonymously. Thus the experts are encouraged to revise their earlier answers in light of 
the replies of other members of the group. During this process the range of the answers 
will normally decrease, and the group will converge towards consensus. After three or 
four rounds the process is usually complete and the median scores determine the final 
outcome that reflects the best available advice from the group. Software is available to 
support the Delphi technique. It can be used at several points in policy, planning and 
management cycles.
facilitation
What is it?
As a critical supporting skill in SEI research with human subjects, facilitation helps 
exchanges, meetings or decision-making to run smoothly and reach desirable ends. 
Facilitation, by itself, does not mean problem-solving. The role of the facilitator is not 
to control a group or make the final decision on anything. The facilitator is trained 
to be responsible for ensuring that group processes are inclusive, productive, and 
effective. 
Why is it important?
Many of the policy and management planning processes in EAF involve groups of 
diverse stakeholders trying to resolve conflicts or reach decisions. It is useful to have 
a trained facilitator guide participants, and so reduce claims of lack of objectivity or 
transparency (McConney et al., 2003). The facilitator should have a feel for the social, 
cultural and institutional landscape, and possess the skills to work with diverse groups 
of stakeholders and under sometimes very difficult circumstances, such as when there 
is conflict. The skills and abilities are different to those of a chairman. 
How is it used in EAF?
It is used in all processes, such as a group of resource users, fishery and coastal 
managers, interests from outside the fisheries sector and environmental NGOs trying 
to decide upon management or policy objectives at a national workshop. However, 
facilitation skills are also useful on the beach with a group of fishers in the midst of an 
argument with watersports operators about the use of coastal areas. The opportunities 
for use in EAF are numerous given the several groups involved. It is important to have 
a trained facilitator, who: 
•	Distinguishes process from content 
•	Manages the client relationship 
•	Prepares thoroughly for planning
•	Uses time and space intentionally 
•	Evokes participation and creativity 
•	Maintains objectivity at all times
•	Reads underlying group dynamics 
•	Releases blocks to the process 
•	Adapts to the changing situation 
•	Shares responsibility for process 
•	Demonstrates professionalism 
•	Shows confidence and authenticity 
•	Maintains personal integrity
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visioning
What is it?
Visioning is a group exercise, often used in the initial stages of strategic planning and 
other goal-oriented processes, to define and communicate to create a sense of shared 
ownership a desirable future. 
Why is it important?
It is important for stakeholders to actually see the end point of their efforts and 
not only a path that may lead to it. The more stakeholders there are, the more 
important it is to share a vision early in the process.
How is it used in EAF?
Visioning provides a frame or reference for strategizing the outcome that EAF 
stakeholders want to achieve. Vividly describing and then agreeing upon the con-
ditions of the future as if they could be seen in the present, makes easier to devise 
the path (through mission, goals, objectives, activities and tasks). 
InfoRmATIon ACQuIsITIon And dIssemInATIon
Information acquisition covers a variety of means of collecting and converting data 
into information. It is often the first step in policy and planning processes such as 
those described above. Information dissemination or communication is a similarly 
multifaceted term used to describe means of communication to diverse audiences, often 
by several channels, pathways and products (FAO, 2006b). Some agencies go a step 
further beyond outputs to address information uptake and knowledge mobilization 
such as to produce management or policy outcomes.
Asset mapping
What is it?
An asset map is typically an inventory of the features and relationships of a community 
as perceived by the people in that community (Guy et al., 2002). Mapping assets 
involves: 
•	 collecting an inventory of positive aspects of a community 
•	 ranking aspects of the community valued the most by members
•	determining why people place high value on certain assets in the community
Why is it important?
Asset mapping provides a shared community view of what are the important assets of 
the entire community, highlighting interconnections among assets and revealing how to 
access those assets such as for use in livelihood or coping or community development 
strategies. 
How is it used in EAF?
An asset map can be used to devise collaborative strategize about how to build on assets 
in order to sustain and enhance community development. The process is often one of 
empowerment and reveals the relationships that communities have with ecosystems.
brainstorming
What is it?
Brainstorming is process for creatively generating many alternative ideas or solutions 
for a specific topic or problem. It can be used by individuals, but is often a group 
process. After ideas are generated they are often categorized, discussed and prioritized 
for further analysis.
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Why is it important?
Good brainstorming exercises can produce very innovative ideas or solutions. It is an 
equitable method in that any person can participate. Criticism is not allowed during 
brainstorming and this free flowing participation can also be useful for building 
teamwork.
How is it used in EAF?
Employed mainly in planning processes, brainstorming can quickly generate a series 
of objectives and activities for closer examination afterwards. If the stakeholders are 
diverse the mix of ideas can be quite varied. The best ideas, “outside of the box”, may 
come from those who are not experts.
Communication strategy
What is it?
A communication strategy is a summary framework that sets out, often in a matrix 
or table, the key elements and relationships of any initiative to share information to 
achieve expected outcomes. Elements typically include target audiences, objectives, key 
messages, products and pathways with appropriate budgets.
Why is it important?
Unless a strategy is devised, it is likely that simply disseminating information (such 
as in technical reports or scientific articles) will result in key audiences (e.g. policy-
makers, resource users) being overlooked or not communicated with effectively. It is 
important to ensure that key stakeholder groups are kept informed of progress and 
problems with the EAF.
How is it used in EAF?
Especially during the early introduction of an EAF it will be necessary to keep all 
stakeholders well informed, and information will need to be packaged in different ways 
to meet the needs of different audiences. Using a communication strategy will assist in 
clearly setting out who needs what information in what form, and facilitate budgeting 
for it rather than leaving communication as an afterthought. Monitoring and evaluating 
communication outcomes can be part of a participatory strategy to keep stakeholders 
involved. 
focus groups
What is it?
Focus groups are an interactive form of group interviewing. Group interviewing 
involves interviewing a number of people at the same time, the emphasis being on 
questions and responses between the researcher and participants. Focus groups 
however rely on interaction within the group based on topics that are supplied by the 
researcher (Morgan, 1997).
Why is it important?
The focus group is important in providing a means of collecting data that more closely 
resembles daily interactive conversation and information sharing than the standard 
individual interview, especially in some cultures. Often a focus group may be the best 
way to solicit information when, for a variety of reasons, respondents may be reluctant 
to participate in individual surveys. Unlike the latter or simple group interviews, 
focus groups encourage the respondents to react to each other, share knowledge, trade 
opinions and so on, all without the obligation to reach a group decision or consensus. 
Annex 147
How is it used in EAF?
In EAF it may be useful to have a variety of stakeholders that meet the basic focus 
group criteria for respondent selection gather to answer questions concerning, for 
example, the multiple uses of a particular reef or estuary. They may have very different 
views that will be revealed in the focus group session without the need for a “correct” 
answer or to achieve consensus.
Institutional analysis
What is it?
Institutional analysis is the investigation of how formal and informal social rules 
(institutions) shape human behaviour. Institutional analyses focus on how individuals 
and groups construct institutions, how institutions operate by patterns of interaction, 
how they are linked and the outcomes generated by institutions. As an example 
of institutional analysis the International Centre for Living Aquatic Resources 
Management (ICLARM) and Institute for Fisheries Management and Coastal 
Community Development (IFM) (ICLARM and IFM, 1998) developed a methodology 
for institutional analysis that has been employed particularly for research into co-
management arrangements and conditions for success (Figure Annex 1). 
The set of contextual variables shown on the left describe the fishery system that, 
influenced by external factors, results in incentives for fishery actors to interact or not 
in various patterns that have observable outcomes which feedback into the system that 
is constantly adapting. 
Why is it important?
Without institutional analysis a clear understanding of the complex interactions 
and relationships among the actors in fisheries is not likely to be achieved. This 
understanding is even more important as EAF encompasses a greater number of actors 
including those in other sectors. 
How is it used in EAF?
It is used in EAF to determine what institutions are involved in policy, planning and 
implementation within the contexts of the key attributes of the fishery system. It 
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allows interventions to be designed, monitored and evaluated in a systematic fashion 
that facilitates learning and adaptation. The main aspects of institutional analysis 
conducted within the framework introduced above for investigating co-management 
are as follows (ICLARM and IFM, 1998). 
•	 Institutional arrangements analysis: This links the contextual variables that 
characterize key attributes of the resource and the resource users with management 
institutions (fishery rights and rules). These arrangements and contexts affect how 
resource users and fisheries authorities use incentives and penalties to coordinate 
and cooperate in resource governance, management and use. Incentives influence 
the patterns of interaction and behaviour of the co-management partners, i.e. the 
type of co-management arrangement and how it functions.
•	Co-management performance analysis: The co-management produces outcomes 
that feedback to impact upon contexts and the behaviour of all stakeholders 
including fisheries authorities. Contexts that change over time may change 
institutional arrangements. These affect incentives, patterns of interaction and 
outcomes. Co-management outcomes can be evaluated in terms of management 
efficiency, and the equity and sustainability of resource utilization. Analysing 
successful outcomes is particularly useful for learning and adapting.
Participatory monitoring and evaluation
What is it?
Participatory monitoring and evaluation (PM&E) involves the assessment of change 
throughout processes that involve many people or groups, each of whom is affecting 
or affected by the impacts being assessed. Negotiation leads to agreement on how 
progress should be measured and the findings acted upon. It is a challenging process 
for all concerned as different stakeholders must examine their assumptions about what 
constitutes progress – and together deal with the contradictions and conflicts that can 
emerge (Guijt , 1999).
Why is it important?
It promotes transparency and accountability while ensuring that the stakeholders and 
beneficiaries are fully engaged in the initiative. Where there are significant differences 
in the perspectives or backgrounds of participants it allows for information exchange 
focused on assessment in a way that may, by its objectivity, facilitate consensus 
building. 
How is it used in EAF?
Within the policy and planning cycles PM&E can be used throughout implementation 
or at particular milestones to assess progress particularly prior to taking decisions on 
adaptive management action. It is one of the methods that fosters institutional and 
social learning and can contribute towards stakeholder empowerment.
Poverty assessment
What is it?
Poverty assessment encompasses a diverse suite of tools used to measure the complex 
multidimensional attributed of the state of relative deprivation defined in various ways 
as poverty with reference to a standard such as the “poverty line”. The assessment 
tools address matters of income, nutrition, health, power, services and other aspects 
of quality of life, with areas of emphasis and approach (e.g. participatory or not) often 
depending on the method, purpose and agency doing the assessment.
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Why is it important?
Poverty assessments have become particularly in the context of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and the relationships between poverty and ecosystems 
described in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA). 
How is it used in EAF?
In an EAF poverty assessments can facilitate the development of pro-poor policies and 
measures that help to alleviate poverty. They elucidate the conditions and underpinnings 
of poverty associated with particular ecosystems, locations and sectors of society. The 
poor or aspects of poverty may be overlooked in conventional fisheries management 
or approaches that do not encompass the human dimensions.
Rapid and participatory rural appraisals
What is it?
Rapid rural appraisal (RRA) emphasizes the importance of learning rapidly and 
directly from people. RRA involves tapping local knowledge and gaining information 
and insight from local people using a range of interactive tools and methods (Jackson 
and Ingles, 1995). Participatory rural appraisal (PRA) involves field workers learning 
with local people with the aim of facilitating local capacity to analyse, plan, resolve 
conflicts, take action and monitor and evaluate according to a local agenda. 
Why is it important?
RRA is regarded as a set of guidelines and tools which can be used in many different 
ways and many different circumstances and without necessarily attempting to change 
political and social structures. PRA is the specific use of RRA approaches and tools to 
encourage participation in decision-making and planning by people who are usually 
excluded from these processes. RRA is a useful technique for data gathering and 
problem identification, whereas PRA is more appropriate to programme design and 
planning. The distinction is not merely one of proper sequencing. If not used correctly, 
PRA can generate false expectations of what the programme will provide or what local 
people can achieve. This can cause problems in the relationship between the community 
members and the programme staff which can threaten success. Both approaches are 
carried out by multidisciplinary teams and differ from conventional information-
gathering approaches in that field workers work with and learn directly from local 
people. The methods involve a minimum of outsider interference or involvement 
(Pomeroy. and Rivera-Guieb, 2005). Several have been specially adapted for coastal and 
fisheries applications (Bay of Bengal Programme, 1993; Pido et al., 1996).
How is it used in EAF?
RRA can be especially useful in the early stages of scoping or introducing EAF when 
it is critical to quickly get information on the people in an area or industry. The RRA 
toolbox is broad, varied and constantly growing. The tool is chosen for a specific 
objective, context and conditions and should reflect “personal” tools of the user 
(Townsley, 1996). In a broad categorization, RRA tools include:
•	 secondary data reviews;
•	workshops;
•	 structured observations;
•	 ranking and classifications;
•	 interviews;
•	 community meetings;
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•	mapping techniques;
•	diagrams and graphics; and
•	understanding processes and change.
Risk and vulnerability assessment
What is it?
Risk assessment is the term used to describe either a process or a product (of risk 
analysis), used in risk management. Risk assessment essentially determines whether the 
probability of a particular hazard, in relation to the severity of its impact, is considered 
acceptable or not when compared to some standard or benchmark. It is employed to 
guide decision-making. When the emphasis is on vulnerability as a special attribute of 
risk it is termed vulnerability assessment.
Why is it important?
Risk is a complex concept with a large perceptual component. It is important to 
systematically assess risk, usually quantitatively but also qualitatively, so as to remove 
some of the subjectivity found in the casual estimations of risk that people routinely 
make. Vulnerability, the flip-side of resilience, is important for noting the weakest links 
(those even more at risk) in a chain or system.
How is it used in EAF?
Decisions that utilize, or can benefit from, risk and vulnerability assessment occur at 
all levels of policy and planning in an EAF. These assessments, used at the policy level, 
can assist in selecting policies that have the least problematic impacts on the poor or 
women, for example. 
social mapping
What is it?
Social mapping is a visualization technique closely related to stakeholder analysis 
and cognitive mapping. It allows stakeholders to draw maps illustrating their 
interrelationships and their relationships to natural resources or other features of a 
particular location.
Why is it important?
The importance of social mapping, like many other visualization tools, lies in the 
ability to elicit information from stakeholders in a format that is easily understood and 
shared. This can serve as the basis for fruitful discussions and decision-making. 
How is it used in EAF?
When different stakeholder groups (e.g. fishers and hoteliers), or people with different 
attributes within the same group (e.g. men and women) in an EAF each produce a 
social map their outputs can be compared in workshop sessions to determine and 
discuss reasons for similarities and differences. Since social maps reflect perceptions, 
attitudes, beliefs and values the information shared can assist the various parties to 
understand each other better and assist researchers or planners to take these differences 
into account in their work. 
stakeholder analysis
What is it?
Stakeholder analysis helps to systematically determine who needs to be a partner 
in the management arrangement, and whose interests are too remote to make this 
necessary. In doing this it also examines power, conflict, relative incentives and other 
relationships. 
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Why is it important?
The importance of stakeholder analysis lies mainly in its ability to ensure that the many 
actors in an EAF are properly identified and characterized in terms of their interests 
in the particular circumstance and some of their interactions that relate especially to 
power. Without stakeholder analysis being done at the start of the policy and planning 
cycles it is likely that critical actors will be omitted from the processes and that this will 
lead eventually to problems with the EAF. It is an important analytical tool that also 
helps to promote transparency.
How is it used in EAF?
There is no single best method of stakeholder analysis. Situation-specific common sense 
must be applied. Special care must be taken to ensure that voiceless and disadvantaged 
groups that may include women, youth, the elderly and poor people, are not excluded 
from the analysis. Multiple group memberships are common, especially in small 
communities. In such cases it will be necessary to be certain “who is speaking” at any 
given time (McConney et al., 2003). Stakeholder analysis poses questions such as: 
•	Who is directly affected by the problem situation being addressed? 
•	What are the interests of various groups in relation to the problem? 
•	How do groups perceive the management problem to affect them? 
•	What resources do groups bring to bear (for good or bad) on the problem? 
•	What organizational or institutional responsibilities do the groups have? 
•	Who should benefit, or be protected from, management interventions? 
•	What conflicts may groups have with each other and management strategies? 
•	What management activities may satisfy the interests of the various groups?
survey methods
What is it?
Survey research is the collective term for a large variety of measurement methods in 
applied social research that involve asking questions of respondents, often combined 
with making observations (Converse and Presser, 1986). A survey method can range 
from a brief informal interview yielding purely qualitative data to an intensive in-
depth questionnaire that is highly quantitative in content and analysis. There are 
methods for the scientifically rigorous treatment of both types of data. In addition, a 
survey can elicit information from the entire population of interest or may be based 
on samples, the costs of which will depend on the population of interest and other 
factors. 
Why is it important?
Surveys present opportunities to elicit a great variety of data and information 
from respondents that provide insight useful for problem-solving and decision-
making. Different groups of people can be compared and contrasted over a range of 
conceptually relevant variables often as part of hypothesis testing. Since managers 
involved in EAF will almost inevitable come across survey results, even from other 
sectors, it is important that they understand the benefits and limitations of surveys, 
when they should or should not be used, and how they can be abused. 
How is it used in EAF?
In EAF, surveys are often part of larger methodologies, such as socio-economic 
monitoring and economic valuation. They can be part of any investigation in which 
the views of people or learning about their attributes are useful (Villareal et al., 2004). 
This can start with basic demographic and socio-economic data available from national 
population and housing census surveys that tell how many people reside in or use 
the area in which EAF will be introduced, and what their characteristics are. This 
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information can be used to design the policy and planning processes to ensure that all 
relevant aspects of the human dimension are addressed.
Transect diagram and walk
What is it?
A transect diagram is a cross-section illustration of an area such as on a line running 
from the nearshore to some distance inland. Bio-physical, infrastructure and socio-
economic features are inserted to show the social-ecological characteristics of that 
section. A walk along the transect can be used to either construct or validate it, or 
both.
Why is it important?
It is a useful low cost method for gathering and sharing information in which all 
stakeholders can participate. 
How is it used in EAF?
Transects of various parts of coastline can be used to enhance learning about 
ecosystems. If digital photographs or measurements are taken, the transects can be used 
in monitoring trends similar to ecological sampling stations. In this case the samples 
can be of human activity. The walks can be used for both information acquisition and 
dissemination while planning in a participatory manner.
workshop methods
What is it?
Workshop method is the collective term for a suite of ways in which to get a group 
of people, normally with the assistance of a facilitator, to participate actively and 
effectively in tasks such as visioning, strategic planning, problem-solving, reaching 
consensus or other desirable end points. 
Why is it important?
The event of “holding a workshop” should have associated with it a structured 
methodology to reach a pre-determined end point. Even brainstorming is structured to 
provide the latitude for creativity. It is not an unstructured process without rules. Hence 
it is important for fisheries manager to be familiar with various workshop methods and 
the extent to which they can meet the requirements of the EAF processes.
How is it used in EAF?
Workshops may occur in many parts of the EAF policy and planning cycles. For 
example, a visioning workshop may be held at the start of the policy and planning 
cycles to construct a shared perspective on what a variety of stakeholders see being 
put in place as a result of the implementation of EAF. Workshops are also an efficient 
way of sharing information with stakeholders as well as maintaining buy-in/interest 
throughout the EAF process.

